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ABSTRACT 
This study investigates the management of cross border acquisitions (CBAs) and their performance. 
Specifically, the study examines the motives, the determinants of top management retention, the 
pre-acquisition management process, and the impact of post- acquisition management on cross 
border acquisition performance using data from a sample of CBAs made by UK firms. 
Analysis of the cross border acquisition types shows that UK firms mostly acquired 
privately managed profitable SMEs operating in the same industry that have a friendly attitude 
towards the deal. UK firms tend to adopt a preservation type integration strategy in which top 
management were retained and top managers were frequently communicated with informally during 
the integration process. The findings revealed that a high percentage of acquisitions were 
considered successful by the management of the acquiring firm. The analysis reveals that CBAs are 
seen primarily as a means to enable a presence in new markets, to enable faster entry to the market, 
to facilitate international expansion, and to gain new capabilities. 
The findings indicate that thorough evaluation of the strategic and cultural fit and, 
employee and business capability during the pre-acquisition phase improves the chances of 
acquisition success. The findings suggest that apart from understanding national and corporate 
cultural issues, experienced acquiring firms and inexperienced acquiring firms face similar levels of 
pre-acquisition problems. The analysis reveals that post-acquisition autonomy and the acquirer's 
commitment to the acquired firm significantly affects top management retention while financial 
incentives do not. The findings suggest that knowledge transfer and level of integration are 
significant positive determinants of CBA performance. 
This study makes a contribution by providing an analysis of the types of cross border 
acquisitions undertaken by the UK firms during the current takeover boom, the process undertaken 
in their management and the outcomes achieved. The study also contributes to the existing literature 
by examining the impact of the evaluation of the target firm on acqnisition performance which has 
rarely been attempted before. A further contribution is the investigation of the determinants of top 
management retention by applying both the theory of relative standing and the financial incentive 
mechanism of retention. A significant contribution is that the study provides an empirical 
examination of the effect of knowledge transfer on the success of cross border acquisition 
performance. 
From the perspective of management practice, this study provides managers with an 
indication of where to pay particular attention when selecting a target firm. In addition, this study 
provides managers with an indication of whcre to focus their efforts and expend resources in order 
to retain valuable human capital during cross border acquisition integration. The study shows the 
importance of selecting the appropriate level of integration to achieve positive acquisition 
outcomes. A critical insight of importance to managers is the finding that knowledge transfer can 
facilitate the attainment of acquisition success. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 BACKGROUND 
Cross border mergers and acquisitions (M&As) are playing a progressively more important 
role in worldwide M&A activity both in terms of deal numbers and values (Bertrand and 
Zuniga, 2006). A significant increase in the number of high value cross-border deals was 
observed in the 1990s with a considerable participation of European firms (Sleuwaegen and 
Valentini, 2006). Recent estimates of announced global M&A activity range from US$3.5 
trillion to a little over US$4 trillion. In 2006, Dealogic estimated the total value of M&A 
transaction to be US$4.06 trillion and Thomson Financial has estimated the level of 
announced M&A deals at US$3.8 trillion (Economic Outlook, 2007). 
In parallel to this rise in activity, there has been increasing recognition of the poor 
performance of many cross border M&As. For example, Rostand (1994) reports that about 
half of the cross border acquisitions fall short of meeting their initial strategic objectives. 
Moreover, Datta and Puia (1995) fmd that on average cross border acquisitions destroy 
value for acquiring firm shareholders. A study by KPMG found that only 17% of cross 
border acquisitions created shareholder value, while 53% destroyed it (The Economist, 
1999). Moreover, cross border M&As are widely perceived as higher risk compared to their 
domestic counterparts. Aw and Chatterjee (2004) reported that cumulative abnormal returns 
for acquiring firms were significantly more negative for European cross border targets than 
in the case of domestic UK targets. 
These findings raise the fascinating questions of what makes M&As so challenging 
and moreover, how do the firms manage their cross border acquisitions? This study is 
primarily concerned with the latter question. Specifically, how do the firms manage their 
cross border acquisitions in order to create value or improve performance? Given the 
increasing number of cross border acquisitions and their growing importance in the global 
market, a better understanding of the pre- and post-acquisition management issues is 
required. 
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1.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The difficulty of making M&As succeed has been traced back to an inadequate strategic 
rationale and a lack of pre-acquisition evaluation as well as the inappropriate management 
of the post-acquisition integration (Jemison and Sitkin, 1986a; Datta, 1991; Haspeslagh and 
Jemison, 1991; Schweiger et al., 1994; Morosini, 1998; Schweiger and Goulet, 2000; Ranft 
and Lord, 2002). 
A number of studies have touched the issue of integration (Haspcslagh and Jemison, 
1991; Norburn and Schoenberg, 1994; Morosini and Singh, 1994). However, based on their 
extensive review of extant research, Schweiger and Goulet (2000) argue that there is a need 
for improved understanding of "managing the post acquisition integration process". In 
particular these researchers regret the lack of an empirical research relationship between the 
pre and post acquisition phases to the successful outcome ofM&As. 
These concerns would seem to be particularly salient in the context of cross border 
M&As that present thc challenge of differing country contexts in addition to the traditional 
burden of post-acquisition organizational integration. Surprisingly, cross border M&As 
have received scant research attention as compared to domestic ones (Olie, 1994; Shimizu, 
et al., 2004; Quah and Young, 2005). More specifically, while cross border mergers have 
been studied (Olie, 1990; Olie, 1994; Zahecr et al., 2003), cross border acquisitions remain 
an under-studied phenomenon (Shimizu, et al., 2004; Quah and Young, 2005). This is all 
the more important given that most so-called 'M&As' are in practice acquisitions, not 
mergers (UNCT AD 2000 quoted by Buckley and Ghauri, 2002; Zaheer et al. 2003). This 
study aims to contribute to M&A and international business research by addressing these 
gaps in the context of cross border acquisitions. 
1.3 RESEARCH RATIONALE 
To select a suitable M&A target requires a thorough due diligence. The process has some 
similarity with the due diligence for domestic M&As, however, the process is complicated 
by several elements (such as different institutional environments, cultures) that appear even 
more crucial in cross border acquisitions (Kissin and Herrera, 1990). Despite the 
significance of this process, relatively few studies have focused on the due diligence 
involved in cross border acquisitions (Shimizu, et aI., 2004). Moreover, there is little prior 
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research examining the impact of the pre-acquisition management process on acquisition 
success. This study intends to examine the relationship between pre-acquisition 
management issues and acquisition performance. 
In reality both the purpose and nature of the M&A selection and negotiation process 
is extremely complex (Shimizu, et al., 2004). Managers face difficulties in analyzing 
strategic and organizational fit as they are prevented from understanding these factors by a 
series of problems inherent in the process of analyzing and negotiating with the target firm. 
Negotiating a cross border M&A is difficult because of lack of information and the 
difference in cultures (Buckley and Ghauri, 2002). Therefore, more research is needed to 
unpack the complexities of the due diligence and negotiation process in the context of cross 
border M&As. 
In order to explain the departure of top management teams, existing literature has 
used the relative standing theory (e.g. Cannella and Hambrick, 1993) or market for 
corporate control theories (Walsh and Ellwood, 1991). Relatively few studies have 
investigated the determinants of top management retention by applying both the theory of 
relative standing and the fmancial incentives mechanism of retention. Therefore, more 
research is needed to explore the determinants of top management retention by applying 
both relative standing theory and the fmancial incentive mechanism of retention in the 
context of cross bordcr acquisitions. 
A number of post-acquisition integration issues influences the success of acquisition 
such as degree of integration, organizational cultural differences, knowledge transfer. The 
extent to which an acquiring firm attempts to integrate the acquired firm has significant 
implications for acquisition performance. Child et al. (2001) argued that the degree of 
integration achieved following a cross border acquisition is crucial because an improper 
level of integration might be detrimental to acquisition performance. However, prior 
empirical work on this matter is limited and has not yielded defmitive results. Datta and 
Grant (1990), for example, did not fmd a statistically significant relationship between 
acquisition performance and the level of integration for their sample of related acquisitions. 
In contrast, Shanley (1994) found some support for the positive association between 
acquisition performance and the level of integration. The indecisive research fmdings 
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relating to the impact of degree of integration on acquisition performance call for further 
research. 
Cultural difference is one of the significant contributors for the high failure in both 
domestic and cross border deals (Buono and Bowditch 1989; Cartwright and Cooper, 
I 992a, 1993; Chatterjee et aI., 1992; Datta, 1991; Morosini, 1998; Weber, et al., 1996). 
Prior research has generally focused on national cultural differences as determinants of 
acquisition performance. However, instead of proving the commonly expected and 
suggested negative impact of cultural differences on the performance of M&A, prior 
research has produced contradictory fmdings (Teerikangas and Very, 2006). In addition, the 
issue of organizational culture difference has received considerably less attention in cross 
border acquisition research - the existing research is limited, fragmented and conflicting 
(Buono and Bowditch, 1989; Sales and Mirvis, 1984; Datta, 1991), indicating the need for 
additional research. 
The resource based view suggests that knowledge transfer is particularly critical for 
multinational companies and cross-border inter-firm alliances (Gupta and Govindarajan, 
2000; Kogut and Zander, 1993). This research stream assumes that value creation by 
multinational companies is determined by their capability to transfer tacit knowledge (e.g., 
Buckley and Carter, 1999). However, only little empirical evidence exists about the 
relationship between cross border knowledge transfer and performance. In most knowledge 
based research, attention is directed towards factors that enhance or impede knowledge 
transfer, without subsequently examining the link to firm performance (see, for example, 
Ranft and Lord, 2000). As a result, further research is required to understand the 
relationship between knowledge transfer and acquisition performance. 
This study focuses on cross border acquisitions which are popular and important in 
international business practice. However, the relationship between acquisition performance 
and the management of pre- and post-acquisition issues is a relatively unexplored research 
area. This study intends to fill this research gap by shedding light on the links between (i) 
pre-acquisition evaluation of the target firm and acquisition performance and (ii) post-
acquisition management issues and acquisition performance. 
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1.4 RESEARCH AIM 
The research aims to investigate the management of pre- and post-acquisition management 
process and acquisition performance in the context of cross border acquisitions. 
1.5 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
There are several research questions arising from the research aim. This study intends to 
answer the following research questions: 
What the motives are for cross border acquisitions? 
What is the impact of pre-acquisition evaluation oftarget fIrm on performance? 
What the determinants of top management retention are in cross border acquisition? 
What is the impact of post-acquisition management issues on performance? 
1.6 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
There are four main objectives and ten sub objectives in this research. They are derived 
from the research questions and literature review. The objectives of this research are 
presented below: 
Objective 1: To identify motives for cross border acquisitions 
a) To identify the motives for cross border acquisitions 
b) To provide a parsimonious set of factors influencing motives for cross border 
acquisition 
c) To test hypotheses on the way in which the relative importance of factors motivating 
cross border acquisition may vary with the sample characteristics 
Objective 2: To investigate the impact of pre-acquisition management on acquisition 
performance 
d) To identify the importance of the factors leading to a successful acquisition deal 
e) To identify the factors evaluated by the acquiring fIrm during the pre-acquisition 
phase 
f) To discover the problems faced by the acquiring fIrm during the pre-acquisition phase 
g) To investigate the impact on acquisition performance of thorough evaluation of the 
target fIrm 
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h) To investigate whether prior acquisition experience leads to fewer pre-acquisition 
problems 
Objective 3: To examine the determinants of top management retention 
i) To identify the importance of retaining employees of the acquired firm 
j) To assess the impact of post-acquisition autonomy of the acquired firm, the acquirer's 
commitment to the acquired organisation, and fmancial incentives on the retention of 
top management team 
Objective 4: To examine the impact of post-acquisition management on acquisition 
performance 
k) To explore the impact on cross border acquisition performance of the degree of 
integration, organizational cultural differences, transfer of knowledge and top 
management retention. 
1.7 SCOPE OF THE STUDY 
The study focuses on acquisitions, not mergers. This stemmed from the exceptionally small 
proportion of all completed M&A transactions that are actually mergers of equals, despite 
the fact that mergers of equals are likely to be more complex in nature than acquisitions 
(Zaheer ct aI., 2003). Hence, as a societal phenomenon, acquisitions would seem to be of 
greater importance in terms of their frequency of occurrence. Moreover, there exists less 
research on the challenges related to the pre- and post-acquisition implementation of cross 
border acquisitions (Shimizu, et aI., 2004; Quah and Young, 2005). 
The study includes countries from the European and North American continents. 
This choice arose from the large numbers of acquisitions currently taking place between 
Western countries. The acquisition of companies from non-Western countries is likely to 
represent different management challenges than those completed in Western countries. 
The study involves acquisitions at the level of individual subsidiaries or units, not at 
the corporate organisational level. Within larger-scale multi-unit acquisitions, each 
individual unit generally has a different organisational history. This makes the integration 
of each acquired unit a unique challenge. Thus, acquisitive responses appear to occur at the 
local, unit level rather than being shared across units at the corporate level. Within units, 
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this scope can be further refmed to specific businesses and product lines, if the unit consists 
of two or more businesses that operate along different logics. 
1.8 STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY 
This study is organized in the following way. Chapter two provides a review of existing 
literature relating to the pre- and post-acquisition management process. In particular, it 
reviews the literature on four issues: the motives for mergers and acquisitions; the pre-
acquisition management issues; the post-acquisition management issues; the performance 
of cross border acquisitions. 
Chapter three sets out the research methods of the study, including the choice of 
research design, data collection procedure, operationalization of the constructs, the 
response rate and conceptual framework of the research. 
Chapter four presents secondary data on recent trends in UK cross border M&As in 
ordcr to bettcr locate the findings of the study from primary data. The fmdings regarding 
the motives for cross border acquisitions are presented and discussed in chapter five. 
Chapter six presents and discusses the empirical fmdings related to pre-acquisition 
management issues and the impact of target firm valuation on acquisition performance. In 
chapter seven, the fmdings and discussion related to dcterminants of top management 
retention are presented. Chapter eight provides the findings and discussion in relation to the 
impact of post-acquisition management issues on acquisition performance. 
Chapter nine presents the conclusion of the study including the academic and 
practical contributions, limitations of the research and recommendations for future research. 
1.9 SUMMARY 
The chapter has presented the aim and objectives of the research along with the research 
questions. The research problem and research rationale were discussed to substantiate the 
significance of the study. The chapter also discussed the scope of the research. The fmal 
section provided the structure of the study. 
The following chapter provides a review of literature relating to motives, pre- and 
post- acquisition management process, and acquisition performance. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
The objective of this chapter is to review the literature on cross border M&As. The chapter 
begins with a review of phases of M&As. Section two provides a review of research on 
motives of cross border M&As. Section three focuses on the literature on pre-acquisition 
management process. Literature on post-acquisition management process is presented in 
section four. The fmal section reviews the research on the performance of cross border 
M&As. 
2.2 PHASES OF MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS 
Describing different phases of M&As has been quite a common approach in the literature to 
understand the M&A process .(Risberg, 2003). The importance of these distinctions 
between the phases is that the process of integration and activities that influence the success 
of the integration begin long before the closing, at the point when companies first take 
contact. Surprisingly, there is little empirical research that has systematically examined the 
relationships among the stages and how activities conducted during the different stages 
affect the success of the M&As integration process (Schweiger and Goulet, 2000). 
Table 2.1 Summary of selected studies on M&As Phases 
Study Model Phases 
Marks & Mirvis 3 stage Pre combination - Combination - Post combination (2001) 
Haspeslagh & 
-4 stage Idea - Justification - Integration - Result Jemison (1991) 
Quah & Young 4 stage Pre acquisition - Slow absorption - Very active (2005) absorption - Totally absorbed 
Lobrum (1992) 5 stage Observation - Planning - Execution - Consolidation -Maturity 
Buono & Bowditch Pre combination - Combination planning - Announced 
(1989) 7 stage combination - Initial combination - Formal combination-Combination aftermath - psychological combination 
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In describing the mergers and acquisitions process, different researchers have used a Three-
Stage model (Marks and Mirvis, 2001), a Four-Stage model (Haspeslagh and Jemison, 
1991; Quah and Young, ~005), a Five Stage model (Lobrum, 1992), and a Seven Stage 
model (Buono and Bowditch, 1989). Table 2.1 presents summary of the selected studies on 
M&As phases. 
Three-Stage Model 
Marks and Mirvis (2001) identified the M&As process to be composed of Pre-
Combination, Combination, Post-Combination. In the pre-combination stage, the deal will 
be conceived and negotiated by executives and then legally approved by shareholders and 
regulators. In combination phase, integration planning will be ensued and implementation 
decision will be made. In post-combination stage, the combined entity and its people will 
be regrouped from initial implementation and the new organization will be settled in. The 
model for acquisition process is presented in figure 2.1. 
Marks & Mirvis 
(2001) 
Four-Stage Model 
Pre-Combination Combination Post-Combination 
Figure 2.1: A Three Stage Model of Mergers and Acquisitions process 
Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) consider the acquisition process to contain four major 
phases: idea, acquisition justification, acquisition integration, and results. The first two are 
referred to as the pre-combination stage, while the last two are referred to as the post-
combination stage. During the idea phase, the potential acquisition is suggested and 
eventual combination partners are evaluated. Thereafter the acquisition must be justified to 
the rest of the company before the actual decision to go on with the deal is made. When the 
deal is a fact, the integration starts with a special pha~e called the "stage-setting phase". 
This phase involves a transition period before the integration actually starts. 
In Haspeslagh and Jemison's model, the boundaries between the phases are not 
clear; many of the acquisition questions they raise overlap the different phases (Risberg, 
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2003). Hence, even though there are different phases during an acquisition, they are at the 
same time interactive, and the issues arising during the different phases need to be 
considered together (Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991). 
HaspesJagh and 
Jemison (1991) 
Idea Justification 
Pre Combination stage 
Integration 
Post Combination stage 
Figure 2.2: A Four stage model ofM&As Process 
Results 
Recently, Quah and Young (2005) suggested that to improve success, the post-acquisition 
management process should be divided into a number of phases with defmed objectives and 
actions. The study provides preliminary evidence drawing upon the post-acquisition 
management of four European cross border M&As undertaken by an American automotive 
multinational firm. The authors have divided the Post acquisition management into four 
phases - Phase 1: Pre acquisition (6months prior to M&A), Phase 2: Slow absorption (Year 
1), Phase 3: Very active absorption (Year 2-5), Phase 4: Totally absorbed (> 5 years). In 
addition, the authors have suggested actions to be taken in each phase. In phase 1, the 
acquirer should conduct interviews with key management and also carry out a cultural audit 
on target. The results of the cultural audit should be communicated in phase 2 along with 
providing training for changes in language and the fmancial system. In phase 3, the acquirer 
should gradually change the target's management and provide further training as needed. In 
the fmal phase, employee behaviour should be measured and a continuous check made of 
the sensitivity of national cultural difference in the acquired business. 
Five-Stage model 
Different parts of the process have also been divided into phases. Lobrum (1992) divided 
the integration into different phases to facilitate the understanding of what happens during 
acquisition integration. In her study of a cross border M&A, she identified the following 
five integration phases. The integration process started with an observation phase, where 
the two parties observe each other and the situation (Haspeslagh & Jemison's stage-setting 
phase). The next phase is the planning phase, where the management of the acquiring ftrrn 
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starts the formal and structural changes. The changes stayed at the formal level while the 
integration ofpeople and cultures were neglected. Then the execution phase follows, which 
brings about a lot of changes. The human and cultural integration start in this phase, which 
also triggers a reaction among the employees in the acquired fIrm In the consolidation 
phase, the real socio-cultural integration starts, when it is important to establish contacts 
between all hierarchical levels in both companies. When the two corporate cultures have 
been blended, the last phase starts - the maturity phase. 
Seven-Stage Model 
Buono and Bowditch (1989) identified as many as seven different combination phases. The 
phases are called pre-combination, combination planning, announced combination, initial 
combination, formal combination, combination aftermath and psychological combination. 
The authors discuss how the decisions in the different phases are affected by ambiguities 
and uncertainties in the environment. They found that in each phase the ambiguities and 
uncertainties were more or less salient than in other phases. 
The problem with discussing the M&As process in terms of different phases is that 
it is difficult to identify when each phase ends and the next starts (Risberg, 2003). It is also 
difficult to say when the post-combination stage ends, and the relationship between the 
acquiring and acquired company turns into a headquarters-subsidiary relationship. Another 
problem with phase thinking is that phases do not have to correspond with time. Two 
events occurring at the same time can consequently be referred to as different phases. 
Different parts of the organisation and different individuals can experience different phases 
at the same time. Therefore it is diffIcult to talk in terms of the whole organisation being in 
"this phase" or "that phase" (Risberg, 2003). 
One can also question whether phases really are sequential. Maybe some parts of 
the organisation experience a sequence of phases different from those described by 
researchers; some may skip one phase or enter a later phase before an early phase. Lohrum 
(1992) made an observation that people at different hierarchical levels experience different 
integration phases. For example, blue-collar workers only experienced two integration 
phases-when representatives from the acquiring company worked in the company and 
when they had left. It is not only difficult to distinguish between phases in reality but also 
in theory. In Buono and Bowditch's (1989) theory, the phases are very diffused and even 
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the authors seem to have difficulties keeping them apart. They failed to make clear to the 
reader the use of all these different phases and the differences between them (Risberg, 
2003). 
The point of identifying stages has been to distinguish different events and activities 
of each stage, to further the understanding of the acquisition process and how it can be 
managed. Based on the previous discussion, the management of cross border M&As can be 
divided into two major parts i.e. the pre-acquisition management and post acquisition 
management. The pre-acquisition management process starts with strategic intent followed 
by target selection and negation process. The next section reviews the literature on motives 
of cross border M&As. 
2.3 MOTIVES FOR CROSS BORDER M&AS 
In light of the increasing significance of cross border mergers and acquisitions (CBM&As) 
phenomenon, . scholars in the field of international business and strategy had begun to 
examine various aspects of mergers and acquisitions (Seth, Song and Pettit, 2000). The 
existing body of research is still searching answers to a fundamental question: Why do 
these mergers & acquisitions occur? Even though the question sounds simple, the 
theoretical answer is very complex. There is not one grounded theory for mergers & 
acquisitions, because this phenomenon covers all aspects of the firm such as cost, sales, 
risk, revenues, salaries, capabilities and relations to the environment. 
The motives and objectives for carrying out a M&A transaction from the acquiring 
firm's perspective are different across various industries (see Walter and Barney, 1990; 
Brouthers et aI., 1998). Several theories attempt to explain the objectives driving M&As: 
the efficiency theory, monopoly theory, hubris theory, to name but a few examples (see 
Roll, 1986; Trautwein, 1990; Berkovitch and Narayanan, 1993). Evidently, since an M&A-
transaction constitutes an investment project which usually competes with other projects 
within a firm and is usually only part of the overall corporate strategy, each M&A-
transaction is based on different motives. Some of the literature on M&A suggests that top 
management has not one single motive but follows various motives when undertaking 
acquisitions (e.g. Trautwein, 1990; Walter and Barney, 1990; Ingham et aI., 1992; 
Brouthers et aI., 1998). There are probably almost as many motives for M&A as there are 
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Table 2.2: Taxonomy and empirical studies on motives for mergers & acquisitions 
Motive Result 
Synergy More efficient organizations and pooling of 
complementary resources creates a gain 
Synergy Replacement of inefficient management 
Minimize cost Large scale reduces different kinds of cost 
Minimize Cost Hierarchical solutions reduces governance 
cost 
Financial Reduced capital cost and utilisation of tax 
synergy shield 
Managerial Maximising managers wealth 
Market Shares Create or extend sales opportunity 
Market Power Above-normal profit 
Minimise Risk Minimising fluctuations in 
Revenues 
Theory 
Differential managerial 
efficiency 
The market of corporate 
Control 
Economics of scale/scope 
Transactions cost 
Debt/equity 
Empire-Building 
Growth 
Monopoly 
Diversification 
Speculative Acquisition's price is lower than correct Undervaluation 
market price 
Position 
Competitive 
advantage 
Resources 
Taking another position in different network, Network 
depending on trust and relations. 
Core-competencies secure a sustained 
competitive advantage 
A unique pool ofresources, and efficient 
management of these 
Competence 
Resource-based 
Empirical Studies 
Richardson (1972), Teece (1987), Seth, et. aI., (2000) 
Fama (1980), Manne (1965), Marris & Mueller (1980), Seth, et. aI., 
(2000) 
Florence (1953), Hughes, Mueller and Singh (1980), Itami (1987) 
Hart (1995), Williamson (1975) 
Brealey & Myers (1988), Lewellen (1971), Steiner (1975) 
Amidhud & Lev (1981), Gort (1969), Jensen (1986), Jensen & Meckling 
(1976), Hogholm (1994), Ravenscraft & Scherer (1987) 
Gort (1969), Hallen & Wiedersheirn-Paul (1982), Hay & Liu (1998), 
Starbuck (1965) 
Hughes, Mueller & Singh (1980), Pfeffer & Salancik (1978), Trautwein 
(1990) 
Lewellen (1971), Weston & Mansinghka (1971) 
Barney (1986b), (1988), Vasconcellos & Kish (1998), Gort (1969), Roll 
(1986) 
Forsgren (1989), Forsgren et aI. (1995), Johanson & Mattsson (1988), 
Mattsson (1998) 
Hamel (1994), Prahalad & Hamel (1990) 
Barney (1986a), Penrose (1959), Rumelt (1984), Wernerfe1t (1984) 
Source: Based on Gammelgaard (2005) 
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bidders and targets. Yet, grouping the motives of M&A transactions into various categories 
is useful. 
The explanations are legion so the purpose of this section is to set up a taxonomy 
covering different strategic motives 0 f M&As that give different results and relate them to 
the relevant theoretical approach. Table 2.2 presents the taxonomies. Moreover, the 
relevance of each approach will be illustrated in the specific context of cross border M&A. 
The subsequent sections present a discussion on various motives of merger & acquisition. 
The motives are presented without any specific order, thus no motive has more significance 
than any other. The discussion starts with the synergy motive which is one of the most 
commonly cited motives for M&A. 
2.3.1 SYNERGY MOTIVE 
The term synergy is more often associated with the physical sciences rather than with 
management sciences (Gaughan, 1991). It refers to the type of reactions that occur when 
two substances or factors combine to produce a greater effect together than what the sum of 
the two operating independently could account for. For example, a synergistic reaction 
occurs in chemistry when two chemicals combine to produce a more potent total reaction 
than the sum of their separate effects. Simply stated, synergy refers to the phenomenon of2 
+ 2 = 5. It refers to the ability of a corporate combination to be more profitable than the 
individual profit of the firms that were combined i.e. NPV FirmAB > NPV FirmA + NPV Firms. 
Several empirical studies lend support to the importance of synergy as a merger 
motive. For instance, Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1988) documented that a successful tender 
offer increases the combined value of the target and acquiring firms by an average of 7.4 
percent. Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993) also showed that synergy is the primary motive 
in takeovers with positive total gains. In another study, Maquieira, Megginson, and Nail 
(1998) examined 260 pure stock-for-stock mergers from 1963 to 1996. They documented 
significant net synergistic gains in non-conglomerate mergers and generally insignificant 
net gains in conglomerate mergers. Recently, Mulherin and Boone (2000) studied the 
acquisition and divestiture activity of a sample of 1305 firms from 59 industries during 
1990-1999. The symmetric, positive wealth effects for acquisitions and divestitures are 
consistent with a synergistic explanation for both forms of restructuring. 
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Synergy theory is also applied when analyzing the motives of cross border M&A. 
Bun, Kolodny, and Schcraga (1996) tested the synergy hypothesis for cross-border 
acquisitions using a sample of foreign acquisitions of u.s. firms during 1979-1990. Their 
fmdings indicate that cross-border takeovers are generally synergy-creating activities. In 
addition, Seth, Song, and Pettit (2000) fmd that the synergy hypothesis is the predominant 
explanation for their sample of cross border merger & acquisitions of U.S. firms. 
There are two main types of synergy - operating synergy and fmancial synergy. 
Operating synergy refers to the effIciency gains or operating economies that are derived in 
horizontal or vertical mergers. Financial synergy refers to the possibility that the cost of 
capital can be lowered by combining more or more companies. These two types of synergy 
are discussed below. 
2.3.1.1 OPERATING SYNERGY 
The synergy theory proposes that merger and acquisition take place when the value of the 
combined firm is greater than the sum of the values of the individual firms (Bradley, Desai 
and Kim, 1988; Seth, 1990a). The additional value, or synergistic gain, is derived from an 
increase in operational efficiency or an increase in market power (Singh and Montgomery, 
1987; Seth, 1990b). One of the main sources of operating synergy is the cost reductions that 
occur as a result of a corporate combination. These cost reductions may come as economies 
of scale - decrease in per unit costs that result from an increase in the size or scale of a 
company's operations. 
Manufacturing firms typically operate at high per unit costs for low levels of output. 
This is because the fixed costs of operating their manufacturing facilities are spread out 
over relatively low levels of output. As the output levels rise per unit costs decline. This is 
sometimes referred to as spreading overhead. Some of the other sources of these gains arise 
from increased specialization of labour and management as well as the more efficient use of 
capital equipment whieh might not be possible at low output levels. This phenomenon 
continues for a certain range of output, after which per unit costs rise as the firm 
experiences diseconomies of scale. Diseconomies of scale may arise as the firm 
experiences the higher costs and other problems associated with coordinating a large scale 
operation. The extent to which diseconomies of scale exist is a topic of dispute to many 
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economists. Some cite as evidence the continued growth of large, multinational companies 
such as Exxon, General motors. These firms have exhibited extended periods of growth 
while still paying stockholders an acceptable return on equity. Others contend that such 
firms would be able to provide stockholders a higher rate of return if they were a smaller, 
more efficient company (Gaughan, 1991). 
The graph presented in figure 2.3 depicts scale economies and diseconomies. It shows that 
there is an optimal output levels where per unit costs are a minimum. This implies that to 
the left of minimum cost in the diagram an expansion through the horizontal acquisition of 
a competitor may increase the size of the acquiring firm's operation and lower per unit 
costs. 
Another concept that is closely related to economies of scale is economies of scope. 
This is the ability of a firm to utilize one set of inputs to provide a broader range of 
products and services. A good example of scope economics arises in the banking industry. 
Scope economics, rather than economies of scale, are often seen as the main benefits banks 
derive by merging (Loretta, 1987). When fmancial institutions merge, they can share inputs 
to offer a broader range of services such as a trust department or an investment department. 
Inputs such as a computer system can be shared to process a wide variety of loans and 
deposit accounts. Whether these benefits are either the true reason or a sufficient reason for 
the increased number of banking mergers that have taken place in the recent period of 
deregulation is very different issue (Gaughan, 1988). 
Average 
cost 
Economies 
of Scale 
Diseconomies 
of Scale 
Output 
Figure 2.3: Scale economies and diseconomies 
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The sources of synergetic gain presented above are applied to domestic M&A. In the 
specific context of Cross Border M&A, the literature on corporate foreign investment 
describes various means by which cross border mergers & acquisitions may create value. 
Acquiring an existing foreign facility provides a means for the rapid exploitation of the 
potential for synergistic gain compared with de novo entry. One important source of 
synergy comes from the potential to transfer valuable intangible assets, such as know-how, 
between the combining firms in the presence of transaction costs that lead to failure of 
factor markets (Caves, 1982). If a firm has know-how under its control that can be used in 
markets where the sale or lease of such knowledge is inherently "inefficient", then the firm 
will tend to exploit its own organization. Although different versions are developed by 
various scholars (e.g., Williamson, 1975; Rugman, 1982; Casson, 1987), all assume that 
transacting in the international market entails substantial costs which will reduce the value 
of proprietary information. Faced with this cost, a firm will be likely to internalize the 
transaction and use the proprietary information within its expanded organization. Gains 
may also be realized from "reverse internalization": firms acquire skills and resources from 
cross border M&A that are expected to be valuable in their home markets. A related source 
of synergistic gains in cross border acquisitions focuses on market development 
opportunities. In order to efficiently utilize their "excess" resources for long-run 
profitability, firms will invest abroad when growth at home is limited or restricted and in 
the presence of trade barriers which restrict exports. 
In addition, if national markets are segmented due to capital controls, information 
asymmctries and/or exchange controls, it may be possible for firms with multinational 
operations to realize diversification benefits which create shareholder value. This benefit 
arises from the reduced variability in the firm's earnings resulting from less than perfect 
correlation between earnings in different markets (Lessard, 1973). Another source of gains 
in cross bordcr M&A associated with imperfections in capital markets arises from the 
potcntial for assets to be undervalued in their domestic market (see Aliber's (1970) 
"currency premium argument"). 
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2.3.1.2 FINANCIAL SYNERGY 
The second type of synergy is fmancial synergy. "Financial synergy" refers to the impact of 
a corporate merger or acquisition on the costs of capital to the acquiring firm or the 
merging partners. If fmancial synergy exists in a corporate combination, the costs of capital 
should be lowered. Whether fmancial synergy actually exists, however, is a matter of 
dispute (Gaughan, 1991). 
The combination of two firms can reduce risk if the fIrms' cash flow streams are not 
perfectly correlated. If the acquisitions or merger lowers the volatility of the cash flows, 
supplicrs of capital may consider the firm less risky. The risk of bankruptcy would 
presumably be less given the fact that wide swings, up and down, in the combined firms' 
cash flows would be less likely. This implies that it is less likely that cash flows would fall 
so low that the firm could become tcchnically insolvent. 
Higgins and Schall (1975) explain this effect in terms of debt-coinsurance. If the 
correlation of the income streams of two firms is less than perfectly positively correlated, 
the bankruptcy risk associated with the combination of the two firms may be reduced. 
Under ccrtain circumstances one of the firms could experience conditions forcing it into 
bankruptcy. It is diffIcult to know in advance which one of two possible firms would 
succumb to this fate. In the event of one of the firms goes under, creditors may suffer a 
loss. If the two firms were combined in advance of these financial problems, however, the 
cash flows of the solvent firm, which are in excess of its debt service needs, would cushion 
the decline in the other firm's cash flows. The offsetting earnings of the firm in good 
condition might be suffIcient to prevent the combined firm from falling into bankruptcy and 
causing creditors of suffer losses. 
There are number of sources of fmancial synergy. One source of fmancial synergy 
is the lower cost of internal fmancing in comparison with external fmancing. Firms with 
large internal cash flows and small investment opportunity have excess cash flows. Firms 
with low internal funds generation and large growth opportunities have a need for 
additional financing. Combining the two may result in advantages from the lower costs of 
internal funds availability. Previous empirical fmdings appear to support this internal funds 
effect. Nielsen and Melicher (1973) found that the rate of premium paid to the acquired 
firm as an approximation to the merger gain was greater when the cash flow rate of the 
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acquired fIrm was greater than that of the acquiring fIrm. This implied that there was 
redeployment of capital from the acquired to the acquiring fIrm's industry. The investment 
literature also indicates that internal cash flows affect the rate of investment of firms (Nickell, 
1978). 
Another source fmancial synergy is the low cost of capital. A larger company has 
certain advantages in fmancial market which may lower the cost of capital to the fIrm. It 
enjoys better access to fmancial markets, and it tends to experience lower costs of raising 
capital, most probably because it is considered to be less risky than a smaller fIrm. 
Therefore, the costs of borrowing by issuing bonds are lower since a larger fIrm would 
probably be able to issue bonds offering a lower interest rate than a smaller fIrm. In 
addition, there are certain fIxed costs in the issuance of securities, such as SEC registration 
costs, legal fees, and printing costs, these costs would be spread out over a greater pound 
volume of securities since the larger company would probably borrow more capital with 
each issue of bonds. 
The capital market approach also contains gains from fmancial synergy. It arises 
from changes in the debt/equity ratio. Raising the debt rate creates fmancial synergy 
through the exploitation of the tax shield. This strategy is efficient as long as the value from 
reduced tax is higher than the cost offmancial distress (Brealey and Myers, 1988). The new 
company with a lower bankruptcy risk could induce lenders to establish a higher limit of 
lending. This will exceed the sum of original limit for the two individual fIrms and may 
result in a better exploitation of the tax shield (Lewellen, 1971). 
In describing the motives of cross border M&As, researchers have also used the 
fmancial synergy approach (Seth, et. aI., 2000). The effect of the guarantee must roughly be 
the same according to nationality. In small countries with comparatively small firms, it can 
be easier to locate a fIrm with the necessary excess of capital by going abroad. On the other 
hand this argument is supportive to more central motives like revenue, cost, risk and 
competence etc. Finally, reducing the cost of capital is useful as an argument for cross 
border M&As in two ways. First; the acquiring fIrm gets access to the acquired fIrm's 
fmancial network. Second; the prestige of being a large internationalised fIrm may 
sometimes lower the rate of interest (Seth, et. aI., 2000). 
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2.3.2 MANAGERIAL MOTIVES 
Unlike the hubris hypothesis, which proposes that managers inadvertently overpay for 
target firms, the managerialism hypothesis suggests that managers will knowingly overpay 
in takeovers; managers embark on M&A to maximize their own utility at the expense of 
their firm's shareholders (Seth, Song and Pettit, 2000). Managers can have private or 
personal reasons for their behaviour and make investments which from an economic point 
of view may seem irrational, but for the individual can be of high value. The empire-
building theory explains this situation of the management wanting growth for personal 
reasons and acquisitions match this situation. Most important is the wage explanation, 
saying that the salary paid out to managers is a function of the size of the company 
(Mueller, 1969). Motives like power and prestige are also essential (Ravenscraft and 
Scherer, 1987) and managers from large companies have an easier way to positions in 
committees and board of directors (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). 
Managers engage in conglomerate mergers to decrease their employment risk, 
which is largely un-diversifIable. The risk consists of loosing their job, professional 
reputation, etc. The risk associated with managers' income closely relates to the firm's risk 
(Gort, 1969; Amidhud and Lev, 1981). Another factor creating incentives to acquisitions is 
free cash flows, meaning cash flows more than required to fund all projects that have a 
positive net present value discounted at the relevant cost of capital. This cash flow belongs 
to the shareholders, but used for investment instead, managers cause their firms to grow 
beyond the optimal size. A solution to this problem lies in issuing debt in exchange for 
stock, so the contract forces the managers to payout future cash flows (Jensen, 1986). The 
managers' time horizons relate to their tenure and tend to be shorter than the shareholders' 
time horizons. Managers will not have an interest in cash flows that cover the period after 
the end of their term of office (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
While managerialism has been proposed as a motive for domestic M&A, it may also 
be relevant for cross border M&A if managers of foreign firms have the incentive and the 
discretion to engage in M&A aimed at empire building (Seth, Song and Pettit, 2000). In an 
integrated capital market, firm-level diversification activities to reduce risk are generally 
considered non-value maximizing as individual shareholders may duplicate the benefit 
from such activities at lower cost. However, managers may still seek to stabilize the firms' 
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earnings stream by acquiring foreign (rather than domestic) firms, given low correlations 
between earnings in different countries. Foreign acquisitions may be more satisfactory 
vehicles for risk reduction than domestic acquisitions, and in the absence of strong 
governance mechanisms to control managerial discretion, managers may overpay for these 
acquisitions. 
2.3.3 DIVERSIFICATION 
Another motive for acquisition within the same industry is to reduce some of the 
uncertainty that derives from competition (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). In the theory of 
diversification the risk-adverse firm has an opportunity to minimize risk by expanding 
activities to different lines of business and thereby equalize the fluctuations in revenues. In 
the 1960s and the 1970s this motive of acquisition was very popular in practice and in 
theory, but now it has become less important. The reason for this is that most of the 
conglomerate acquisitions failed and ended up with losses for the acquiring firm. 
Furthermore, the Sharpe-Litncr portfolio theory concludes that for the shareholders it is a 
much better way to reach the market-portfolio through their investments than through the 
companies they own (LeweHen, 1971). 
Weston and Mansinghka (1971) give several reasons for diversification; first, to 
avoid sales and profit instability; next to elude unfavourable growth development and to 
avoid adverse competitive shifts. Further arguments are technological obsolescence and to 
decrease uncertainties associated with their industries. Finally, the motivation of a vertical 
acquisition of a supplier can be risk-reducing. An example is in the natural resource 
industries where demand and supply are unstable and integration can mitigate the cost 
associated with fluctuation in prices. 
Pitts (1976) gives three reasons for diversifications. The most important is the 
situation where the failure of one business area threatens the whole corporation. Second, 
the diversified company has the opportunity to reallocate scarce resources to the most 
dynamic areas. FinaHy, there is a better opportunity to commercialize more broadly 
technological innovations. To minimize the uncertainty in the environment is also 
important here (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) and the acquisition of a unit that knows the 
rules of the market is preferable. No industry is totaHy independent of the fluctuations in 
32 
the economy, but some lines of business are not as cyclical as others. Further, different 
growth rates exist within the same industry (Salter and Weinhold, 1979). In the end what 
matters is what gives the highest NPV. When the fIrm reaches a satisfactory position within 
the area of specialization and the fIrm has the resources needed for expansion, they might 
fmd the opportunities for expanding into new areas more promising than further expansion' 
in its existing areas (Penrose, 1959) 
DiversifIcations relates to the cross border M&A of the fIrm because this gives a 
better chance to fulfIl the goal of reducing fluctuations, in consideration of the wider 
spreads of industries and markets. Furthermore, it can neutralise a national depression. By 
acquiring a going concern that knows the rules of the market, it may minimise the risk too. 
In the beginning of an internationalisation process this is useful because the fIrm probably 
does not possess the wanted knowledge (Forsgren, 1989). 
2.3.4 SPEED AND ACCESS 
Apart from the general explanations of the paradigm, there are some specific motivating 
factors for firms choosing cross-border M&As a vehicle for investment in foreign locations 
(UNCT AD, 2000). Among others, speed and access to proprietary assets are particularly 
important. 
Cross-border M&A is the fastest means for firms to expand their production and 
markets internationally (UNCT AD, 2000). When time is vital, takeover o~ or merger with 
an existing firm in a new market with an established distribution system is far more 
preferable to developing a new local distribution and marketing network. For a latecomer to 
a market or a new field of technology, cross-border M&A can provide a way to catch up 
rapidly. With the acceleration of globalization, enhanced competition and shorter product 
life cycles, there are increasing pressures for firms to respond quickly to opportunities in 
the fast changing global economic environment. This is highlighted by the fast 
development and increasing competition in the information and communication technology 
industry. 
To access proprietary assets is another important motivation for firms to undertake 
cross-border M&A. Merging with or acquiring an existing company is the least-cost, and 
sometimes the only, way to acquire strategic assets, such as R&D or technical know-how, 
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patents, brand names, local permits and licences, and supplier or distribution networks, 
because they are not available elsewhere and they take time to develop. Such assets may be 
crucial to increasing a fIrm's income-generating resources and capabilities (Dunning 2000). 
To take just one example of where the need for speed - the alternative between 
"build" or "buy" - and the search for proprietary assets came together: the main reason for 
the Indian company Tata Tea to acquire Tetley Ltd. in the United Kingdom was to obtain 
access to a global brand name and a global distribution network; reaching the same 
objective through organic growth would have been more or less impossible. To quote Tata 
Tea's Vice-Chairman who engineered the acquisition: "For us to develop a global market in 
the time frame we had in mind, the acquisition of Tetley, with its brand name and 
distribution system, was the only option" (UNCTAD, 2000). 
2.3.5 NEW MARKET AND MARKET POWER 
The search for new markets and market power is a constant concern for fIrms. Where 
domestic markets are saturated, in particular, foreign ones beckon. High transaction costs 
associated with arm's-length transactions involving intangible assets may explain why 
firms possessing ownership specifIc capabilities often prefer to exert direct control (instead 
of exporting or licensing) when exploiting them in new geographical locations or industry 
segments (UNCT AD, 2000). 
Through M&A, fIrms can quickly access new market opportunities and develop 
critical mass without adding additional capacity to an industry. By taking over an existing 
company, immediate access to a local network of suppliers, clients and skills can he 
obtained. This motivation is of particular importance for cross-border M&A as the need for 
knowledge about local conditions increases when leaving the home market. Beyond this, 
and especially in markets characterized by oligopoly, M&A can also be motivated by the 
pursuit for market power and market dominance. Especially in the case of horizontal M&A, 
the motivation can well be the search for oligopolistic positions. In addition, consolidated 
market control may provide opportunities for anti-competitive practices and increased 
barriers to entry. A firm with market power establishes barriers to entry for competitors and 
that extends the period of making profIt (Hughes, Mueller and Singh, 1980). 
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2.3.6 MACRO ECONOMIC FACTORS 
Many macro economic factors are contributing, at least in part, to the increases in cross-
border M&A during the past century (Vasconcellos and Kish, 1996). Positive merger 
factors which encourage such transactions relate to exchange rates, diversification, the 
current level of business activity in the domestic economy, and technology. 
2.3.6.1 Exchange rate 
Exchange rates may impact cross-border M&A in several ways. The relative strength or 
weakness of the domestic currency vis-a-vis the foreign currency - as reflected by the 
probabilities of appreciation or depreciation - plays a major role in the decision-making 
process (Vasconcellos and Kish, 1996). The effective price of the transaction, it's 
financing, the costs of managing the acquired firm, and the repatriated profits to the 
acquiring firm are all affected. For example, if the GB pound is strong relative to another 
currency or currencies, UK companies should benefit and become increasingly able to 
acquire foreign firms. Additionally, one should observe a decrease in the acquisitions of 
UK firms by foreign companies. The converse should hold true in periods of a relatively 
weak pound. Harris and Ravenscraft (1991) provide support for the importance of currency 
fluctuations on foreign direct investment via acquisition from the target and buyer 
shareho ldcrs' gains and losses. 
A counter argument has been made concerning the importance of the relative 
strength (or weakness) of the domestic currency at the time of the planned acquisition. This 
involves the repatriation of profits and other remittances from the subsidiary or affiliate to 
the parent firm. As the domestic currency appreciates relative to the foreign currency, the 
discounted value of the expected amount of future remittances will come to a lower figure 
when translated into the home currency. This would work against the case for acquiring a 
foreign company. But this argument is weakened by the fact that the FDI's economic value 
will increase. Therefore, the precise effect that exchange rate has on the direction of cross-
border acquisitions becomes ultimately an empirical question (Vasconcellos and Kish, 
1996). 
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2.3.6.2 ECONOMIC CONDITIONS 
The home country's economic conditions appear to have a considerable effect on a fIrm's 
international strategies (Vasconcellos and Kish, 1996). One view holds that during times of 
prosperity, a fIrm may fmd itself well positioned to look towards international expansion. 
The reverse would also hold, for unfavourable economic conditions in the home country. 
For example, a recession or credit restrictions, might require that a fIrm concentrate 
primarily on its domestic operations. However, for a different view see Harris and Nicholls 
(1988) who, among other fmdings, hold that conglomerate growth is a by-product of 
stagnant domestic markets and that the primary expansion criteria include focusing on free 
enterprise countries with relatively low perceived political risk and with growing 
economics and markets. 
2.3.7 CONCLUSIONS 
Why docs fIrm A wants to buy fIrm B? There are different replies to this question. The 
answers are legion and include explanation such as reaching synergy effects by pooling 
resources, or raise efficiency by replacement of the management. Reduced cost is 
attainable through economics of scale and vertical integrations can lead to a change in 
cost related to governance structures. The most natural explanation is the growth motive, 
where the strategic goal is the entry to a new market, so intensifying growth which results 
in monopoly position. Entering new lines of business through diversifIcation neutralises 
the effect of fluctuations in earnings. Acquisitions motivated by fmancial motives reduce 
the capital cost and provide an opportunity for a better utilisation of different tax 
structures. Another fmancial approach relates to the price of the undervalued target, 
bccause of imperfections in the market of information. Finally the acquisition may cover 
an economic irrational point of view, because managers try to maximise own wealth by 
an empire-building strategy. By looking at the internationalisation of the fIrm, most of the 
above-mentioned theories are useful in an explanation of cross border M&A. 
From the discussion above, it is apparent that more than one reason exists for 
pursuing cross border M&As. The decision to acquire a fIrm in another country is rarely 
made because of a single issue. Thus, although the above reasons are discussed as 
independent influences, in many instances more than one reason accounts for the cross 
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border transaction decision. Nonetheless individual descriptions allow us to emphasize 
the significant characteristics of each reason. Of the reasons discussed so far, the two that 
most commonly drives the decision to engage in cross border M&As is the desire for 
increased market power and increased speed to market. In part, this frequency indicates 
the significance of the relationship between firm size and competitive success in the 
global economy. 
2.4 THE PRE-ACQUISITION MANAGEMENT 
One of the first phases in the pre-acquisition process concerns how to select a target or 
partner. The acquisition decision making process is often described as a step by step 
analytical process that starts with M&As objectives and passes through systematic search 
and screening, strategic evaluation, financial evaluation, and negotiation i.e. the due 
diligence process (Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991). 
This section presents literature on the pre-acquisition management process. The 
section is divided into three parts. The first part reviews the literature on the target selection 
process. The second part presents a review of research focusing on the negotiation process. 
The third part reviews research dealing with problems in target selection and the 
negotiation process. 
2.4.1 TARGET SELECTION PROCESS IN CROSS BORDER M&AS 
The acquisition process begins with the identification of potential targets that suits the 
acquirer's expansion strategy. Buono and Bowditch (1989) emphasize that top management 
should carefully analyze goals of the acquisition, the strategic and organizational fit, and 
how to establish commitment of employees to the acquisition. Additionally, several 
researchers have identified the critical role of gathering information about human resource 
practices, organizational culture and structure, and making a detailed "blueprint" for 
anticipated organizational change, including the selection of a leader and management team 
to be in charge of the integration stage (Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991; Schweiger, Csiszar 
and Napier, 1993). Collectively, these authors suggest that careful preliminary planning 
will facilitate the implementation stage. 
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To identify appropriate M&A targets and to negotiate and effectively complete 
acquisitions requires a thorough due diligence process. This process has features similar to 
the due diligence for domestic M&As. However, it is complicated by a few elements that 
appear even more crucial in cross border M&As (Angwin, 2001). These elements include 
the different institutional environments between the two fIrms' horne countries and their 
two different cultures (at both national and corporate levels). 
Firms are embedded in a system of social and cultural norms that often affect the 
processes and outcomes of cross border M&As. In general, differences in the institutional 
environments may be based on different regulations, accounting standards, value systems, 
etc. Differences in the national cultures largely imply different individual values, risk 
propensity, acceptance of uncertainty, etc., while differences in corporate cultures suggest 
different organizational routines, managerial practices and styles, communication systems, 
etc (Shimizu, Hitt, Vaidyanath and Pisano, 2004). 
Angwin (2001:35) argued "Due diligence is intended to be an objective, 
independent examination of the acquisition target. In particular, it focuses upon fmancials, 
tax matters, asset valuation, operations, the valuation of a business, and providing 
assurances to the lenders and advisors in the transaction as well as the acquirer's 
management team". The process is intended to provide the acquirer with adequate 
information about the value and risks associated with the target. Cross border M&As 
require special attention to topics such as exchange rates, local taxes, local accounting 
standards, foreign government potential trade regulations (dividends, fees, royalties), risk of 
expropriation, and debt/equity ratios that might be imposed by the foreign government 
(Kissin and Herrera, 1990). 
Considering the complexity and variety of the issues regarding the analysis of a 
foreign target, fIrms often seek help from fmancial and legal advisors in the country where 
the target fIrm is headquartered. Recent work by Angwin (2001) examines how managers 
in Europe use advisors to value the due diligence process. He conducted a survey of 
European firms' top executives regarding national perspectives on due diligence. His 
results showed that interpretations of the due diligence process vary across managers of 
different countries. Specifically, managers from separate European countries stated diverse 
primary objectives for the due diligence process (i.e., help in the negotiation, insight into 
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the existing management, evaluation of the assets, assess cultural fit, help to plan 
integration, commercial insight into the market). Moreover, he found that all aspects of the 
due diligence process were conducted by the acquiring frrm, although acquirers of different 
nationalities tended to rely on external advisors for specific issues (i.e., fmancial), and the 
extent to which advisors were used varied considerably. Angwin (2001) also argued that the 
use of advisors injects external knowledge into the process. Using this approach should 
help avoid path dependence in learning during the due diligence process. 
Table 2.3: Summary of selected studies on the target selection process 
Study Sample Key Findings 
20 acquirer from 10 countries (US, Information should be gathered regarding HR 
Haspeslagh & 
GB, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, practices, organization practices. Leader and 
Switzerland, Sweden, Finland, and management team should be selected to carry 
Jemison (1991) 
Netherlands) during the period 1985- out the integration process. 
1989. 
acquisitions by six 
Cross border M&As require special attention 
Cross border 
countries (UK, France, Germany, 
to topics such as exchange rate, local tax, local 
accounting standards, foreign government 
Angwin (2001) Sweden, Switzerland, and 
Netherlands) during the period 1985-
potential trade policy etc. Due diligence should 
provide adequate information about the value 
1995. 
and risk associated with the target. 
Top management carefully analyze goals of the 
Buono & acquisition, the strategic and organizational fit, 
Bowditch (1989) 
N/A (Book) 
and how to establish commitment of 
employees. 
Despite the importance of this process, we lack studies specifically focused on the due 
diligence involved in cross-border M&As (Table 2.3 presents summary of selected studies 
focusing on target selection process of M&As). On the contrary, research on alliances and 
joint ventures examines in depth the issue of partner selection (Gulati, 1995; Hitt, Dacin, 
Levitas, Arregle and Borza, 2000). For example, in studying the international partner 
selection of frrms from emerging and developed markets, Hitt et al. (2000) found that 
emerging market frrms stress fmancial, technological, and intangible assets, while 
developed market frrms search for resource exploiting opportunities. In examining alliance 
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formation in a longitudinal setting, Gulati (1995) found that the social relationship 
originating from an initial alliance increases the likelihood of a future alliance between the 
same fIrms. 
The selection of the right target fIrm for acquisition can provide the acquirer with a 
strong local network of relationships in the host country. This important topic needs to be 
further examined. Related to this topic is the analysis of the target fIrm's social capital, 
particularly in situations of foreign market uncertainty and information asymmetries. While 
there is some anecdotal research dedicated to practitioners (e.g., Kissin and Herrera, 1990; 
Sebenius, 1998; Emerson, 2001), virtually no scholarly research exists in this area. 
Therefore, more systematic research is needed to unpack the complexities of the due 
diligence process in cross border M&As (Shimizu, et at, 2004). 
Although M&As activity is predominantly driven by a rational economic model, 
cultural attitudes are likely to play a role in influencing target selection decisions 
(Cartwright and Price, 2003). This section presents research investigating whether different 
national managerial groups have similar/dissimilar attitudinal preferences towards foreign 
M&A partners. 
In terms of selecting a compatible foreign acquisitions target, Larsson and Risberg 
(1998) note that organisations tend to prefer to invest in neighbouring territories or those 
with which they have the closest economic, linguistic and cultural ties. The results of the 
survey conducted by Cartwright, Cooper and Jordan (1995) found that mainly the Northern 
European sample of managers showed stronger preferences for merging with other 
Northern European and American organisations. The results found Japan, Italy and Spain 
amongst their least preferred partners. 
Recently, Cartwright and Price (2003) reported the US as the most popular 
preference, with the UK being a close second for each of the analysed nationalities. In 
addition, forty-seven percent of German respondents chose their own nationality, a similar 
percentage of US respondents also chose their own nationality; with 40% of UK 
respondents choosing their own nationality. In 69% of cases the reasons given for their 
choices was perceived cultural compatibility, which was cited as being at least four times as 
important as market potential or management approach. With regards to least preferred 
partner/target, Japan emerged as the least preferred choice for the overall sample and sub 
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sample of national groups. A range of issues relating to incompatible culture and 
differences in working practices dominate the reasons given by respondents for avoiding 
Japan. 
In the context of cross border M&As, research suggests that, given a choice, 
managers would choose to merge or be acquired by a firm from a foreign national culture 
which they perceive to be similar and hence compatible with their own. However, studies 
have not determined to what extent the decisions made by the mangers were influenced by 
cultural stereotypes. Moreover, existing studies have relied heavily upon the Hofstede 
(1980) model of national culture despite its acknowledged limitations (Very et aI., 1998). It 
may be helpful to develop new cultural measures specifIcally tailored for use in M&A 
research (Cartwright and Price, 2003). 
2.4.2 THE NEGOTIATION PROCESS IN CROSS BORDER M&AS 
After the target firm has been selected and the initial due diligence process has been 
completed, the acquiring firm often has to pay a premium price for the acquisition to 
conclude the deal. Thus, the negotiation process becomes important. Much of the studies 
focused on the premium paid by the acquirer of different nationalities. Table 2.4 presents a 
summary of selected studies on the negotiation process. 
Table 2.4: Summary of selected studies on the negotiation process 
Study Sample Key findings 
Inkpen et al. 11,639 M&As of US firms European buyers paid a premium about three times (10,309 US buyers, 446 higher than US buyers did. (2000) 
European buyers) 
The target firms of foreign buyers enjoyed higher 
Harris & 1273 acquisitions of US wealth gains than did the target firms of US buyers. 
Ravenscraft firms between 1970 and They suggested that the higher premium could be the 
(1991) 1987 (1l14 domestic and result of overly aggressive bidding by foreign buyers 
159 cross border) or of a strong will to expand into the US market to 
exploit its general advantages. 
M&As announced by 116 While there is no significant difference within industry 
mean takeover premium levels, the sensitivity of 
Dewenter chemical industry firms and 
takeover premium levels differs across buyers. Market (1995) 268 retail industry firms 
reaction to the buyer's nationality is closely tied to the between 1978-1989 
transaction's characteristics. 
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Researchers found that foreign buyers usually pay high premiums in acquiring U.S. firms 
relative to U.S. buyers (Harris and Ravenscraft, 1991; Inkpen et aI., 2000). For example, 
Inkpen et al. (2000) examined 11,639 technology-based M&As of U.S. firms (10,309 U.S. 
buyers, 446 European buyers) and found that European buyers paid a premium about three 
times higher than U.S. buyers did. Harris and Ravenscraft (1991) examined 1273 
acquisitions of U.S. firms between 1970 and 1987 (1114 domestic and 159 cross border) 
and found that the target firms of foreign buyers enjoyed higher wealth gains than did the 
target firms of U.S. buyers. They suggested that the higher premium could be the result of 
overly aggressive bidding by foreign buyers or of a strong will to expand into the U.S. 
market to exploit its general advantages (compared with their home markets), such as 
market size, well-developed capital markets, political stability, or tariff and tax differences 
between the United States and the bidders' home countries. 
However, in contradiction to their results, Dewenter (1995) found that there is no 
significant difference in the level ofpremiums paid by foreign and domestic bidders. Using 
an integrated theoretical approach based on transaction costs and macroeconomics, 
Dewenter found that while there is no significant differences in the within-industry mean 
takeover premium levels, the sensitivity of takeover premium levels differs across buyers. 
He found that foreign investors pay a higher premium in the case of hostile transactions, but 
also pay less when there are rival bidders. Therefore,. market reactions to the buyer's 
nationality are closely tied to the transaction's characteristics. 
Given the uncertainty associated with foreign investments, professional firms, such 
as investment bankers, play an important role in advising and closing many of the cross 
border deals (Angwin, 2001; Kosnik and Shapiro, 1997). Although issues such as agency 
conflicts between investment banks and client firms have been addressed by scholars 
(Kosnik and Shapiro, 1997) and in the popular business press as well, research on the roles 
of investment bankers in both domestic and cross border M&As is still limited. Given the 
high premiums paid by foreign buyers and the information asymmetries involved in most 
cross border M&As, research on the roles of investment bankers and other professional 
firms (e.g., consultants, law firms, and accounting firms) would add significant value to the 
literature and likely suggest important managerial implications (Shimizu, et aI., 2004) .. 
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2.4.3 PROBLEMS IN TARGET SELECTION AND THE NEGOTIATION PROCESS 
In reality both the purpose and nature of the M&As selection and negotiation process is 
extremely complex. Managers face difficulties in analyzing strategic and organizational fit 
as they are prevented from understanding these factors by a series of problems inherent in 
the process of analyzing, negotiating with, and acquiring the other firm. 
Due diligence is a complex process in all M&As (Hitt, Harrison and Ireland, 
2001a,b). However, in cross border M&As, the evaluation process of the potential target is 
even more complicated at all levels (Kissin and Herrera, 1990). In response to the question 
on the special wrinkles that come up in the due diligence process, Joseph Miller, Chief 
Technology officer of Dupont, commented: 
"Well the first thing is the quality of the information. The quality is variable. And one should be 
persistent with respect to getting the kind of information that you need to do as high a quality 
assessment as possible around the value of the acquisition. However, it's more difficult with 
cross border because you have accounting conventions that might be different from the 
accounting convention of an English company or a German company. And there is need to 
align those accounting conventions so that there's apples and apples comparison. Typically 
what we do in European acquisitions is to use a European legal and accounting teams to deal 
with that for us. The third thing is around regulatory requirements. They're different here than 
they are in Europe. [it is important to have] a better understanding of the timetable so that 
remediation efforts, at plants especially, are known. How much remediation must be done from 
an environmental standpoint, from a safety standpoint, and [in terms of] pending legislation in 
Europe? The answers will be helpful in determining the amount of money that should be 
reserved for the efforts and who's liable for those remediation efforts" (Buckley and Ghauri, 
2002: p 103). 
At the firm level, differences in accounting standards and fluctuating exchange rates 
between different countries may cause difficulties in the evaluation of the target firms' 
fmancial assets. Furthermore, the due diligence process should go beyond the mere 
examination of the fmancial health of the target frrm, providing a thorough analysis of its 
intangible assets and resources (Shimizu, et aI., 2004). This process may require an 
understanding of the educational system, skills, and capabilities of the work force in the 
foreign country. At national and industry levels, the due diligence process must provide an 
understanding of the institutional environment in which the target firm is located, such as 
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government regulations, to effectively respond to potential local constraints, particularly in 
specific industries such as those with high technology standards, in which regulations can 
be extremely sensitive. In this sense, Hall (1992) stresses the relevance of the target's 
reputation as a major factor in the decision to acquire. In fact, the history of a firm in 
responding to the country requirements represents a distinctive strength that the investor 
should always consider in selecting the target. 
In general, the due diligence process largely conforms to organizational learning 
theory and exploratory learning, specifically. While an original structure to the approach is 
needed to ensure that all major areas are evaluated, effective due diligence also has an 
exploratory nature. If some information is identified that poses further questions, answers to 
them must be pursued even if they require movement outside of the original structure. 
Thus, good due diligence can be described as semi-structured, containing both primary and 
exploratory inquiries (Shimizu, et aI., 2004). 
Negotiating a cross border M&A is an extremely complex process. It is made even 
more difficult because of lack of information and the difference in cultures (Buckley and 
Ghaur~ 2002). Scbenius (1998) suggested several guidelines. First, be prepared for a long 
process. Second, divide players into allies, potential allies, and opponents. Third, each of 
these groups should be handled differently and sequentially. Fourth, the negotiation does 
not stop even once the deal is done because you need to ensure the rationale for the deal 
remains viable and continues to create value. Joseph Miller, Chief Technology officer of 
DuPont, who had direct experience in cross border merger and acquisition negotiations, 
commented that: 
''There's a very practical part to this. These (negotiations) are highly draining experiences. And so the 
composition of the team, their preparedness, their physical preparedness of, and the support extended 
to that team to conduct a legitimate negotiation is most important. It's tough. It's draining, The 
importance of understanding human behaviour and resQurcing that team and supporting that team is a 
very important part so that the company gets the best with respect to the deal and inadvertently or 
consciously doesn't give away what might have been kept in the negotiation. So the negotiation is most 
important and the team that conducts it [is importantJ."(Buckley and Ghauri, 2002: p 102) 
On cross border negotiations, Joseph Miller cautions that the acquiring firm must be 
prepared for lots of surprises. "You might understand what you're doing before you go in 
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or think: that you do, but you're going to get lot of surprises in the process"(Buckley and 
Ghauri, 2002: p 103). 
Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) spotted four problems inherent in the decision 
making process. The fIrst problem is the fragmented perspective of the many specialists 
during analysis and decision making. The next problem is the increasing momentum among 
all participants in the process to consummate the transaction. The third problem is the 
ambiguous expectations about key aspects of the acquisitions between both sides of the 
negotiation. The fmal problem is the multiple motives among acquiring managers. Further, 
the authors have linked the severity of these problems to the company's resource allocation 
style which they described as ranging from limited to robust on a number of dimensions. 
The broader problems that tend to limit the effectiveness of a company's resource 
allocation style include: short time horizons, a fmancial results oriented perspective on 
competition, 'limited top management involvement in the substance of the decision, politics 
driving out facts, and a single champion approach to investment responsibility. 
The problems of target selection and negotiation process mentioned so far can be 
managed and dealt with effectively (Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991). However, despite the 
importance of target selection and negotiation process in a cross border context, 
comprehensive research on these processes is still rare. 
2.5 POST-ACQUISITION MANAGEMENT 
This section reviews the literature on post-acquisition management. A number of issues 
have been reviewed such as degree of integration, national culture and integration practices, 
degree of control, speed of post acquisition change, post acquisition change, integration 
stage communication, fostering involvement and promoting involvement, challenges and 
problems in integration process, knowledge transfer and resource based view, human 
resource management. 
These areas are based on a thematic assessment ofthe literature, rather than on clear 
streams of programmatic research. With the exception of research on the antecedents and 
outcomes of top management turnover following acquisition, the integration research, 
especially cross border integration, has not been programmatic (Schweiger and Goulet, 
2000). 
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2.5.1 DEGREE OF INTEGRATION 
The extent to which an acquired company should be integrated into its parent organization 
is a vital decision (Child, Faulkner and Pitkethly, 2001). There have been a number of 
writers who have touched on the extent of integration (Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991; 
Marks and Mirvis, 1998; Child, et aI., 2001). 
Table 2.5: Summary of selected studies on the degree of integration 
Study 
Haspeslagh & 
Jemison (1991) 
Child, Faulkner 
& Pitkethly 
(2001) 
Schweiger 
(1999) 
Sample Key findings 
20 acquirer from 10 Based on the need for strategic interdependence or 
countries (US, GB, organisational autonomy, the authors suggested four 
France, Germany, Italy, different approaches for integration: absorption, 
Japan, Switzerland, preservation, symbiosis, and holding. They also 
Sweden, Finland, and indicated that different types of acquisitions should 
Netherlands) during the be combined with one certain integration approach. 
period 1985-1989. For example, they suggest that domain-strengthening 
acquisitions should use an absorption approach. 
The authors suggested that the degree of integration 
ranges from acquisitions with little integration (1-2 
Interviews with 40 
on the scale), to those where the integration is almost 
acquirer in the UK by 
total (6-7 on the scale). Symbiotic acquisitions can be 
companies from the 
USA, France, Germany, 
Japan 
N/A (Unpublished 
manuscript) 
arranged at intermediate points on the scale 
corresponding to partial integration where some but 
not all functions and departments of the acquired 
firm are integrated to acquiring firm. 
The author suggested that within an acquisition, 
different types of approaches may be used, based on 
functions. He noted that there are four types of 
approaches that might be used within an M&A .:.. 
Combination, Standardization, Coordination, and 
Intervention. 
The overall degree of integration achieved following an acquisition is an issue of great 
interest (Table 2.5 provides the summary of selected studies on the degree of integration). 
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This is because an inappropriate level of integration may be detrimental to perfonnance 
(Child et al., 2001). Thus a tendency to over or under integrate as a result of cultural factors 
hindering integration or pressuring moves towards it may result in sub-optimal solutions. 
Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) have proposed a set of "metaphors" to classify acquisitions 
into four types depending on whether the needs for organisational autonomy and needs for 
strategic interdependence are high or low. 
Need for 
organizational 
autonomy 
High 
Low 
Need for Strategic Interdependence 
Low High 
Preservation Symbiosis 
[Holding] Absorption 
Source: Haspes\agh and Jemison (1991: 145) 
Figure 2.4: Types of acquisition integration approaches 
According to Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991: 146): "Some acquisitions have a high need for 
strategic interdependence, and a low need for organizational autonomy. These acquisitions 
call for what we level an absorption approach to integration. Other acquisitions, to the 
contrary, present a low need for strategic interdependence, but a high need for 
organizational autonomy. We will call the integration approach associated with these 
acquisitions preservation. Other acquisitions are characterized by high needs for 
interdependence and high needs for organizational autonomy. We will use the tenn 
symbiosis to describe the integration approach called for in such acquisitions ..... [the fourth 
type] would be acquisitions where the fIrm has no intention of integrating and creating 
value though anything except fmancial transfers, risk sharing, or general management 
capability .... The only integration is such acquisitions would, in a sense, be mere holding 
activity. " 
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Marks and Mirvis (1998) also take a multi-dimensional view of integration ranging 
from full consolidation to near separation of the companies. They see this range as 
including such forms as separate holding company, strategic control, managed subsidiary, 
operational control and merged and consolidated. The order is presented in increasing 
levels of consolidation of the acquiring and acquired fIrms. Marks and Mirvis also view 
integration from the perspective of degree of change made in either the buyer, the target or 
in both fIrms. Similar to Haspeslagh and Jemison, they identify fIve approaches i.e. 
absorption, preservation, best of both, transformation and reverse merger. 
Whereas Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) and Marks and Mirvis (1998) view each 
acquisition representing a different type of integration, Schweiger (1999) notes that, within 
an acquisition, different types of approaches may be used, based on functions, geographical 
areas and product lines. He notes. that there are four types of approaches that might be used 
within an M&A. 
1. Combination - The extent to which the separate functions and activities of both the 
acquirer and the target fIrms are physically consolidated into one. 
2. Standardization - The extend to which the separate functions and activities from 
both fIrms are standardized and formalized, but not physically consolidated. This is 
typical when acquirers formally transfer best practices across the flrm. 
3. Coordination - The extent to which functions and activities of both fIrms are 
coordinated. 
4. Intervention - The extent to which interventions are made in the acquired fIrm to 
turnaround poor cash flow or operating profits, regardless of inherent sources of 
combination value. 
Whichever way one looks at mergers and acquisitions there appears to be a potential 
continuum in the degree on integration. Child, Faulkner and Pitkethly (2001) demonstrated 
the cross border acquisition with varying degrees of integration. This is illustrated in flgure 
2.5. They suggested that the degree of integration ranges from acquisitions with little 
integration (1-2 on the scale, corresponding to Haspeslagh and Jemison's Preservation and 
Holding) to those where the integration is almost total (6-7 on the scale, corresponding to 
Haspeslagh and Jemison's Absorption). Symbiotic acquisitions can be arranged at 
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intermediate points on the scale corresponding to partial integration where some but not all 
functions and departments of the acquired firm are integrated with the acquiring firm. 
Figure 2.5 also suggests the way in which the integration of the new subsidiary may 
vary. With a low level of integration (1-2), regular fmancial and other operating figures will 
be required for the parent to monitor the performance ofthe subsidiary. With a higher level 
of integration (3-5), the new parent is likely to take over and run centrally whole areas of 
activity. This is likely to cover strategy, and may involve fmance, personnel policy and 
systems, procurement, product development, IT systems and possibly the whole area of 
branding and management of the company image. The highest integration levels (6-7) 
correspond to total absorption into the parent organization. Brand names may be retained if 
they are strong but, particularly in service organisations, may be discontinued after a 
transitional period. 
ri~:::=lii:l?, I 
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Not Integrated Partially Integrated Fully Integrated 
Figure 2.5: Degree ofIntegration 
2.5.2 NATIONAL CULTURE AND INTEGRATION PRACTICES 
Several studies have examined the influence of national culture on cross border M&As 
integration practices. Table 2.6 presents summary of selected studies on national culture 
and integration practices. 
Research by Morosini and Singh (1994) examined the relationship between the 
degree of cultural distance between acquirers and acquired firms and the degree of 
integration and its effect on organizational performance. Their longitudinal study, of 65 
western European and US firms involved in cross border acquisitions, used Hofstede's 
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uncertainty avoidance and individualism/collectivism dimensions to characterize national 
culture. The results indicated that the higher the uncertainty avoidance of the acquired 
company's national culture, the stronger the relationship between an independence strategy 
(of the acquired fIrm) and profItability one year after acquisition. Conversely, in countries 
with lower uncertainty avoidance, integration was signifIcantly related to profItability; no 
effect was found relating uncertainty avoidance to productivity growth. Morosini and Singh 
(1994) also found that in highly individualistic societies a lower level of post acquisition 
integration appeared to lead to higher productivity growth one year after acquisition. On the 
other hand, the relationship between individualism and integration was not found to 
influence profItability growth. 
Table 2.6: Summary of studies on national culture and integration practices 
Study 
Morosini & 
Singh (1994) 
Calori, 
Lubatkin & 
Very (1994) 
Lubatkin et a1. 
(1998) 
Sample 
65 cross border 
acquisitions 
between Italy and 
Western European 
and US during the 
period 1987-1992 
75 cross border 
Acquisitions in 
Europe (UK and 
France) during the 
period 1987-1989 
83 French and 
British domestic 
and cross border 
acquisitions 
during the period 
1987-1989 
Key findings 
The higher the uncertainty avoidance of the acquired 
company's national culture, the stronger the relationship 
between an independence strategy (of the acquired firm) 
and profitability one year after acquisition. Conversely, in 
countries with lower uncertainty avoidance, integration 
was significantly related to profitability; no effect was 
found relating uncertainty avoidance to productivity 
growth. 
The findings tend to support the significance of 
Hofstede's cultural dimensions, and indicate that 
differences exist among integration measures practiced 
by national heritage of acquirer. For instance, French 
acquirers tend to exercise higher formal controls than do 
US and British acquirers. This is consistent with 
Hofstede's cultural dimension of uncertainty avoidance, 
in which France is known to score higher than both the 
US and UK. 
French acquirers were found to rely more on centralized 
headquarters-subsidiary controls, so that power and 
influence resides at the hierarchical top, than were the 
British. The research findings are consistent; national 
differences do in fact exist, and they are significantly 
related to post acquisition integration procedures 
employed by the acquirer. 
Another study, of 75 cross border acquisitions, by Calor~ Lubatkin and Very (1994), 
examined the integration procedures practiced by US, British and French acquirers of both 
British and French acquired fIrms. Their fmdings tend to support the signifIcance of 
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Hofstede's cultural dimensions, and indicate that differences exist among integration 
measures practiced by national heritage of acquirer. For instance, their study found that 
French acquirers tend to exercise higher formal controls than do US and British acquirers. 
This is consistent with Hofstede's cultural dimension of uncertainty avoidance, in which 
France is known to score higher than both the US and UK. Other results indicated that the 
types of integration measures practiced were significantly related to post acquisition 
performance. 
The study also found that the higher the informal personal efforts of the 
management of the buying firm, the higher the economic performance of the acquired firm 
and, conversely, the level of control exercised by the acquirer over the acquired firm's 
operations is negatively correlated with economic performance. These results indicate that 
for British and French acquired firms the use of informal integration mechanisms yield 
higher post-acquisition performance. Acquirers must therefore be aware of how they may 
be culturally predisposed to approach integration of acquired firms in an effort to maximize 
M&A performance. 
Lubatkin et a1. (1998) extended the above fmdings in a subsequent study. Their 
study of 83 French and British domestic and cross border acquisitions found a significant 
relationship between national heritage of acquirers and the administrative approaches used 
by mangers during merger integration. The French .express a greater acceptance of power 
distance and demonstrate a greater degree of uncertainty avoidance than do the British. As 
a result, French acquirers, compared to the British, were found to rely more on centralized 
headquarters-subsidiary controls, so that power and influence resides at the hierarchical top. 
The research findings are consistent; national differences do in fact exist, and they are 
significantly related to post acquisition integration procedures employed by the acquirer. 
2.5.3 DEGREE OF CONTROL 
When one company acquires another it needs to exercise some control over the acquired 
company (Pitkethly, Faulkner and Child, 2003). Control is in many ways the antithesis of 
trust since the greater the level of trust between the companies the less the perceived need 
for right control systems (Faulkner, 1998). 
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Control can take a variety of forms. Control systems may be limited to control over 
budgets and capital expenditure. They may involve appointing staff to key positions in the 
subsidiary company, carrying out certain important functions like planning and personnel in 
the parent company, or imposing 'need for approval' requirements on identified decisions 
(Geringer and Hebert, 1989). The control system selected illustrates the degree to which the 
parent is willing to grant a level of autonomy to the newly acquired subsidiary, and may be 
crucial in terms of influencing the level ofmotivation of the acquired company personnel. 
Research has also shown that managers from different countries are likely to' 
implement different control systems and use different managerial practices in acquired 
firms. Table 2.7 presents a summary of a selection of studies on degree of control. 
Table 2.7: Summary of selected studies on degree of control 
Study Sample Key findings 
25 British firms acquired by The French exercise higher formal control by 
French Firms, 21 British firms centralization than the Americans with the exception 
acquired by U.S. firms, 16 of formal control over individual managers and 
Calori et al. 
French firms acquired by financial resources. Americans exercise higher (1994) 
British firms, and 13 French informal control through teamwork than the French. 
firms acquired by U.S. firms, Americans exercise higher formal control through 
1987-1989 procedures than the British. 
French acquiring firms rely more on managerial 
35 French and 48 British firms transfer than British firms. French firms are higher in 
Lubatkin et that were acquired either by strategic control than British firms. The British and 
al. (1998) French or British firms French acquiring firms appear to adhere to their own 
between 1987-1989 unique mix of control structures, regardless of whether 
they are merging domestically or cross-nationally. 
By employing a theoretical framework based on national cultural differences and 
governance, Calor~ Lubatkin and Very (1994) examined the use of control mechanisms and 
showed that acquirers are influenced by their national culture (national administrative 
heritage). Moreover, Lubatkin, Calori, Very and Veiga (1998) found that French acquiring 
firms rely more on managerial transfer and use more strategic control than do British firms. 
In characterizing different integration styles, Child et al. (2001) call American acquirers 
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"absorbers", Japanese acquirers "preservers'" and French acquirers "colonialists". They 
found that any set of controls could be successful if managed effectively. Additionally, 
recent surveys have shown that countries differ greatly in the types of corporate governance 
mechanisms used (Gedajlovic and Shapiro, 1998; Short, 1994). As a result, agency theory 
may apply more readily in individualistic cultures, such as the United States, than in more 
collectivistic cultures common in Asian countries. Given this scenario, governance 
problems related to post-M&A integration require more study (Shimizu, et aI., 2004). 
2.5.4 SPEED OF POST ACQUISITION CHANGE 
The pace of implementing the post-acquisition changes is a conflicting issue in the 
literature. Some researchers argue that immediately after the close of the deal there is a 
period when employees at the acquired company expect and even welcome change (Searby, 
1969; Shrivastava, 1986), while other researchers argue that firms should 'go slow' and 
prepare employees for change and reorganization (Yunker, 1983). 
Management's ability to implement changes affects the way employees perceive the 
trustworthiness of post-acquisition leadership. Researchers, who encourage quick change, 
argue that since employees anticipate reorganisation in the acquired company, quick-
change implementation helps reduce uncertainty (Searby, 1969; Shrivastava, 1986). Some 
researchers argue that slow-change implementation is not a result of strategic planning, but 
a sign of ineffective management (Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991). In a similar vein, 
Schmidt and Schettler (1999) argue that there is an incremental resistance to change over 
time. 
In contrast, there is an argument that employees in a state of shock after an 
acquisition can only accommodate a limited amount of change initially; and, therefore, 
advocate a gradualist approach (Buono and Bowditch, 1989). Rosnow (1988) argues that 
the acquiring management requires time to learn about the acquired company before 
designing and implementing change. Frequent and helpful communication during this 
period will increase employee trust of management and will make reorganisation easier 
subsequently. Furthermore, a gradualist approach permits greater learning about markets 
and environments, especially important in cross border M&As. 
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As noted earlier, there is debate in the literature on the timing of post-acquisition 
changes; but the literature (for example, Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991) has not paid 
sufficient attention to cross border acquisitions, where national culture differences would 
seem to suggest a gradualist approach. Quah and Young (2005) support this view that the 
changes should take place over a period of time and not immediately after the M&A. This 
not only allows the acquirer to learn about its new business and markets, but also facilitates 
cultural understanding (national and organisational). Rapid implementation runs the risk of 
a haemorrhaging of senior executives, causing long-tenn damage to the business. 
Both management consultants and academic researchers have empirically tested the 
role of speed of integration on M&As performance. Table 2.8 presents a summary of a 
selection of studies on the speed of integration. 
Table 2.8: A summary of selected studies on the speed of integration 
Study Sample Key findings 
The timing of changes should take place over a period of 
time and not immediately after the M&A. This not only 
Quah and Young 4 Cross border M&As by allows the acquirer to learn about its new business and 
one American company markets, but also facilitates cultural understanding (2005) during the period 1991- (national and organisational). Rapid implementation runs 
1995 the risk ofa haemorrhaging of senior executives, causing 
long-term damage to the business. 
Survey of executives in 
Price Waterhouse 125 companies across a A quick implementation of changes is beneficial because it 
Coopers (2000) broad range of industries minimizes the amount of uncertainty among members of 
in 1999; 72% of firms the combining firms. 
were U.S.-based. 
152 trans-Atlantic deals 
Mercer Consulting from 1994 to 1999 using Success of the deal depends on careful planning, and 2-year post deal (2001) 
comparison to industry speedy, well-directed implementation. 
specific S&P stock price 
index 
3 case studies of Dutch- A slow integration process can be appropriate to minimize Olie (1994) German merger conflicts between the merging partners. 
7 Case studies of 
Ranft and Lord acquisitions in high A slow integration can enhance trust building between the 
(2002) technology section merging firms' employees. 
between 2000-2002 
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A number of management consulting frrms have published empirical studies on M&A 
performance which also consider the role of speed as a potential success factor (Mercer 
Management Consulting, 1997; Price WaterhouseCoopers, 2000). These studies provide 
some evidence that speed of integration may be positively correlated with M&A success. It 
is typically argued that a quick implementation of changes is beneficial because it 
minimizes the amount of uncertainty among members of the combining firrns. However, 
although based on large samples, these studies do not meet basic requirements of empirical 
academic research in terms of sampling, construct measurement, and data analysis. 
The limited academic work that addresses speed of integration includes studies by 
Bragado (1992), Gerpott (1995), Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991), Homburg and Bucerius 
(2005), Inkpen, Sundaram, and Rockwood (2000), Olie (1994), and Ranft and Lord (2002). 
Inkpen et al. (2000) conducted a case-based analysis of various acquisitions of six 
technology-based companies. These authors identified speed of integration as an important 
driver of successful post acquisition integration. On the other hand, Otie (1994) notes, on 
the basis of several case studies, that a slow integration process can be appropriate to 
minimize conflicts between the merging partners. In line with that, Ranft and Lord (2002) 
found (also on the bases of several case studies) that a slow integration can enhance trust 
building between the merging firms' employees. These researchers' work is, however, 
entirely qualitative in nature and does not provide a statistical analysis of the relationship 
between speed of integration and success. 
Gerpott (1995) conducted a large-scale empirical study focusing on the integration 
of R&D functions among merging manufacturing firms. He found that centralization of 
R&D in the post merger integration phase and speed of integration has a joint positive 
impact (i.e., an interaction effect) on M&A success. Also, ba~ed on several case studies, 
Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) argue that the type of acquisition integration approach 
(including speed of integration) depends on the joint influence of the need for strategic 
interdependence and the need for organizational autonomy of the involved firms. Bragado 
(1992) provides an extensive discussion of the 'correct speed for post merger integration.' 
He argues that under certain conditions a slow approach to post merger integration may be 
superior to a fast approach. His key argument is that a period of studying and understanding 
between the employees of the two companies is often needed. This author further argues 
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that the appropriate speed of integration depends on the 'fit' (Bragado, 1992: 27) of the 
involved firms, especially on their cultural fit. 
In summary, we fmd that research on performance implications of speed of 
integration is very sparse. More specifically, there is very limited empirical academic study 
on cross border M&As performance where speed of integration is considered in depth. 
2.5.5 POST ACQUISITION CHANGE 
Research in this area is stilI highly fragmented, especially in the cross border context. 
Attention in the literature is given to the human resource management issues, which include 
human resource planning and downsizing, training, and changes to systems for 
communications and rewards (Napier, 1989). There is little research into the timing and 
effects of post-acquisition changes. Angwin (1998) suggests that there are clear parallels 
bctwecn post-acquisition management and corporate turnarounds, and draws upon 
turnaround studies such as Slatter (1984) and Grinyer et a1. (1988) to identify the main 
areas of change involved. These major changes in management include the replacement of 
the Chief Executive Officer (CEO); stronger fmancial controls; intensive efforts to reduce 
production costs; an increased importance given to marketing, especially customer relations 
and a new product market focus; and debt reduction. The evidence also indicates that CEOs 
appointed from outside the acquired company will replace more subordinates and generally 
bring about more change than will insider CEOs who hold continuing appointments or 
come from other positions within the acquired firm. 
There are discernible differences between approaches to post acquisition change by 
companies of different nationalities, irrespective of the international experience of the 
acquirer or the economic condition of the subsidiary. Faulkner, Child and Pitkethly (2003) 
found distinctive approaches were taken by US, Japanese, German and French companies 
to bring about change in newly acquired companies. They found that the changing process 
in US cross border acquisition tended to be characterized by three main features: (a) 
changes was initiated by the new parent company, (b) it is often effected by absorption into 
the parent company in the manner described by Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991), and (c) 
strong backing is usually given to new subsidiaries, not just in the form of fmance, but also 
in support activities and technology. In contrast, Japanese company attitudes towards 
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acquisition, and to implementation of change following them, differed quite markedly from 
US and other nationalities. Most of the change came from the subsidiaries themselves, 
rather than from the Japanese parent companies. However, the support provided by the 
Japanese parent companies, particularly fmance, played a large role in making 
implementation of such subsidiary initiatives possible. 
Faulkner et al. (2003) also found the French style tended to be 'centralist'. They 
either appointed a new French Managing Director or took decisions after discussion in 
France, or they left the local team in day to day charge of operations but determined high 
level strategy at headquarters. This contrasts somewhat with Calori, Lubatkin and Very's 
(1994) experience that the French tended to exercise high formal control of both strategy 
and operations. The French approach was generally effective. On the contrary, German 
companies were found to be less successful or less certain in their methods (Faulkner et aI., 
2003). There was no discernible German method of change-making, as their actions varied 
from appointing a Managing Director and giving orders to leaving well alone and hoping 
for the best. This eclectic, perhaps unfocussed, and largely non-interventionist approach 
achieved no turnarounds in their troubled acquisitions, but maintained profit in their 
profitable ones. 
2.5.6 INTEGRATION STAGE COMMUNICATION IN CBM&AS 
Communication has been identified as the major intervention for reducing the uncertainty 
of people going through M&A (Schweiger and Goulet, 2000). However, few studies have 
examined the impact of communication and differences in communication style in the cross 
border context. 
In the integration phase of an acquisition a lot of decisions are made concerning the 
future operations of the company. These decisions are often specific and made by a small 
group of managers. The majority of the people in the workplace are unaware of these. In 
order to keep them motivated to work and committed to the company constant 
communication about decisions and how the change proceeds is needed (Risberg, 1996). As 
more information on the implications of change becomes known, it should be transmitted to 
the employees concerned in order to decrease the uncertainty they feel. Especially, extra 
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attention should be paid to informing about work and role related details as they become 
known (Klein, 1996). 
The methods and style of communication adopted by a parent company in dealing 
with a foreign subsidiary varies depending on the nationalities. Pitkethly et al. (2003) found 
the US to be professional communicators relishing the use of frrst names, regular meetings 
at all levels, notice boards with mission and vision statements on them and company 
newspaper. Communication between Japanese companies and their UK subsidiaries was 
found not as easy or open in comparison. German companies on the other had appeared to 
veer between the stimy formal and the self conscious, while French companies seemed to 
suffer little self-doubt, communicating well amongst themselves but informing subsidiary 
staff only on a 'need to know' basis and adopting what one interviewee referred to as a 
generally 'colonial attitude'. 
Although research on the impact of communication in the cross border context is 
sparse, a number of studies have examined the impact of communication in the domestic 
context. A three case study by Bastien (1987) examined the impact of acquisition on 21 
acquired managers. He found the impact of communication appeared to be associated with 
both positive reactions toward the acquirer, stabilization of volatile situations and 
minimization of management resignations. Regardless of the form of communications 
honesty was found to be important. In a study of 51 frrms, Shanley (1988) examined the 
effects of communication on perceived acquisition performance. There were significant 
positive relationships between the use of training or information programs and the 
placement of acquiring corporate personnel at the acquired frrm's site. Similarly, Schweiger 
and DeNisi (1991) examined the impact of communication during a merger on a number of 
employees' reactions, all of which are believed to affect the success of the integration 
process. 
On an overall basis, these studies provide enough evidence that the method and 
style of communication can have direct or indirect impact on the integration outcome. 
Further research is needed on the impact of communication in the cross border context.· 
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2.5.7 FOSTERING INVOLVEMENT AND PROMOTING LEARNING 
The management of the integration transition process can significantly affect the success of 
the subsequent integration (Marks and Mirvis, 1998). The objective of this process is to 
ensure that conditions for cooperation, commitment and learning, among people from 
merging f]fms, are created and that decisions on how to combine the frrms are based on 
sound information (Schweiger, 1999). To that end, a number of studies have examined the 
integration transitions process. Studies have broadly examined two issues, involvement of 
acquired people in the integration process and approaches for facilitating learning between 
the combining f]fms. Table 2.9 and 2.10 provides a summary of studies focusing on 
fostering involvement and promoting learning, respectively. 
a. Fostering Involvement 
In a case study of three Dutch and German international mergers, Olie (1994) observed an 
effort to preserve parity (i.e., the balancing of positions assigned to acquiring and acquired 
firms managers) between the merging frrms. This was accomplished through a transition 
structure of equal representation, from both firms, on the board of directors and in other key 
management positions. Although this structure was found initially to eliminate conflict, it 
did not lead to a true integration of the two firms. 
Table 2.9: Summary of selected studies on fostering involvement 
Study Sample Key findings 
Three cross border The author observed an effort to preserve parity between 
Olie (1994) Dutch and German the merging firm with respect to positions assigned to 
mergers acquiring and acquired firms' managers. 
The extent of interaction and coordination during the 
organizational integration process was the strongest 
Larsson & 61 domestic & cross predictor of synergy realization. The authors argue that it 
Finkelstein border acquisitions may not be enough for a merger or acquisition to have 
(1999) during the period potential synergies to exploit. Structural and process 1960-1989 changes must be undertaken that allow those synergies to 
be realized. 
The study found that this structure did not reconcile the different styles of management 
between the Dutch (congenial and informal) and German (autocratic and formal) firms, and 
distrust between certain departments was never reconciled (i.e. sales departments retained 
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their pre merger perceptions as competitors). In addition, board members felt a greater 
attachment to their respective home structures than to the newly combined firm. Integration 
did not take hold until the parity of power, responsibility and authority, between Dutch and 
German firms, was abandoned and board members and managers in key positions were 
primarily selected on the basis of capability. Only under this structure were the combined 
firms able to shape a common identity that allowed for the benefits of integration. 
The post-acquisition structure of the successful International Computers Ltd (lCL) 
acquisition of Nokia-Data (NO) in 1991 (Mayo and Hadaway, 1994) supports the Olie 
fmdings. This combination created managerial positions that were granted based on 
capability, rather than parity, with the acquired firm overseeing a majority of the combined 
firm's operations in Europe. In addition, the ICL-ND combination utilized in-house 
integration teams, consisting of mangers from both companies, to reach conclusions 
together on proposals regarding organization, process and people. Training in national 
inter-cultural understanding between the UK and Finnish firms, respectively, and 
persuading managers deemed critical to the integration process to stay, aided the integration 
process. Moreover, an integration director position in headquarters was created to assist and 
support (not direct) the integration process, and full-time local integration managers were 
appointed to coordinate various integration activities at the local level. This transition 
structure exhibited that integration was a serious exercise, requiring dedicated resources 
and involvement of all participants, and as such the combined firm was able to understand 
the importance of shared education to build shared vision and values (Schweiger and 
Goulet, 2000). 
Also supporting a high degree of involvement in integrating combining 
organizations is a study of synergy realization, involving 61 domestic and cross border 
acquisitions, by Larsson and Finkelstein (1999). They found that the extent of interaction 
and coordination during the organizational integration process was the strongest predictor 
of synergy realization. The authors argue that it may not be enough for a merger or 
acquisition to have potential synergies to exploit. Structural and process changes must be 
undertaken that allow those synergies to be realized. 
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b. Promoting Learning 
A number of studies have focused on promoting learning during the cross border 
integration process. It is argued that by facilitating interaction and the sharing of 
information and feelings, conflict between people of combining companies will be more 
effectively managed, and better solutions for the new organization will be reached. These 
then will result in a more effective integration process. 
In a study of 35 acquisitions of Central East European companies, by western 
companies, Villinger (1996) found that both Western and Central Eastern European fIrms 
placed greater value on manager's general business skills than on their cross border 
management skills (e.g. understanding of the partner's language, general sensitivity to the 
merger partner). Paradoxically, the author also found that these same cross-border skills 
proved to be more important in facilitating learning and successful integration. These 
fmdings led the author to suggest that following cross border acquisition, language training 
and cultural awareness workshops should become a main focus of employee development, 
to facilitate learning and the consequent transfer of business-related skills. 
Table 2.10: Summary of studies on promoting learning 
Study Sample Key findings 
35 Cross border The author suggested that following cross border 
Villingcr acquisitions in central acquisition language training and cultural awareness 
east European workshops should become a main focus of employee (1996) 
companies during development, to facilitate learning and the consequent 
ther peiod 1993-1994 transfer of business-related skills. 
With respect to managerial and socia-cultural integration, 
3 cross border communication, leadership, involvement of acquired Hakanson 
acquisitions by three people and face to face personal relationships among (1995) Swedish companies people from both organizations were found important to facilitate partnerships and collaborative working 
environments. 
With increased experience, acquirers do learn what does 
Haleblian & 449 acquisitions of and does not apply from previous contexts and utilize that 
Finkelstein manufacturer information to improve the subsequent performance of 
(1999) companies during the acquisitions. Performance is greater in cases where firms period 1980-1992 make acquisitions similar to those that they made in the 
past. 
Hakanson (1995) examined the integration of R&D units in three cross border acquisitions 
by three Swedish multinational companies. He found that managerial, socio-cultural, 
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technical and procedural issues were critical to successful integration, especially in 
symbiotic acquisitions (See Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991). With respect to managerial 
and socio-cultural integration, communication, leadership, involvement of acquired people 
and face to face personal relationships among people from both organizations were 
important to facilitate partnerships and collaborative working environments. 
A study by Haleblian and Finkelstein (1999) addressed another aspect of learning. 
Rather than focusing on the process of learning, among counterparts of combining 
companies, they focused ~n whether companies learn and improve their acquisition 
performance with experience. In a study involving 449 acquisitions of manufacturers, they 
found that relatively inexperienced acquirers, after making their fIrst acquisition, 
inappropriately generalize the next acquisitions. More experienced acquirers, however, 
appropriately distinguish between their acquisitions. The results suggests that, with 
increased experience, acquirers do indeed learn what does and does not apply from 
previous contexts and utilize that information to improve the subsequent performance of 
acquisitions. Moreover, performance is greater in cases where fIrms make acquisitions 
similar to those that they made in the past. 
2.5.8 CHALLENGES & PROBLEMS IN CROSS BORDER INTEGRATION 
Integrating the firms is a process fraught with diffIculty. Researchers suggest that 
integration is very challenging and have identifIed numerous problems that the acquirer 
faces when integrating (Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991; Cartwright and Cooper, 1996; 
Marks and Mirvis, 1998; Hubbard, 1999; Habeck, Kroger and Tram, 2000; Schweiger and 
Goulet, 2000; Schweiger, 2002). The problem is more complex in cross border acquisitions 
than in purely domestic ones given the differences of national culture between firms 
(Hopkins, 1999). 
The literature on integration is eclectic (Schweiger and Very, 2003). While most of 
the studies focused on the human issues (e.g. Risberg, 1999; Larsson and Risberg, 1998; 
Haspcslagh and Jemison, 1991; Hambrick and Cannella 1993), few studies have 
concentrated on acquisition integration issues (e.g. Schweiger and Goulet, 2000; Morosini 
et al., 1998; Very et al., 1997; Weber et al., 1996). Based on previous research, fIve major 
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issues pertaining to the integration process can be identified. Each of the issues is briefly 
described in the subsequent sub-sections. 
a. Individual uncertainty and ambiguity 
Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991: 187) stated ''the immediate post acquisition is pregnant with 
expectations, questions and reservations, among the personnel and the managers of both the 
acquired and acquiring organizations." During this period some employees perceive threats 
while others perceive opportunities. Risberg (1999), and Larsson and Risberg (1998) make 
a distinction between two kinds of issues: uncertainly and ambiguity. Uncertainty occurs 
when employees feel a lack of information. Ambiguity is characterized by the 
inconsistency of information provided to the employees. More communication is itself not 
sufficient for resolving ambiguous situations; what prevails is the consistency and clarity of 
the future communication flows (Feldman, 1991). 
Uncertainty and ambiguity explain why employees react to a merger announcement 
and to the inherent changes. They are concerned about their future in the combining 
organization. Consequently, these issues contribute to a loss of productivity; defection of 
competent executives, managers and employees; absenteeism; poor morale; safety 
problems; and resistance to change during the first months of the post-acquisition period 
(Schweiger and DeNisi, 1991; Cartwright and Cooper, 1996; Marks and Mirvis, 1998). 
Subsequently, it contributes to value leakage and an inability to realize projected cash flows 
and synergies. 
b. Organizational politics 
M&As often lead to a change in ownership for acquired firms, which leads to changes in 
their organization and management practices (Schweiger and Very, 2003). Power bases are 
also likely to shift as authority structures change and sources of power (e.g. expertise) 
needed in the organization change. As these happen instability is created, as employees 
perceive threats or opportunities; i.e. some people will perceive that they have "gained" 
whereas others will perceive that they have "lost". 
These conditions are ideal antecedents to organization politics - that is to say ''those 
activities taken within organizations to acquire, develop, and use power and other resources 
to obtain one's preferred outcomes" (Pfeffer, 1980:7). Consequently, M&As can create an 
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excellent context for political tactics like scapegoating, controlling information, networking 
or manipulating people. As Pfeffer and Salancik (1977) argued, the greater the 
organizational politics the greater the SUb-optimization within organizations; thus, if too 
many people jockey for their own interests, the overall frrm's performance is likely to 
decline. 
Power and politics have rarely been the direct focus of cross border M&A research. 
However, two studies have focused on power and politics in the context of domestic 
M&As. The fIrst is Schweiger, Ivancevich, Power (1987) who studied executive actions for 
managing human resources before and after a merger. They found that one of the greatest 
challenges for executives was to minimize warfare among employees and to avoid "playing 
favourites" especially in staffmg decisions. In other words, effective managers were 
perceived as those who avoided or minimized political behaviour. 
The second is research on the "theory of relative standing" which has been used to 
explain top-management behaviours (e.g. Hambrick and Cannella, 1993). This theory 
asserts that the status an employee feels for himself in a social setting is based on how he 
compares his status to others in a proximate social setting. According to Hambrick and 
Cannella (1993:736) "acquired executives are placed in a new social setting in which 
comparisons to acquiring executives as well as comparisons to their prior situation are 
inevitable and salient". This line of research suggests that the loss of standing, and resulting 
loss of power and stature, can lead to the turnover of executives. When this happens there 
may be a loss of leadership talent need to drive the changes required to realize synergies 
and cash flows. 
Finally, political behaviour during a merger can foster so much internal 
organizational competition that executives, managers and employees fail to attend to 
external competition and other important market and business issues (Haspeslagh and 
Jemison, 1991). Again, the net result can be unrealized synergies and cash flows as 
customers defect to aggressive competitors. In conclusion, political behaviour can lead to 
the loss of key people, the de-motivation of others needed to implement changes to realize 
synergies and cash flows. 
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c. Voluntary departure of key people 
Key people are those who are necessary for value preservation (e.g. relationships with key 
customers) or synergy realization (e.g. important technology knowledge). Their retention 
becomes critical to the success of an acquisition (Schweiger and Very, 2003). Table 2.11 
presents summary of selected studies on voluntary departure of key people. 
Employee or top management voluntary turnover is seen as a consequence of what 
Buono and Bowditch (1989) called "dysfunctional combination-related behaviours", citing 
the example of a merger where engineers and scientists left during the integration phase. 
Jemison and Sitkin (1986a) suggested that such turnover could potentially come from 
acquirer arrogance. Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) underlined that those who leave are 
often the most talented. The reason is that they can easily fmd a new job. 
Table 2.11: Summary of selected studies on voluntary departure of key people 
Study 
Krug & Hegarty 
(2001) 
Krug&Nigh 
(1998) 
Sample 
273 managers (182 stay, 91 
leave) in 90 U.S. firms 
acquired by foreign firms 
and 54 U.S. firms acquired 
by U.S. firms between 1986-
1989. 
210 U.S. target firms 
acquired by a non-U.S. 
acquirer between 1986-
1989 
Key Findings 
Perceptions of acquired firm managers regarding 
merger announcement, top management team 
interactions, and long-term effects influence whether 
they stay or leave. 
Top management departures in US companies acquired 
by a non-US firm are positively associated with the 
cultures between the US and the home country of the 
foreign MNC, the level of international integration 
among the subunits of multinational firms within the 
target industry, the foreign acquirer's US acquisition 
experience. Top management departures in US 
companies acquired by a non-U.S. firm are negatively 
associated with the pre-acquisition performance in the 
US target company, the interaction between the US -
foreign country cultural distance and the international 
experience of the foreign acquirer, and the interaction 
between target company pre-acquisition performance 
and the US acquisition experience of the foreign 
acquirer. 
Most of the research dealing with voluntary departure focuses on top-managers. For 
instance, Walsh (1988) found that acquisitions cause increased top management turnover in 
comparison with ordinary conditions. In most studies, researchers do not make clear 
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distinctions between voluntary and involuntary turnover in their empirical work, although 
they build their framework and interpret their results from a voluntary perspective. 
Reviewing past research on that theme, Risberg (1999) concluded that results do not clearly 
help us understand why managers leave a company. But she agreed that top management 
voluntary turnover is a problem many acquirers face and have to overcome in order to keep 
valuable skills and knowledge. Therefore, departure of valuable employees is likely to 
threaten the intrinsic value of the integrating fIrms and prevents the realization of synergies 
and cash flows. 
Weber et al. (1996) argued that national cultural differences produce more stress, 
negative attitudes toward the merger, and less cooperatio~ than corporate culture 
differentials do in cross-border M&As. Krug and Hegarty (2001) pointed out that 
executives of fIrms acquired by foreign organizations are more likely to leave than those 
acquired by domestic fIrms. The loss of these executives viewed from a Resource Based 
View often represents a serious reduction in valuable resources, thereby decreasing the 
value of the fIrm acquired. Employing an upper echelons theoretical perspective, Krug and 
Hegarty (2001) stressed the importance of being sensitive to the perceptions of the merger 
by the acquired fIrm executives, the top management interactions, and the long-term effects 
of the transaction. This idea is consistent with the argument of Hitt et al. (200Ia,b) that 
successful cross-border M&As require managers and other key personnel in the acquiring 
fIrm to develop a global mindset. A global mind set helps managers view the acquired fIrm 
not from an idiosyncratic cultural perspective, but from a broader perspective recognizing 
the value of different cultural perspectives. 
d. Loss of customers 
Many stakeholders are affected by an acquisition: customers, bankers, suppliers, and 
competitors (Csiszar and Schweiger, 1994; Schweiger, 2002). However, research on issues 
related to stakeholders is very poor. The limited research tends to focus on customers. 
Many researchers cite loss of clients as a major threat characterizing acquisitions, but most 
of them only posit relationships, interpretations or explanations for customer defection. 
Hax and Majluf (1996) used the Merck-Medco merger to explain how vertical 
integration changed a customer-supplier relationship into competitive rivalry. Such a 
change in the rules of the game may benefIt a merging firm's initial competitors. Customers 
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may also leave when they perceive, like employees, uncertainty or ambiguity about the 
future; or when they are concerned about whether existing contracts and agreements will be 
honoured after a deal is closed (Csiszar and Schweiger, 1994); when the merger leads to too 
much concentration of their suppliers; or when they have to deal with new procedures and 
polices (Buono and Bowditch, 1989). Whatever the motivation for exiting, retaining and 
satisfying the most important customers of both fIrms remains necessary to sustain the 
fIrm's historical revenues, and thus avoid value leakage. Moreover, loss of customers can 
also affect expected synergies like cross selling that is aimed at enhancing revenues and 
thus cash flows. 
e. Cultural resistance 
Schweiger and Goulet (2000), in their review of the literature, conclude that culture is a 
complex issue. Organizational cultural difference and clashes are identifIed by most 
researchers and practitioners as primary cause of M&A failure, both in domestic and cross 
border deals. However, some research comparing domestic and cross border deals, suggests 
alternative fmdings (e.g. Larsson and Finkelstein, 1999; Morosini et aI., 1998; Very et a1., 
1997; Weber et a1., 1996). This research tends to show that the existence of cultural 
distance might not be directly associated with poor performance. Conclusions indicate that 
the relationship with performance is more complex that initially assumed. For instance 
Very et a1. (1997) found that the level of autonomy given to an acquired fIrm influences the 
culture-performance linkage. Some researchers introduced a cultural process called 
acculturation, to explain performance (e.g. Nahavandi and Malekzadeh, 1988; Larsson, 
1993; Very, Lubatkin and Calori, 1996). These researchers contend that the success of 
integration may depend upon how cultural integration is managed rather than upon initial 
cultural similarities (Schweiger, 2002). 
Using this process perspective, Larsson (1993) connects acculturation to the 
reduction of conflict. In brief, questions remain about the conditions under which cultural 
problems and their interplay with other dimension occur and how they influence 
performance. The integration process at least seems to moderate the relationship. Despite 
these unanswered questions, research has shown that when cultural incompatibility exists, 
employee resistance emerges. As a consequence, target top management turnover is likely 
to increase and acquirers can face strong barriers for implementing their integration plan 
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(e.g. Schweiger and Goulet, 2000). In other words, cultural resistance may have a negative 
impact on synergy realization and cash flows if cooperation between combining fIrms is not 
achieved. 
f Characteristics of integration Challenges and Problems 
The five challenges and problems discussed above are clearly not independent (Schweiger 
and Very, 2003). For instance, uncertainty and ambiguity can lead to the departure of key 
people, but such departure can also emanate from unfavourable organizational politics or a 
recruitment opportunity offered by a competitor. Moreover, each problem is likely to have 
a negative effect on value preservation and or synergy realization. For example, individual 
uncertainty and ambiguity decrease the productivity of employees, diminishing the fIrm's 
cash flow. In addition, when such a loss of productivity happens, the realization of 
synergies can be threatened: employees will not easily share their competencies as long as 
they are concerned about whether they will be retained. The same analysis can be made for 
the four other issues. The importance of a particular issue depends upon the strategy behind 
the acquisition. 
2.5.9 KNOWLEDGE TRANSFER AND KNOWLEDGE-BASED VIEW 
Hayek (1945) highlighted the importance of distribution of knowledge on organizational 
structure. Hayek (1945) explained that business activities commonly require the integration 
of widely dispersed bits of incomplete and frequently contradictory knowledge, which all 
separate organizational members possess. Over the last decade, researchers have 
extensively used a knowledge perspective to explain a variety of strategy topics, such as 
alliances (e.g., Simonin, 1999), acquisitions (e.g., Bresman et at, 1999), internal transfer of 
capabilities (e.g., Szulanski, 1996), and development of local competitiveness in foreign 
markets (e.g., Ranft and Lord, 2000). 
International Context and Knowledge Transfer 
Much research on knowledge transfer within and between organizations has been 
conducted in an international context (lnlcpen and Dinur, 1998; Gupta and Govindarajan, 
2000; Kogut and Zander, 1993; Ranft and Lord 2000; Subramanian and Venkatraman, 
2001). This research suggests that knowledge transfer is particularly critical for 
multinational companies and cross-border inter-fIrm alliances. For example, Kogut and 
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Zander (1993) argue that, compared to markets, organizations better are able to transfer 
tacit knowledge across borders. "The multinational company" they write "arises not out of 
the failure of markets for buying and selling of knowledge, but out of its superior efficiency 
as an organizational vehicle by which to transfer this knowledge across borders" (625). 
Taking a knowledge-based view of the multinational company, this research stream 
assumes that value creation by multinational companies is determined by their ability to 
transfer tacit knowledge about best practices and foreign markets across borders (e.g., 
Buckley and Carter, 1999). However, only limited empirical evidence exist about the role 
of international knowledge transfer and performance. Like most knowledge based research, 
attention is directed towards factors that enhance or impede knowledge transfer, without 
subsequently examining the link to firm performance. For example, Ranft and Lord (2000) 
fmd that differences in organizational structures influence the extent of internal transfer 
about new international markets among divisions. To date, limited study has examined the 
role of geographic and cultural distance between transfer parties and their influence on the 
knowledge transfer-firm performance link. This is an important void because multinational 
companies may face unique complexities in distant knowledge transfer (e.g., Kostova, 
1999). In order to extend the knowledge-based view of the firm to a view of the 
multinational company, advantages and disadvantages of transferring knowledge across 
greater distances need further theoretical and conceptual examination. 
Theories of the multinational company provide insight about the role of distance 
and transfer of knowledge. First, it contends that the primary reason why firms exist is 
because of their ability to transfer and exploit intangible assets more effectively than 
market mechanisms (Buckley and Casson, 1976; Kogut and Zander, 1993). Second, the 
internationalization process of the multinational firm is viewed as a function of the 
development of knowledge about foreign markets (Barkema and Vermeulen, 1998; 
Johanson and Vahlne. 1977, 1990). Multinational companies become better international 
empire builders as they learn more abo,ut foreign markets. Morosini et a1. (1998) provide a 
compelling resource-based view explanation of the role of cultural distance on firm 
performance. These authors argue that bundling resources with resources from culturally 
distant locations endows multinational companies with more diverse resource pools, which 
are more causally ambiguous and socially complex. Accordingly, these resource pools are 
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more difficult to imitate by competitors and have a better chance to serve as source of 
sustained competitive advantage (Barney, 1991). As an extension of the resource-based 
view, bundling knowledge from greater geographic and cultural distance can be expected to 
provide the multinational company with a richer and more diverse knowledge base. 
These observations from the theory of the multinational company and the resource-
based view provide an explanation for why knowledge transfer across greater distances can 
provide the fIrm with more sustained competitive advantages. However, the geographic and 
cultural distance between transfer parties also form a critical barrier to internal knowledge 
transfer. The theory of the multinational company argues that fIrms that expand in overseas 
markets face liabilities of foreignness in the form of coordination costs and cultural 
adaptation (e.g., Eriksson, et al., 1997; Hymer, 1976; Zaheer, 1995). Since the success of 
transnational transfer of organizational practices depends on various social, organizational 
and relational factors, this liability can bring about serious challenges to the transfer 
(Kostova, 1999). 
The knowledge-based view, therefore, needs to incorporate the added costs of 
transferring knowledge across greater distances. As it raises costs of coordination and 
cultural adaptation, transfer of knowledge across greater distances makes it more difficult 
to develop combinative capabilities. For example, the transfer of complex tacit knowledge 
may only be possible through rich communication channels (Subramanian and 
Venkatraman, 2001), which require frequent cross-border visits and meetings (Bresman et 
al., 1999). 
Greater geographic distances strain a fum's opportunity to provide these rich 
channels, because it becomes more costly to disburse travel expenditures to bring transfer 
parties together. In addition, greater cultural distances complicate the development of the 
ability to share knowledge, because transfer parties need to overcome greater cultural and 
language barriers (Zaheer, 1995). Firms may offset these greater strains on developing 
combinative capabilities with greater absorptive capacity. Zaheer and Mosakowski (1997) 
fmd that the effect of the liability of foreignness on fIrm survival diminishes with 
experience in the local market. However, since fIrms have a tendency to develop their 
'international experience' incrementally, beginning near the home market (Johanson and 
Vahlne, 1977), fIrms can be expected to have less experience in distant overseas markets. 
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Thus, geographic and cultural distance likely also is negatively associated with absorptive 
capacity. 
In summary, distance between transfer parties may become a double-edged sword, 
providing greater diversity and richness to transferred knowledge only at the expense of 
suppressing combinative capabilities and absorptive capacity. To avoid this, it is essential, 
particularly in international contexts, which transfer parties have or develop these 
capabilities. Only those transfer parties of distant knowledge transfer that are able to 
develop absorptive capacity and combinative capabilities will be able to reap the benefits of 
barriers to imitation associated with the enhanced social complexity and causal ambiguity 
in distant knowledge transfer. 
2.5.10 HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN M&AS 
The human perspective on M&A has also been the subject of research. The aim has been to 
identify the human toll of M&A so that non-fmancial aspects would also be taken into 
account in the management ofM&A (Buono and Bowditch, 1989; Cartwright and Cooper, 
1990). The concern shared by these researchers is that human aspects are not sufficiently 
considered in the management and integration of M&A (Schweiger and Weber, 1989; 
Napier, 1989; Cartwright, 1998). 
a) Human Resource Management Practices In M&As 
According to a considerable number of researchers (e.g., Cartwright and Cooper, 2000; 
Gutknecht and Keys, 1993; Meeks, 1977; Sinetar, 1981) post-merger performance is 
adversely affected by lowered morale, which is often linked to perceptions of unfair 
treatment. Employees' perceptions of justice or fairness concerning how they are treated 
with regard to pay, promotion, and individual consideration have important consequences 
for organization performance more generally (Colquit, Conlon, Ng, Porter, and Wesson, 
2001) and have become an important focus of psychological research (Folger and 
Cropanzano, 2001; Gilliland and Paddock, 2005; Greenberg, 1990, 2001; Korsgaard and 
Robertson, 1995). The concept of organizational justice is underpinned by equity theory 
(Adams, 1965), in that people expect to receive fair rewards for their work efforts and will 
reduce their efforts ifthey experience a sense of injustice. 
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According to organizational justice theory, perceptions 0 f fairness are linked to both 
procedural justice (how fair the organizational processes and procedures are) and 
distributive justice (how fairly the rewards are distributed). Employees who feel they are 
treated fairly and with respect have been shown to be more inclined to exhibit high levels of 
Organizational Citizenship Behaviours (OCBs) and do things for the organization over and 
above that which they are contractually obliged to do (Guest, 1998). High levels of OCB 
are considered to be desirable post merger to meet the demands of increased workload and 
increased employee flexibility (Cartwright and Cooper, 2000). 
In the context of M&As perceptions of organizational justice and fairness concern 
not only the way in which new roles and rewards are allocated to those who are retained by 
the merged organization but also the ways in which termination decisions are made and the 
process of employee lay-offs is handled (Cartwright and Cooper, 2000). In addition, 
employee perceptions and future expectations concerning organizational justice and 
consideration are likely to shape the terms of the psychological contract (Rousseau, 1995) 
which acquired employees will be seeking to re-establish with their new employer. If they 
consider that their new employer is unjust and lacking in consideration toward employees, 
then the reciprocal expectations which form the basis of that psychological contract 
between employer and employee are unlikely to extend beyond the transactional level to 
the deeper, more enduring relational level. M&A researchers have only recently begun to 
study the concept of organizational justice (Meyer, 2001). As yet this does not appear to 
have been extended to include consideration ofthe psychological contract. 
However, there is a body of research evidence to suggest that the morale of 
survivors is adversely affected by employee lay-offs and the resultant increase in workloads 
(Brockner, 1986; Gutknecht and Keys, 1993). In a survey of over 50 US M&As, Jacobs 
(1988) found that 80% of the respondent organizations had initiated downsizing operations 
post merger and in 75% of cases the work performed by the redundant employees was 
reallocated among the remaining workforce. Although, initially, surviving employees report 
feelings of guilt, anger, and/or relief at the dismissal of co-workers, over time these feelings 
are often replaced by fear of future dismissals and anxiety and frustration about increased 
workloads (Brockner, 1986; Cartwright and Cooper, 2000). Furthermore, there is some 
limited, mainly anecdotal, evidence that feelings of injustice among displaced executives 
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and employees can damage the reputation and performance of the merged organization 
(Cabrera, 1990). 
Not surprisingly, the literature has emphasized the importance of providing support, 
advice, and outplacement services to employees who are made redundant or are early-
retired in the process of M&A (Gutknecht and Keys, 1993). The impact of organizational 
initiatives to assist redundant employees seems to have been little evaluated, although some 
years ago Allied Signa~ who made 45 acquisitions over a 6-year period, attributed their 
success to the investment they made in a program to develop and retrain survivors (Fulmer, 
1986). More recently, Summers and Holcombe (1990) conducted a small study of 
employees who lost their jobs following the closure of their division post merger. The 
employees were offered alternative employment elsewhere in the company, although this 
would have necessitated major relocation to another part of the US. Consequently, none of 
the employees took up the offer. 
Summers and Holcombe (1990) conducted a questionnaire survey to ascertain how 
fairly the employees felt they had been treated. A correlation analysis found partial support 
for the notion that the offer of alternative employment contributed to their satisfaction with 
and perceived fairness of their employer. Unfortunately, however, the sample size was less 
than 30, thus limiting the generalizability of the findings. Schweiger and Very (2003) have 
observed that the allocation of post-merger roles and functions invariably benefit some 
employees and is perceived to disadvantage others. Power differentials between the 
organizations are considered to influence the allocation process (Halvorsen, 1984). Other 
criteria, such as merit, equality, and seniority, which emphasize how important it is that 
acquiring management are not seen to favour appointing their existing staff over acquired 
employees, have also been mentioned (Marks and Mirvis, 2001). Systematic selection 
processes present a means of ensuring the equality criterion is met. However, such 
processes are lengthy and time-consuming and reselection and promotion decisions are 
more often made on the basis of seniority, which enables decisions to be made easily, 
quickly, and safely, in legal terms (Serpa, 1988). 
Citera (2001) conducted a simulation study to investigate the criteria on which 
judgements of fairness are likely to be made in M&A situations. Students were presented 
with four different types of acquisition scenarios and asked to make judgements. It was 
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found that the higher the degree of expected integration the more likely individuals were to 
expect more unfair and fewer fair changes to occur. Child, Faulkner, and Pitkethly (2001) 
have presented data to suggest that changes in relation to pay, promotion, and reward 
mechanisms are more pronounced in cross-border than domestic M&As. In a study of 
European mergers Very, Lubatkin, and Veiga (1997) found that changes in the perceived 
objectiveness of the performance and reward procedures were significant predictors of 
employee stress levels. 
Meyer (2001) applied an organizational justice perspective to investigate the ro Ie 
allocation processes in two Norwegian mergers. Earlier studies (Fried, Tiegs, Naughton and 
Blake, 1996; Newman and Krzystofiak, 1993) have found that the timing, criteria, and 
mechanisms used to allocate new roles can result in negative emotional and behavioural 
outcomes. In her study, Meyer (2001) conducted a series of interviews, supplemented by 
documentary and archival data and direct observation, to compare the experiences of key 
informants involved in a banking merger and an insurance merger. In terms of outcomes, 
Meyer discusses the comparative impact the allocation processes had on employee 
satisfaction and the difficulties that organizations may face in applying justice rules which 
satisfy both productivity- and relationship-oriented goals. 
b) Human Resource management and acquisition performance 
Although domestic and cross border M&As have become an essential part of the daily 
business environment and the number of deals is expected to increase in the future (Evans, 
Pucik and Barsoux, 2002), the M&A track record is clearly controversial (Schweiger, 
2002). It seems that despite the frequency of cross border M&As, the discovery and 
exploitation of value-creating synergies serves as a major challenge and therefore often 
results in unsatisfactory outcomes (Schuler and Jackson, 2001). Disappointing financial 
results have been explaincd as being the result of poor target selection, strategic 
mismatches, fmancial mismanagement or incompetence, or unexpected changes in the 
business environment and market conditions (Cartwright and Cooper, 1990). Whilst these 
factors are likely to have an effect on fmancial performance, Cartwright and Cooper (1990) 
argued that such explanations are incomplete, because they do not take into account the 
people factor in M&A success. 
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Several studies have addressed the importance ofhuman resource issues in domestic 
and international M&As (Napier, 1989; Buono and Bowditch, 1989; Cartwright and 
Cooper, 2000; Schuler and Jackson, 2001; Evans et.a!, 2002). According to Evans et al 
(2002: 264), "there is no shortage of evidence that attention to people issues is one of the 
most critical elements in making acquisition strategy work." Indeed, it is hard to defme a 
cross border acquisition in which HR issues are not involved. 
When the objective of an acquisition is to establish a new geographic presence, the 
management of a foreign culture, language, and communication are all very important 
issues (Very and Schweiger, 2001; Evans et aI, 2002). On the other hand, in acquisitions 
where the aim is to acquire technology, market share, the competences of skilled employees 
are needed. Therefore, retaining key employees is a principal challenge (Evans et aI, 2002). 
When acquiring or merging internationally, companies are faced with the differences in 
language, culture, law, and socio-economic conditions (Very and Schweiger, 2001). Some 
studies have found that these cultural differences have a negative effect on cross border 
M&A performance (e.g. Datta, 1991; Chatterjee et ai, 1992; Weber, 1996) whereas others 
have found a positive effect (e.g. Very, Lubatkin and Calor~ 1996; Larsson and Risberg, 
1998; Morosini, Shane and Sigh, 1998). In reaction to these largely mixed fmdings, Stahl et 
al (2003) state that the critical factor is not the cultural difference itself, but rather how 
these cultural (national and organizational) differences are managed, which is also an HR 
related issue (Bouno and Bowditch, 1989; Schuler et aI, 2004). 
Although the importance of HR issues in cross border M&As is well argued, no 
studies could be found on the relationship between the role of HR and cross border 
acquisition performance. Previous studies have focused mostly on suggesting guidelines or . 
frameworks for effective HR management (HRM) in an M&A process (Buono and 
Bowditch, 1989; Hunt and Dowling, 1990; Cartwright and Cooper, 1990, 1992b; Marks 
and Mirvis 1998; Schuler and Jackson, 2001; Evans et aI, 2002 and Schweiger, 
2002).Whilst a few studies have described the role ofHR in the domestic and international 
M&A process, still very little is known about how the role ofHR impacts on cross-border 
acquisition success. 
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2.5.11 CONCLUSION 
There have been a number of studies on cross border M&As integration during the last two 
decades. Unfortunately, most of this research, with the exception of culture and acquired 
fIrm top management turnover, has not been systematic and linked.to any comprehensive 
theory (Schweiger and Goulet, 2000). The accumulated evidence, however, does suggest 
that both national and organizational culture, the management of the integration process 
and integration decisions play an important role in influencing a variety of outcome 
measures, including fmancial performance of cross border M&As. 
The influence of the form of integration has received mixed empirical support. 
While several studies have reported that the integration approach may moderate the 
negative impacts of any cultural difference present (Morosini and Singh, 1994; Very et al., 
1997; Morosini et a~ 1998), others have concluded that the relationship between cultural 
differences and cross border acquisition performance is independent of the form of 
integration (Buono and Bowditch, 1989; Datta, 1991; Schoenberg and Norburn, 1998). 
Further research is undoubtedly needed in this area, but the implications for practitioners is 
that it may be dangerous to assume that managing a cross border M&As at arm's length 
(preservation integration) will necessarily soften the negative impact of any cultural 
differences. These conclusions confIrm the, often cited, need for practitioners to make a 
detailed assessment of cultural compatibility as part of their pre-bid planning and 
evaluation activities. Yet, the issue remains as to which particular factors should be the 
focus of attention in such an assessment (Schoenberg, 2000). 
To date, very little is stiIl known about the management of the cross border 
integration process itself, although research has provided support for the value of involving 
acquired company people in the integration process and interventions to facilitate learning. 
Though these fmdings are interesting, research needs to examine conditions under which 
involvement may not be warranted. As noted in this literature review, in spite of the 
research under taken there remains many unanswered questions on what contributes to 
cross border M&As integration effectiveness. And, thus, many opportunities exist for 
future theory development and empirical research. 
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2.6 PERFORMANCE OF CROSS BORDER M&AS 
The aim of the current section is to provide a review of the literature relating to the 
performance of cross border M&As. The chapter is organized as follows. The first section 
presents studies focusing on the impact of culture on performance of cross border M&As. 
Section two reviews research that deals with stock returns to shareholders following cross 
border M&As. The fmal section provides a review of research on entry mode and 
performance. 
2.6.1 CULTURE AND PERFORMANCE OF CBM&AS 
Recent years have seen a significant increase in CBM&As activity as firms pursue a 
simultaneous strategy of business consolidation and geographical diversification. Despite 
the increasing level of activity, empirical studies continue to draw attention to the poor 
performance record of such acquisitions (Cartwright and Cooper, 1993; Haspeslagh and 
Jemison, 1991). This has been traced back to an inadequate strategic rationale behind the 
deal, a lack of pre-acquisition planning, evaluation or post-acquisition implementation 
management (e.g. Cartwright and Cooper, 1992a). 
Cultural differences have also been blamed for this high failure rate, for domestic 
and cross border deals alike (Buono and Bowditch 1989; Cartwright and Cooper, 1993; 
Chatterjee et al., 1992; Datta, 1991; Morosini, 1998; Morosini and Singh, 1994; Nahavandi 
and Malekzadeh, 1988; Sales and Mirvis, 1984; Weber, Shenkar and Raveh, 1996). Given 
their implicit nature, differences in e.g. national or organizational cultures seem to go 
unidentified throughout the M&A process, resulting in the newly acquired companies' 
taking a longer time, if ever, to reach their most efficient state (Gertsen, Soderberg and 
Torp, 1998; Morosini, Shane and Singh, 1998). 
Within the M&A literature, a stream of research has specifically examined the issue 
of whether cultural differences contribute to CBM&As performance. However, instead of 
proving the commonly expected and suggested negative impact of cultural differences on 
the performance of CBM&As, these research results reveal contradictory fmdings 
(Teerikangas and Very, 2006). 
This section presents a review of extant research on relationship between culture 
and performance of CBM&As. The first part addresses the empirical studies that have 
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investigated the influence of organisational culture compatibility in CBM&As. The second 
. part presents a review of empirical studies focusing on influence of national culture on the 
performance of CBM&As. The final part addresses the empirical studies that have 
investigated the influence of several cultures and performance of CBM&As. Table 2.12 
presents the summary of selected studies on the culture-performance relationship in 
CBM&As . 
. 2.6.1.1 ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE AND THE PERFORMANCE OF CBM&AS 
A commonly used definition of organizational culture focuses on the beliefs, values and 
assumptions shared by an organization's members (Schein, 1985). However defmed, 
organizational culture is today regarded as important in determining an individual's 
commitment, satisfaction, productivity and longevity within the organization (Holland, 
1985; 0 'Reilly, Chatman and Caldwell, 1991) as well as in understanding organizational 
climate (Ashkanasy, Wilderom and Peterson, 2000; Denison, 1996). 
In the early 1980s, the concept was introduced into the M&A literature. Whilst 
some studies have highlighted the human and cultural consequences of differences in 
organizational cultures (Buono, Bowditch and Lewis, 1985; Marks, 1982; Sales and Mirvis, 
1984), others have focused on the importance of cultural fit (Cartwright and Cooper, 1992a, 
1993; Chatterjee et aI., 1992; Larsson and Finkelstein, 1999). In parallel, efforts to measure 
the organizational culture - performance relationship through survey-based research have 
surfaced. In his study of organizational fit and the performance of US domestic 
acquisitions, Datta (1991) found differences in top management styles, but not in reward 
and evaluation systems, to have a negative performance impact. Weber (1996) researched 
the role of corporate culture fit, autonomy removal and commitment of managers to the 
performance of US mergers across different industries. The relationships between the 
variables studied were found to be complex, varying across industries and providing 
different results with different measures of performance. 
Differences have also been found to provide potential for value creation. Krishnan, 
Miller and Judge (1997) studied the impact of top management team complementarity on 
the performance of US acquisitions. They found differences in functional backgrounds to 
have a positive impact on post-acquisition performance. Complementarity of top 
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Table 2.12: Summary of selected empirical studies on culture - performance relationship 
Study Method & Sample Operationalization of Constructs Key Findings 
Morosini et Cross-sectional survey of 52 Independent variable: National cultural distance Acquisitions perform better the greater 
the distance in national cultures; al. (\998) companies that had engaged in based on Hofstede's (\980) four dimensions 
Weber etal. 
(1996) 
Veryet al. 
(1996) 
cross border acquisitions in Italy Dependent variable: Performance = percentage rate of Diversity in national cultures is a source 
(as acquiring or acquired firms) sales growth in two post-deal years. of competitive advantage for a firm, as it 
during 1987-1992. Survey Control variables: Relatedness, Size, Post-acquisition gets access to different sets of routines. 
complemented by in-depth strategy, acquiring firm's uncertainty avoidance, Year 
interviews. of deal, Industry. 
Cross-sectional survey of 52 
domestic and cross-border 
mergers of acquired US 
companies during \985-1987. 
Cross-sectional survey of 106 
European mergers during 1987-
1989. 
National cultural distance = Hofstede's (1980) Degree of national and corporate culture 
dimensions, Organizational culture distance fit determines effective integration in 
perceived pre merger similarity between the firms, cross-border M&A; In domestic deals, 
Autonomy removal, Stress, Attitudes toward corporate culture results in lower 
cooperation with the acquiring finn's management managerial commitment; (3) in cross-
team, Acquired firm's attitude toward the acquiring border deals, national culture predicts 
firm, Acquired firm managers' commitment, Acquired stress better than corporate culture. 
firm managers' readiness for cooperation. 
Independent variable: Acculturative stress, Perceived 
cultural compatibility (inclusive of measures of 
differences in organizational and national cultures). 
Dependent variable: Postmerger performance 
perceptions of Postmerger performance with regard to 
Acculturative stress is a complex 
phenomenon, sometimes influenced by 
national culture; the influence of national 
culture is difficult to predict, it can result 
in attraction or stress, depending on the 
earnings, sales and market share. countries and cultures involved. 
Control variables: Merger relatedness, Administrative 
involvement of acquired firm managers in merger, 
Relative size, Age of merger Domestic vs. cross border 
merger 
(Continued) 
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Study 
Larsson and 
Risberg 
(1998) 
Krugand 
Hegarty 
(1997) 
Veryet a1. 
(1997) 
Larsson and 
Finkelstein 
(1999) 
Method & Sample 
Case survey on a sample of 62 
studied cases of domestic and 
cross-border M&A during 1960-
1989. 
Sample of270 domestic and 
foreign acquisitions of US 
companies during 1986-1988. 
Operationalization of Constructs 
Achieved level of acculturation, Employee 
resistance, Degree of synergy realization, Domestic 
vs. cross-border M&A, _ Organizational culture = 
management styles of companies. 
Domestic vs. cross-border acquisition, Cumulative 
top management turnover, Country of origin of 
acquiring company. 
Key Findings 
Cross-border deals achieve greatest 
levels of synergy realization. 
Higher turnover rate in US firms 
acquired by foreign vs. domestic firms. 
Cross-sectional survey of 106 Independent variable: Perceived cultural A cultural view of relative standing in 
European mergers during 1987- compatibility (inclusive of measures of differences the performance of European M&A: no 
1989. . .. al d . al I ) Co difli be m orgaruzatIon an natIon cu tures , autonomy perlormance erence tween 
Case survey on a sample of 61 
studied cases of domestic and 
cross-border M&A during 1960-
1989. 
removal, relative size. domestic and cross-border M&A; 
Dependent variable: Postlnerger performance = sometimes, domestic M&A are more 
perceptions of Postlnerger performance with regard difficult; national culture can have a 
to earnings, sales and market share. 
Control variables: Merger relatedness, Age of 
merger Domestic vs. cross-border merger. 
Independent variables: Combination potential 
similarity of marketing, and production operations, 
complementarity of marketing and production 
operations, Organizational integration = I) extent 
of operational interaction, 2) coordination 
mechanisms and structures, Employee resistance, 
Management style similarity = degrees of formality 
vs. participation Domestic vs. cross-border deal 
positive impact 
Strategic. financial, organizational and 
human resource perspectives should be 
considered in parallel in M&A; 
complementary deals provide greatest 
synergy potential; organizational 
integration is important 
Source: Based on Teerikangas and Very (2006: S44) 
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management team members was seen as a means of enhancing organizational learning and 
lowering turnover rates. Based on their study, Larsson and Finkelstein (1999) argue that 
complementarity of operations is a useful way of explaining M&A success, as it represents 
the potential for synergy realization in a deal. 
2.6.1.2 NATIONAL CULTURE AND THE PERFORMANCE OF CBM&AS 
Early studies on culture in M&As were made by American and British scholars. With the 
rise of cross border deals, European scholars began to take an increasing interest in the 
phenomenon. Given the richness of national cultures on the European continent, the 
concept of national culture was introduced into the M&A literature (Cartwright, 1998; 
Gertsen, Soderberg and Torp, 1998). 
National culture can a priori be described using a similar defmition as the one used 
for organizational culture with the level of analysis being the national one. It defmes the 
'shoulds' and the 'oughts' of life that impregnate the minds of a country's citizens, their 
'collective programming of the mind' (Hofstede, 1980). As compared to organizational or 
other cultures, national culture operates at a deeper level (Berger and Luckmann, 1967; 
Hofstede, 1980). Often national boundaries are used as a convenient proxy for national 
culture (Bhagat and McQuaid, 1982), as in much of the cross-cultural literature. This 
framing is somewhat theoretical and imprecise, however, given the existence of minorities 
and regional cultures within the national boundaries of any country (Teerikangas and Very, 
2006). 
Amongst the earliest works on the impact of national culture on CBM&As is the 
work of Olie (1990), who looked at culture and integration problems in cross border 
mergers. He argued that the impact of national culture can result in the nationalistic bias of 
organizational members. Nationalism could result from historical animosities· and 
prejudices or pure chauvinism per se (Mazzolini, 1974). Later, the buying firm's behaviour 
throughout the M&A process has been found to depend on its national background 
(Angwin, 2001; Calor~ Lubatkin and Very, 1994; Lubatkin et at, 1998; Child, Faulkner 
and Pitkethly, 2000, 2001; Faulkner, Child and Pitkethly, 2003; Larsson and Lubatkin, 
2001; Pitkethly, Faulkner and Child, 2003). 
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Whilst cultural differences are frequently associated with poor performance for 
domestic M&As, the relationship seems to be inverse for cross border deals. Thus, 
differences in national cultures would appear not be an impediment, but a potential success 
factor for CBM&As. Morosini, Shane and Singh (1998) found cross border acquisitions to 
perform better as the distance between the national cultures invo lved increased. These 
fmdings were echoed in Schweiger and Goulet (2000). This would seem to suggest that the 
assumed negative relationship between cultural differences and the performance of 
CBM&As does not hold for national cultures. This would suggest that the culture-
performance relationship is more subtle and complex than is assumed (Teerikangas and 
Very, 2006). It is recommended that researchers use greater care when discussing 'cultural 
differences' in the context ofM&A. 
2.6.1.3 SEVERAL CULTURES AND THE PERFORMANCE OF CBM&AS 
Some studies have looked at the simultaneous presence and impact of several cultures on 
CBM&As. The earliest work to mention the simultaneous presence of organizational and 
national cultures in CBM&As is Otie's (1990, 1994). Whilst elements of both 
organizational and national cultures impact CBM&As, clashes will depend on the sought 
degree of integration (Olie, 1990). David and Singh (1994) added professional culture to 
this defmition of cultural distance. With regard to the performance impact, Weber, Shenkar 
and Raveh (1996) studicd the role of national and corporate culture fit in determining the 
effective integration of domestic and cross-border mergers. In domestic deals, differences 
in organizational cultures were found to result in lower top management commitment and 
cooperation bctween the partners. In cross border deals, national culture differences 
predicted stress, negative attitudes toward the merger and cooperation better than 
organizational culture, which had a positive effect. They concluded that in cross border 
deals, both national and corporate cultures determine success. 
Very, Lubatkin and Calori (1996) focused on the formation of acculturative stress in 
domestic and cross border European mergers. They found acculturative stress to be a 
complex phenomenon, sometimes influenced by national culture, but not necessarily in the 
expected direction. Depending on the dimensions of acculturative stress and the home 
countries of the participating companies, acculturation could either produce stress or 
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attraction. In some cases of domestic mergers, acculturative stress was greater than in cross 
border ones. These findings were further refined in a study looking at relative standing and 
its impact on the post-merger performance of European firms (Very et at, 1997). 
Interestingly, the study revealed little evidence of cultures clashing as had been reported by 
prior US studies. Actually, a positive link between post merger performance and 
differences in organizational cultures was found. Furthermore, there was no performance 
difference between domestic and cross-border mergers. Thus, the clashing of national 
cultures was not particularly evident in the sample studied and the authors concluded that 
acquirers should not underestimate the impact of organizational culture in domestic 
mergers. In this line, Larsson and Risberg (1998) argued that as compared to domestic one; 
cross border M&As achieve highest levels of acculturation and synergy realization. The 
authors explain this with the possibly greater awareness of cultural differences in cross 
border versus domestic deals. However, Krug and Hegarty's (1997) study showed that US 
fIrms acquired by foreign firms suffered a higher turnover rate than those acquired by 
domestic ones. 
Whilst studies in this stream of research have included greater cultural complexity 
in their research design than the previously reviewed studies, the results do not seem to 
clarify the problem at stake. For one, it seems that cultural differences occur in domestic 
and cross border M&As alike (Very, Lubatkin and Calor~ 1996; Very et aI., 1997; Weber, 
1996), hence the call for managers not to under-estimate the cultural clash occurring in 
domestic M&A. For another, these studies seem to have difficulties in estimating the 
impact of organizational and/or national cultures in domestic and/or cross-border deals. 
In line with other reviews (e.g. Schoenberg, 2000; Stahl and Voigt, 2003), 
Teerikangas and Very (2006) concluded that current fIndings differ in terms of the impact 
of cultural differences on CBM&As. The shared fmding is that cultural differences impact 
the performance of both domestic and cross border deals. Moreover, all studies suggest that 
cultural differences should be included in the decision making, evaluation and integration 
processes of CBM&As. However, with current knowledge, it is challenging to predict the 
nature and direction of the impact of cultural differences on CBM&As. 
To conclude, it seems that one has to be careful with predicting the impact of 
organizational, national or other cultures on M&As. There seem to be diverse sources of 
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complexity that currently prevent us from answering 'yes' or 'no' to the relationship to the 
question of whether differences between culture affect CBM&As performance 
(Teerikangas and Very, 2006). 
2.6.2 SHAREHOLDERS' STOCK RETURN ON CBM&AS 
Most research on the fmancial performance of CBM&As has focused on stock returns 
surrounding announcement dates. Virtually all researchers have reported large positive 
average abnormal returns to targets, a result that is not surprising given the significant 
premiums typically involved in CBM&As. Conversely, these same researchers found 
surprisingly small abnormal returns to acquirers over the armouncement period. 
Parallel to the research on announcement period returns, a smaller body of work has 
investigated long run post acquisition stock return. Overall, cross border M&As of all 
public and private targets do not result in significantly negative long run returns, whereas 
cross-border acquisitions of targets which are publicly quoted do result in significantly 
negative long run returns. 
This section presents literature focusing shareholders stock return in CBM&As. The 
section is divided into two parts. Part one provides a review of literature on short run stock 
return in CBM&As and, part two reviews studies focusing on long run stock returns in 
CBM&As. 
2.6.2.1 SHORT RUN STOCK RETURNS IN CROSS BORDER M&AS 
In all short run event studies researchers try to estimate the effect of the acquisition 
announcement on market prices of underlying securities, and consequently increments in 
the returns to shareholders. Table 2.13 presents the summary of selected short run event 
studies on CBM&As. 
While cross-border acquisitions have received some attention in the literature only a 
limited body of research exists on the impact of cross border acquisitions on returns of 
acquiring firms. For example, Doukas and Travlos (1988) focus on US acquiring firms and 
fmd that, on average, there is no significant impact on bidders' wealth. However, there is 
considerable variation over their sample of firms with positive abnormal returns arising if 
the acquiring firm is entering new markets or new industries. The authors regard this 
evidence as supporting the multinational network hypothesis, the rationale here being that 
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there are lower (higher) marginal returns if the acquiring fIrm already has (does not have) a 
presence in the target country. 
Other studies that have focussed on returns to bidders based on a sample of US 
fIrms include Fatemi and Furtado (1988), Markides and Ittner (1994) and Datta and Puia 
(1995) all of which fmd either non-signifIcant positive abnormal returns or, in the case of 
Datta and Puia, negative abnormal returns. 
Table 2.13: Summary of selected short term event studies on CBM&As 
Study 
Doukas and 
Travlos(1988) 
Kang (1993) 
Corhayand 
Rad (2000) 
Gregory and 
McCorriston 
(2005) 
Eun et al. 
(1996) 
Cakici, Hessel 
and Tandon 
(1996) 
Sample 
301 foreign 
acquisition by US 
between 1975-1983 
102 Japanese 
acquisitions of US 
firms between 1975-
1988 
84 Western and 10 
Eastern European, 17 
US foreign M&As 
between 1990 - 1996 
333 acquisitions in 
US, EU and rest of 
the world by UK firm 
between 1984 - 1995 
225 foreign 
acquisitions of U.S. 
firms by non US 
firms between 1979-
90 
195 foreign firms 
acquiring US targets 
between 1983-1992 
Model used 
MM 
MM 
MM 
MM 
Mean-
Adjusted 
return 
technique 
MM 
Summary of findings 
Insignificant positive abnormal returns of around 
2% for the US bidder in the time period (10, b 
10) days around the announcement day. 
For Japanese bidders, the CAR( - 1,0) and the 
CAR (- 1, 1) are 0.59% and 0.51 %, which are 
statistically significant 
The CAR for the sample of Western European 
acquisitions was 1.44% for a 5-day period (25, 
15; while regarding the US acquisitions the 
CAR (240, 140) was 4.5 % and was statistically 
significant 
For US acquisitions short-run returns are 
positive but again not statistically significant. 
The CAR results for investment in other regions 
vary being negative for acquisitions in the EU 
and positive for those in the rest of the world but 
neither is statistically significant 
Examining cross border acquisitions in the US, 
. they show that bidding firms sourced from Japan 
experienced positive abnormal returns while UK 
firms experienced considerable negative 
abnormal returns. Acquiring firms based in 
Canada experienced mildly positive abnormal 
returns that were considerably below those / 
experienced by Japanese firms. 
Foreign AC experience positive and significant 
abnormal CAR of nearly 2% over days (10, P 
10). 
Key: AC - Acquiring Companies' Shareholders, MM = Market Model, CAR = Cumulative Abnormal Retum 
8S 
In terms of non-US countries, Kang (1993) investigates the abnonnal returns of Japanese 
bidders in the US and fmds positive abnormal returns to Japanese firms. Corhay and Rad 
(2000) fmd weak evidence that cross border acquisitions is wealth-creating based on a 
sample of Dutch fIrms. They also fmd evidence that the benefIts from internalisation are 
greater for fIrms having less international exposure and making acquisitions outside their 
main industrial activity. Recently, Gregory and McCorriston (2005) estimated CARs with 
an event window (-3, 1) for cross border acquisitions by UK fIrms in the US, EU and rest 
of the world. The results indicated that short-run returns are positive for US acquisitions but 
again not statistically signifIcant. The CAR results for investment in other regions vary, 
being negative for acquisitions in the EU and positive for those in the rest of the world but 
neither is statistically signifIcant. 
In terms of cross-country comparisons, Eun et a1. (1996) have shown that the 
returns to acquiring fIrms are likely to vary across countries. Examining cross border 
acquisitions in the US, they show that bidding fIrms sourced from Japan experienced 
positive abnormal returns while UK fIrms experienced considerable negative abnormal 
returns. Acquiring fIrms based in Canada experienced mildly positive abnormal returns that 
were considerably below those experienced by Japanese fIrms. Cakici et at. (1996) also 
report signifIcantly positive abnormal returns around the event date for acquirers from 
Japan, Australia, the UK and the Netherlands. 
2.6.2.2 LONG RUN STOCK RETURNS IN CROSS BORDER M&AS 
Although there has been an exponential increase in the number and size of CBM&As 
during the past decade, there is limited empirical evidence on long horizon share returns in 
CBM&As. Table 2.14 summarises the results of selected long run studies CBM&As 
performance. 
The four studies by Conn and Connell (1990), Danbolt (1995), Black et at. (2003) and Aw 
and Chatterjee (2004), examine cross border acquisitions ofpublicly quoted targets. 
Despite the variation in methodology and sample, all four studies report 
signifIcantly negative post-acquisition returns. Aw and Chatterjee (2004) directly compare 
cross-border with domestic acquisitions, and fmd that in cross-border acquisitions returns 
are lower although not signifIcantly so. The studies by Eckbo and Thorburn (2000) and by 
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Gregory and McCorriston (2005) examine cross border acquisitions of both publicly and 
privately held targets. In contrast to the other cross border long run studies, neither study 
fmds evidence of significantly negative long run returns. Neither study reports returns 
separately for public and private acquisitions. 
Table 2.14: Summary of selected Long Run Event studies on CBM&As 
Study Bidder Target Period Sample Methodology Share Length of Event Coun!!i: Coun!!i: Size returns !%l Period !Monthsl 
US UK 1971- 35 Market 11.5 12 Conn and 1980 model, CARs 
Connell 
(1990) UK US 1971- 38 Market 22.6 12 1980 model, CARs 
Danbolt Non-UK UK 1986- 50 Market 9.8 5 (l995) 1991 model, CARs 
Eckbo and 1964- Market Thorburn US Canada 394 3.7 12 
(2000) 1983 model, CARs 
Awand Non- 1991- Market Chatterjee UK UK 1996 41 model,CARs 24.4 24 (2004) 
Black et al. Non- 1985- Size! market-US 361 to-book! 22.9 60 (2003) US 1995 BHARs 
Size/ 
Gregory and Non- 1985- market-to-McCorriston UK UK 1994 333 book 9.3 60 (2005) portfolio 
BHARs 
1984 -
Conn et al. Non- 1989 BHARs/ UK & 4344 -0.07 36 (2005) UK 1990 - CTAR 
1998 
Notes: CARs - Cumulative Abnormal Returns, cr AR - Calendar Time Abnormal Return, BHARs "" Buy-
and-Hold Abnormal Returns 
A drawback with four of the studies (Conn and Connell, 1990; Danbolt, 1995; Eckbo and 
Thorburn, 2000; and Aw and Chatterjee, 2004) is their use of the market model 
methodology, the weaknesses of which are now well documented. Market models suffer 
from parameter instability (Coutts et al., 1997), are inferior to multi index models (Fama 
and French, 1992), and are subject to statistical biases which have led to more reliable test 
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statistics being employed than those employed in these studies (Lyon et al., 1999). 
However, the two studies by Black et al. (2003) and by Gregory and McCorriston (2005) 
do address some of these methodological concerns. 
Recently, Conn, Cosh, Guest and Hughes (2005) examined the announcement and 
post-acquisition share returns of UK acquirers in 1140 cross border acquisitions and 3204 
domestic acquisitions. Domestic public acquisitions result in negative announcement and 
post-acquisition returns, whilst cross-border public acquisitions result in zero 
announcement returns and negative post-acquisition returns. In contrast, both domestic and 
cross-border private acquisitions result in positive announcement returns and zero post-
acquisition returns. Overall fmdings indicate that cross border acquisitions result in lower 
long run returns than domestic acquisitions. In cross-border acquisitions, those involving 
high-tech fIrms perform relatively well, as do those with low national cultural differences. 
The tentative overall conclusion is that cross border M&As of all public and private 
targets do not result in signifIcantly negative long run returns, whereas cross-border 
acquisitions of targets which are publicly quoted do result in significantly negative long run 
returns. 
2.6.3 ENTRY MODE AND PERFORMANCE 
Several researchers have examined post acquisition performance using measures other than 
abnormal stock returns. One such research stream compared the performance of CBM&As 
with the performance of other entry mode Goint ventures and greenfield investments). 
Table 2.15 presents a summary of selected studies on entry mode and performance. 
Prior research suggested that returns to CBM&As are generally negative, 
confIrming that FDI is inherently risky (Lee and Caves, 1998). Following this line of 
reasoning, several scholars attempted to demonstrate the inherent risk of CBM&As by 
adopting a transaction cost economics (TCE) perspective. For example, Li and Guisinger 
(1991) found that M&As and joint ventures were more likely to fail when compared with 
greenfield ventures because of the often significant transaction costs involved with Ns and 
M&As (especially in the negotiations and post-merger integration). Their results were 
conflI111ed by a subsequent study published by Nitsch et al. (1996). These authors examined 
the performance of 300 Japanese subsidiaries in Europe and found that the ones initiated by 
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Study 
Barkema 
et at. 
(1996) 
Li and 
Guisinger 
(1991) 
Nitsch et 
al 
(1996) 
Shaver 
(1998) 
Beckman 
and 
Haunschild 
(2002) 
Table 2.15: Summary of selected empirical research on entry mode and performance 
Sample Dependent 
variable 
Data were Longevity of 
collected from the venture 
Foreign ventures 
of 13 large non -
financial Dutch 
finns between 
1966-1988. 
85 foreign Business 
controlled failures 
business failures in (foreign 
U.S. between controlled vs. 
1978-1987 domestic~ 
124 and 173 Subsidiary 
Japanese perfonnance 
subsidiaries in 
Europe, 
1992-1994 
213 U.S. entries by Entry mode 
foreign (acquisition 
manufacturing vs. 
finns in 1987 greenfield), 
investment 
survival until 
1992 
300 acquisitions by Premium paid 
publicly held by the focal 
service finn for the 
manufacturing acquisition 
firms in the US 
between 1986-
1997 
Independent variable 
Finn level: level of foreign 
experience 
Country level: cultural blocks 
of cultural distance 
Entry mode (acquisitions 
65%, others 35%) ownership 
types, cultural distance 
Entry mode (acquisitions, 
greenfield, N,) 
Firm level: Experience, parent 
R&D intensity, etc. 
Industry level: pre-entry 
industry growth, post-entry 
industry growth, industry 
concentration, US finns' 
international ~eration. 
Firm level: premium 
experience of network 
partners, acquisition size of 
network partners, etc. 
Network level: network 
diversity, network partner 
industry, network multiplexity 
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Key findings 
The longevity of foreign ventures is more strongly and negatively 
related to cultural distance in the case of double-layered 
acculturation (Ns and acquisitions), than in the case of single 
layered acculturations (WOSs and start-ups). The longevity of 
foreign ventures is more strongly and positively related to prior 
foreign expansion experiences in the case of double layered 
acculturation than in the case of single layered acculturation. 
The failure rate of foreign-controlled firms in the U.S. is 
significantly lower than the failure rate of domestically owned 
firms. Acquisitions and Ns are more likely to fail than greenfield. 
Cultural distance is positively associated with failure. 
The greenfield mode is the best, N is not far behind in terms of the 
subsidiary perfonnance by entry mode. Acquisitions have at best 
mixed performance. 
The choice of mode of entry influences the survival of the foreign 
subsidiary. Since finns choose entry mode based on their resource 
availability, researchers need to control the self-selection in 
examining the influence of mode of entry on performance 
outcomes. 
The greater the diversity: of network partners' premiums, of the 
size of network partners' acquisitions, ofa focal finn's network, the 
lower the premium a focal firm will pay on its current acquisition. 
The more multiplex the relationship between a finn and its network 
partners, the stronger the relationship between partner diversity and 
the premium a focal firm will pay on its current acquisition. 
acquisitions performed much worse than those that were created by greenfield 
investments or joint ventures. 
Following a different line of reasoning based on different theoretical approaches, 
such as contingency theory or organizational learning, another group of scholars 
reached different conclusions. For example, Shaver (1998) recently questioned the 
methodologies employed in the early research on entry modes and performance. He 
adopted a contingency view approach and suggested that the choice of the best entry 
mode is not a random but a strategic decision based on the firm resources and industry 
context. He stated that "empirical models that do not account for this and regress 
performance measures on strategy choice variables are potentially misspecified and 
their conclusions are incorrect" (Shaver, 1998: 571). Incorporating often unobserved 
firm characteristics, he showed that the survival ratio of entries by M&As was not 
significantly different from the one resulting by greenfield investments. Another study 
supporting international market entry by CBM&As, compared with greenfield entries, 
was conducted by Vermeulen and Barkema (2001). They adopted an organizational 
learning perspective, arguing that greenfield entries tend to be more simple and rigid, 
which leads to higher failure rates than with M&As. In contrast, M&As provide new 
knowledge and perspectives and thus help firms avoid path dependence and build new 
capabilities. 
Another research stream examined the relationship between performance and the 
degree of learning achieved from previous experience. For example, using an 
organizational learning perspective, Barkema et a1. (1996) analyzed whether firms were 
able to reduce the cultural barriers and enhance the performance of different entry mode 
and governance structure alternatives by learning from their prior experience. Their 
results show that the longevity of foreign ventures is negatively related to cultural 
distance, especially in cases of double-layered acculturation, but that the longevity of 
cross-border M&As and their performance are positively influenced by previous 
experience in the same or similar countries. Previous experience provides additional 
benefits, such as being part of a network. Employing a network learning perspective, 
Beckman and Haunschild (2002: 92) argued that "firms use the experience of their 
network partners and learn by sampling that experience". Partners' experiences can 
help firms in learning new skills (Hamel, 1991), discovering unknown financing 
options, gathering important information about the specific industry in which they are 
investing, and learning about the general institutional context at the local level. It also 
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provides information that can be useful m evaluating potential target firms for 
acquisition. 
2.6.4 CONCLUSIONS 
The current chapter reviews literature focusing on performance of CBM&As. Research 
on performance of CBM&As has three main streams. The first research stream explores 
the relationship between culture and performance of CBM&As. The second, which is 
common in the fmance literature, examines issue of wealth creation to shareholders by 
CBM&As. The third stream examines post M&As performance using relatively longer 
term measures than stock price responses in comparison with other modes of entry. 
Despite the widely accepted view that cultural differences have an impact on the 
performance of CBM&A, a review of extant research provides contradictory fmdings. 
In line with other reviews (e.g. Schoenberg, 2000; Stahl and Voigt, 2003 and 
Teerikangas and Very 2006) we can conclude that current fmdings differ in terms of the 
impact of cultural differences on CBM&As. All studies suggest that cultural differences 
should be included in the decision making, evaluation and integration processes of 
CBM&As. However, with current knowledge, it seems challenging to predict the nature 
and direction of the impact of cultural differences on CBM&As. Future research could 
develop on the current arguments by taking into account both the complexity of the 
cultural setting involved and the dynamic nature ofthe CBM&As process. 
Most research on the financial performance of CBM&As has focused on stock 
returns surrounding announcement dates. A smaller body of work has investigated long 
run post acquisition stock return. But, both short term and long term event studies have 
a number of methodological limitations. Further, event studies capture the capital 
market's prediction of the magnitude, nature and viability of the merger process. 
Integrating the various research findings, we can conclude that moving into 
international markets has a high potential for the investing firm, but that the entry mode 
is a critical decision entailing important effects on the success of the investment and, 
therefore, on firm performance. However, several questions still remain unanswered to 
understand the best entry modes into foreign markets. Therefore, research is needed that 
employs different theoretical perspectives to better understand the predictors of wealth 
creation from cross border M&As entry (Shimizu, et aI., 2004). 
In summary, previous studies· have examined the culture-performance 
relationship and financial performance of CBM&As. In terms of long term 
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performance, more research is needed to explore the factors influencing the 
performance ofCBM&As. 
This chapter has provided the literature review on acquisition motives, pre- and 
post-acquisition management and acquisition performance. The next chapter will 
present the methodology adopted to address the research question. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
3.0 INTRODUCTION 
The chapter outlines the methodology adapted in this research. The chapter starts with a 
discussion of the choice of research design. The second section explains the criteria that 
were used to select the cross border acquisitions. Section three provides information 
about the sample size. Next, section four describes the selection of key informants. 
Section five describes the development of questionnaire. Section six illustrates how the 
key constructs in the research model were operationalized. A description of the sample 
and response rate is presented in section seven. The last section examines biases that 
may affect the validity of the survey responses and describes techniques used to check 
the validity of the survey constructs. 
3.1 CHOICE OF RESEARCH DESIGN 
The purpose of this research is to gain a deeper understanding of the factors that relate 
to the management of cross border acquisition and performance. The study explores 
acquisition motives, pre- and post-acquisition management issues and acquisition 
performance. The study is interested in the perception of top managers involved in 
managing cross border acquisition. As the data on acquisition implementation strategy 
is not publicly available, this study adopts a cross-sectional research design in order to 
collect information related to acquisition management. This is consistent with prior 
studies that have focused on the issues related to implementation of acquisition strategy 
such as Datta and Grant, (1990), Datta (1991), Capron, et aI., (1998), Ranft and Lord 
(2000), Schonberg (2004). 
In order to collect primary data, the study opted for a structured questionnaire 
survey. In genera~ a survey involves structured, paper-and-pencil measurement, and is 
an alternative to observational methods of primary research (Dillon et al., 1994). 
Surveys and questionnaires are the most commonly used method of data collection in 
the study of organization. According to Emory and Cooper (1991) surveys are the 
appropriate methodology when information is needed on perceptions and on past 
events. Similarly, the current study intends to explore the perceptions of corporate 
managers on issues related to the management of cross border acquisitions. 
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Even though the data collection strategy chosen in this research is quite common 
m business studies (Ghauri and Gronhaug, 2002), the strategy of relying on a 
questionnaire survey with one single individual as an information source needs some 
amplification. Accordingly the survey technique will be scrutinized below. 
Structured surveys are quite appropriate for large-scale studies. All informants 
are replying to the same questions, it is quite simple to administer, and it is relatively 
easy to tabulate and analyze (Churchill, 1999). However, major weaknesses are also 
recognized: problems concerning interpretation of the questions, terms used in the 
instrument could be misunderstood by the informants, wrong persons could answer the 
questionnaire, and the response rate is often rather low (Ghauri and Gronhaug, 2002). 
Although these are important weaknesses, it is possible to reduce these problems by 
executing a proper design. In addition, the alternatives to a mailed questionnaire were 
few and with major challenges. The reason for not using archival data was simple; the 
archival data did not contain the information needed for measuring degree of integration 
or post-acquisition performance. Moreover, very little information about the underlying 
variables was available. On the other hand, interviewing was not feasible given the time 
and financial constraint facing the researcher. 
3.2 POPULATION UNDER STUDY: A GEOGRAPHICAL RESTRICTION 
Initial identification of cross border acquisitions was accomplished through the Mergers 
and Acquisitions Database of the Thomson One Banker. The Thomson One Banker 
database provides comprehensive secondary information about mergers and acquisitions 
including cross border deals. The sample includes those deals in which the acquirer 
bought a 100 percent equity stake in the acquired company. In order to be selected in 
the sample, the acquisitions have to meet three additional criteria, concerning the 
buyers' country, the target country and the time frame. These three selection criteria are 
discussed below. 
All completed acquisitions made by UK firms in foreign countries formed the 
target population of this study. UK acquirers were selected for four reasons. First, 
throughout the 1990s, the UK ranked among the countries with the highest cross border 
acquisition activity (UNCT AD, 2000). Secondly, by holding the buyers' country 
constant it is possible to control for possible home country effects. Moreover, by having 
only UK acquirers, the need for questionnaire translations can be avoided. Language 
differences among respondents challenge the ability to compare survey data and 
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threaten the validity of the operationalization of the constructs. The selection of UK 
fIrms justifIes the use of one English-language survey. Finally, having only UK 
acquirers facilitates the collection of information about acquiring fIrms that is 
comparable across fIrms. Similar information about UK fIrms could be obtained from 
databases, such as OSIRIS and FAME. As a result, keeping the host country constant 
increases both the reliability and construct validity of the study (Cook and Campbell, 
1979; Schwab, 1999). 
In order to increase the external validity of this study, an effort was made to 
maximize the number of target countries in which UK fIrms make cross border 
acquisitions. Today's global competitive landscape increasingly extends beyond 
economically developed countries to include emerging markets, particularly those 
countries that are moving toward market economies. Accordingly, the sampling frame 
included target countries with both developed and developing economies. The target 
country regions include the USA and Canada, the European Union and Asia Pacific. 
The name of the acquirer fIrm and target fIrm was collected from Thomson One Banker. 
Other relevant information (such as deal date, industry classifIcation of fIrms, private or 
public company) is also available in the Thomson One banker data base. 
This study examined cross border acquisitions that were completed during the 5-
year period from 2000 through 2004 inclusive. This time frame was selected for several 
reasons. First, this period is characterized by intense cross border acquisition activity. 
Secondly, this study will rely heavily on informants' recollection of events through the 
survey instrument. Acquisitions made prior to 2000, therefore, were excluded from this 
study as they potentially create a retrospective bias. Finally, since 2004 is the fInal year 
used for selection of acquisitions, there was at least a two-year time lag between 
completing the deal and administering the survey. This is consistent with the time-
frames employed in prior research. This allows for a more accurate assessment by key 
informants of the integration approaches and controls for the inherent instability during 
periods directly following major organizational change (Buono and Bowditch, 1989; 
Jemison and Sitkin, I 986a,b; Lamont, Williams and Hoffman, 1994). 
3.3 THE SAMPLE 
Constraining the population to the above-mentioned selection criteria provided a 
sampling frame of 2,792 by 915 UK Companies - 1,028 deals were completed in the 
US and in Canada, 1239 deals were completed in the EU, and 525 deals were completed 
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in the Asia pacific region. When acquiring firms have engaged in multiple acquisitions, 
only the most recent cross border acquisition will be selected for inclusion in this study. 
3.4 THE KEY INFORMANT 
Information about the cross border acquisition was collected through a structured 
questionnaire, which was mailed to one key informant in the organization. Generally, 
the key informant approach is a technique of data collection about a social setting 
through interviewing or asking a section of people about a certain research problem 
(Seidler, 1974). Hence, the informants were not randomly chosen. Further, these 
individuals were asked to answer on behalf of an aggregated unit, often an organization 
or a relationship between organizations. However, relying on a single key informant in 
an organization can be problematic in different ways. First, asking informants to assess 
highly complex issues on behalf of an organization may increase the random 
measurement errors just because of the difficulties of answering such questions 
(Phillips, 1981). Second, systematic error may occur, for example, due to inadequate 
knowledge, ignorance or lack of interest in the survey topic contributed to the key 
informants (Phillips, 1981). Third, it is impossible to detect whether the error variance 
in measurements is due to systematic sources of error, or whether it is generated due to 
random errors (Bagozz~ 1980). Fourth, the problem of common method variance can be 
extensive (PodsakofT and Organ, 1986). Because the measure of two or more 
hypothesized correlated variables come from the same single source, any defect in this 
source may ruin the measures on all variables. 
In order to improve the quality of collected data, care needs to be taken both 
before and after the data collection. Especially, important are precautions regarding the 
selection of key informants as well as the design of the questionnaire. Collecting 
information from both sides (i.e. through a key informant in the headquarters and one 
key informant in the foreign subsidiary) could probably solve some of the above 
problems (Bagozzi, et aI., 1991; Phillips, 1981). However, this study is concerned with 
the principal's view of the cross border acquisitions that occur between headquarters 
and affiliates, and likewise, the principal's assessment of the performance of the 
affiliate. Hence, collecting equivalent data from an informant in the foreign subsidiary 
was considered irrelevant, and certainly would not increase the possibility of validating 
the data. Moreover, if it had been necessary to collect dyadic data in this way, only a 
single key informant would be representing each part of the organization. One 
96 
represents the principal and one the agent, who in many cases may also have divergent 
and conflicting interests, even though they by defmition belong to the same 
organization. Instead, choosing a sample of multiple informants from all possible 
informants in the headquarters of each multinational company may increase the validity 
of the study (Seidler, 1974). However, such a design is extremely resource demanding 
and increases the possibility of non-response bias, and bias related to ignorance and 
knowledge differences among the informants (Golden, 1992; Kumar et aI., 1993). 
In accordance with the logic of multiple informant approach, and before the 
decision about a single key informant strategy was taken, the present study tried to 
identify several persons in each company that could be targeted as potential 
respondents. The typical response from the companies was that they did not want to use 
so much resource on one single study, and that in many cases it was only one person 
(often the Chief Executive officer or Business Development Director) that really had the 
expertise to answer the questions. Consequently, this study chose a single key informant 
when collecting the data and each single informant answered a structured questionnaire. 
This strategy is consistent with others studies where performance and acquisition 
integration in various dimensions have been investigated, for example, Datta and Grant, 
(1990), Datta (1991), Capron, et a1. (1998), and Ranft and Lord (2000). 
Given the focus of this study, the key informants were those persons in the 
organization that had appropriate knowledge about the research issue and were willing 
and ablc to talk about it by completing the questionnaire (Campbell, 1995). In most 
cases, this person was the Chief Executive or Business Development Director. The 
procedure to identify these persons was the following. First, the name of the acquirer 
fIrm was collected from Thomson One Banker database. Then, the biographies of the 
directors were checked in the company websites with the intension of identifying the 
person responsible for managing mergers and acquisitions or business development. 
The joining datc of the person identifIed was checked in order to ensure that the person 
was actually working for the company during the acquisition, and was serving the 
company at the time when the survey was carried out. In some cases, companies were 
called by phone to identify a key informant in the company. Based on the results of the 
website search and telephone conversation, a list of key informants and potential survey 
participants was assembled. Some private company websites were not available, and 
some company websitcs did not provide any contact details of the managers responsible 
for mergers and acquisitions. After removing such companies, the sampling frame 
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reduced from 915 to 798 companies. The fmallist includes 798 key informants from 
companies that had acquired at least one foreign company in the 2000 to 2004 period. 
3.5 DEVELOPMENT OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE 
This section outlines the different steps of the questionnaire development. Successively, 
the section discusses the writing of the questions, the questionnaire construction and the 
survey implementation. In short, writing questions deals with the kind of information 
being sought and the questionnaire structure. The questionnaire construction deals with 
question wording and the response structure being used. Finally, the survey 
implementation phase involves the writing of a cover letter, preparing the mail-out 
package and conducting follow-ups. 
3.5.1 Writing a/the questions 
Writing questions is the translation from the research question(s) into survey questions. 
It is necessary to explain how each survey question is closely related to the research 
(sub) question (Dillon et aI., 1994). The main purpose of the questionnaire was to obtain 
data on the acquisition management. The main building blocks of the research model 
are: the motives for cross border acquisition, the pre-acquisition management, the post 
acquisition management, and post acquisition performance 
Several sources were used to develop the questionnaire. The main source was 
the literature on acquisition strategy, as discussed in the literature review section. The 
general theory did not only indicate the research gaps in this research field, but also 
provided valuable instruments which tested several relations within the general 
framework. The use of questions developed by other researchers is sometimes 
encouraged in survey research for several reasons. First, it reduces the time needed for 
testing. And second, it allows a comparison of results across a number of studies (Dillon 
et at., 1994). 
Contribution came from Schoenberg (2004), Child et al. (2001), and Ranft et a1. 
(2000). As indicated in the theoretical overview, Schoenberg (2004) empirically tested 
how differences in management styles impact the performance of cross border 
acquisitions. In addition, the relationship between management style compatibility and 
cross border acquisition performance was found to be contingent upon the level of 
integration imposed by the post-acquisition process. 
98 
A number of other questionnaires were used or adapted to translate research 
questions into survey questions. The study adapted the questionnaire developed by 
Child et al. (2001) to predict the relationship between integration and post acquisition 
performance. The questionnaire developed by Ranft et al. (2000) was also adapted to 
predict determinants of employee retention. Moreover, the study adapted the 
questionnaire of Datta and Grant (1990) to measure the cultural differences. Others 
questionnaires consulted were: Datta (1991), Capron, et al., (1998), Chatterjee et al. 
(1992). 
3.5.2 Questionnaire construction 
This section briefly outlines the rules taken into account when constructing the different 
questions. Although these rules sometimes seem straightforward, it is very important to 
reflect on all these different aspects. For example, the difficulties brought about by the 
problems with question wording exceed most other sources of distortion in surveys 
(Emory and Cooper, 1991). 
Particular attention was paid to the question wording. The questionnaire consists 
of words which typically come from the strategy literature, such as 'integration', 
'centralization', 'performance measurement', 'strategic motive', etc. These words may not 
be fully understood by everyone in an organization, however, as we addressed the 
questionnaire to corporate (and business unit) managers it was supposed that these 
strategic terms did not pose any problems to these people. An attempt was made to 
avoid terms which could have different interpretations. For example, there is often 
confusion between "mergers" and "acquisitions". In the literature these words has been 
used interchangeably. However, mergers and acquisitions bring different types of 
organizational change. Consequently, these words were not used in survey questions. 
The questionnaire used terms such as 'international acquisition' and avoided word such 
as 'international M&As'. All questions were very neutral, there were no loaded 
questions. Moreover, the questionnaire did not use any strong adjectives. 
A second major decision in the questionnaire construction concerns with the 
degree and form of structure imposed on responses. There are two general types of 
response formats. In open-ended questions the respondent is free to choose any response 
deemed appropriate. Open response questions are better suited when the objective is to 
discover opinions and degree of knowledge (Emory and Cooper, 1991). As the purpose 
of this research is to test relations between different constructs quantitatively, the study 
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relied on closed-ended itemized questions. More particularly, Likert scales were used 
for the majority of questions. For questions related to the company background and 
general acquisition information, a dichotomous response pattern was used, where the 
respondents had to tick the item ifthe answer was 'yes'. 
Closed-ended questions are preferable in larger surveys. The survey took about 
25 minutes to complete, which is relatively long. Partly due to the length of the 
questionnaire, this alternative was chosen. This approach has also an advantage in that it 
reduces interviewer bias, although the enumeration of the different alternatives can also 
bias the results because it sometimes suggests which answer is appropriate. However, 
this is less the case when the opinions and perceptions of the respondent are asked for, 
as was the case in this survey. 
As noted earlier, Likert scales were used for the majority of the questions. Likert 
scales are commonly used when measuring attitudes. It is defmed as a scale "which 
consists of a number of evaluative statements concerning an attitude object" (Dillon et 
at., 1994). Likert scales are frequently used in strategy research. For example, all ofthe 
questionnaires that served as an input for this research project used Likert scales. 
The success of Likert scales depends to a large extent on the quality of the scale 
items. According to Dillon et at. (1994), the scale items should fulfil the following 
requirements: (1) they should capture all relevant aspects of the attitude object, (2) they 
should be unambiguous, and (3) they should be sensitive enough to discriminate and 
thus create variability. In order to increase the variability, 5-point Likert scales was 
chosen rather than 3-point Likert scales. Generally, the Likert scales were presented in 
the following format: 
No importance 
2 3 4 
Very important 
5 
Depending on the nature of the questions, the labels were changed (see Appendix B for 
the full questionnaire). For example, 'very similar' - 'very different' when the 
respondents were asked to evaluate the cultural difference between the acquired and 
acquiring company (Section D, question 2). An effort was made to maintain a consistent 
layout. All questions with Likert scales had the same format, as was also the case for the 
questions with a dichotomous answer pattern. 
Although the questionnaire to a large extent was based on existing 
questionnaires which had been pre-tested, the questionnaire used in this study was also 
pre-tested. A draft questionnaire was sent to 50 potential respondents in order to check 
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whether the respondents found the questionnaire comprehensible and easy to complete. 
In total II questionnaires was returned without any suggestion for modifications. In 
addition, four doctoral researchers who were undertaking research in the international 
business area as well as using a questionnaire survey were asked to comment on the 
questionnaire. Some minor word changes were suggested which were incorporated into 
the fmal questionnaire. 
3.5.3 Survey implementation 
The fmal part of the development of the questionnaire was the effective implementation 
of the survey. Special attention was paid to the writing of a cover letter and to the 
introduction to the questionnaire (included in appendix A). The cover letter was 
intended to introduce the subject. 
The purpose and innovation of the research project were explained at the 
beginning of the cover letter. The letter was personalized by including the respondent's 
name in each letter and stressing how important was the contribution of the respondent. 
The letter also assured confidentiality and promised a summary of the research findings. 
The letter was sent using the official letter head of the University of Sheffield. In 
addition, the letter was signed by the supervisor in order to increase credibility. Finally, 
the letter again stressed the confidentiality with which the data would be treated. At the 
end of the questionnaire, the respondents were asked to give their opinion and further 
comments. Very few respondents provided additional comments. 
The mail-out package consisted of the following items: a cover letter, an 
introduction to the questionnaire, the questionnaire itself, and a self-addressed, stamped 
return envelope. The respondents were requested to fill out the questionnaire at their 
earliest convenience. After four weeks a reminder letter was sent. 
Executives because of their demanding schedules often have limited time and 
interest in completing surveys. Consequently, response rates for surveys are often low. 
Particularly when soliciting participation by top managers, the development of the 
survey instrument is a critical stage to ensure an acceptable response rate. Therefore, 
Dillman's (1978) Total Design Method was closely followed in constructing the survey, 
writing the cover letter, and administering the surveys. However, Cycyota and Harrison 
(2002) found that certain response enhancement techniques, such as a monetary 
incentive, advance notice or follow-up, that has been used in general public, customer-
level, or employee-level populations, are not effective for executive level populations. 
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Cycyota and Harrison recommend considering new or stronger ways of increasing 
response rates from executives. 
In addition to optimizing the cover letter and survey instrument through pre-
tests, two ways to maximize response rate were used in the current study. The 
increasing familiarity of executives with the use of the Internet makes it a medium 
worthy of consideration. Administering the survey via the Internet facilitated the 
application of manipulation techniques, such as personalization and follow-up (Sudman 
and Blair, 1999). Response rates were expected to increase when conducting the survey 
both on-line as well as through traditional mail. Finally, since executive surveys 
concern topics at the fIrm-level, rather than the individual-Ieve~ Cycyota and Harrison 
(2002) argue that personal-level incentives (e.g., the one-dollar monetary incentive) are 
less effective for enhancing response rates of ex~cutives. Rather, using a firm-level 
incentive was expected to enhance response rates. Rewarding survey participation with 
an executive summary was expected to be a stronger incentive to elicit data from 
executives. 
Thus, to enhance and facilitate data collection in a timely and cost effective 
manner the survey was administered by using pre-selection of the survey population, 
distributing the survey via mail, fax, or email, offering the choice to complete the 
survey through hard-copy or Internet, and presenting a fIrm-level incentive. 
3.6 OPERATIONALIZATION OF THE CONSTRUCTS 
The study adapted the established scales used by other researchers in the field of 
international business and strategy research. Three management researchers examined 
the survey instrument for both content and face validity. In addition, five managers from 
five fIrmS participated in a pre-test of the survey. Following the pre-tests, slight wording 
and ordering modifications were made to improve the clarity and organization of the 
survey. 
3.6.1 ACQUISITION MOTIVES 
Through a review of previous mergers and acquisitions research (e.g. Seth, et. al., 2000; 
Walter and Barney, 1990) a list of possible motives for conducting a cross border 
acquisition was developed. In addition, this study has used an adapted version of the 
Kreitl and Oberndorfer (2004) instrument to investigate the acquisition movies. The 
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respondents indicated the importance of strategic motives on a scale where 1 indicates 
'no importance' and 5 indicates 'very important'. The list of motives is included in 
Appendix B. 
3.6.2 PRE-ACQUISITION MANAGEMENT ISSUES 
3.6.2.1 Evaluating target firms 
Through a review ofprior research on acquisition (e.g. Galpin and Herndon, 2000; Very 
and Schweiger, 2001; Marks and Mirvis, 1998; Ernst and Young, 1994) a list of factors 
considered in evaluating a target firm was developed. The respondents were asked to 
indicate the extent to which the company evaluated each of the factors relating to the 
acquired firm. The respondents indicated the extent to which each of the factors was 
evaluated on a scale where 1 indicates 'very little evaluation' and 5 indicates 'very 
thorough evaluation'. The list of seventeen factors is included in Appendix B. 
To identify a parsimonious set of variables to determine the underlying 
constructs governing the set of seventeen items evaluated regarding the target firm, 
exploratory factor analysis (EFA) using varimax rotation was used to extract the 
undcrlying factors. The EF A initially produced 5 factors for the 17 items evaluated 
during the pre-acquisition stage. 
A content analysis (Cavusgil and Zou, 1994; Despande, 1982) was carried out to 
eliminate items that had inconsistent substantive meanings with the factor or that had 
low factor loadings from further analysis. This purification process resulted in the 
elimination of three items relating to the target firm: the acquired firm's technological 
competence, the acquired firm's market position and, the acquired flfIll's fixed asset 
value. The remaining 14 items were again factor analysed and produced four non-
overlapping factors, as shown in Appendix C. The four factors explain a total of 71.63 
percent of the observed variance, with Cronbach's (l ranging from 0.64 to 0.85. The 
acceptable lower limit for Cronbach's a of 0.60 in exploratory research (Hair, 
Andcrson, Tatham and Black, 1998, p. 118) is met by all of the factors. The four factors 
relating to the pre-acquisition evaluation of the target firm are used in the subsequent 
analysis. The interpretation of each of these factors is also presented in Appendix C. 
These four factors can be summarized in the following way: Factor 1: Investment and 
fmancing issues; Factor 2: Employee and business capability; Factor 3: Lega~ Tax and 
IT compatibility; Factor 4: Strategic and organizational fit. 
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3.6.2.2 Pre-acquisition problems 
Through a review of previous research on acquisition (e.g. Very and Schweiger, 2001; 
Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991) a list of pre-acquisition management problems was 
developed. The respondents were asked to indicate the extent to which they experienced 
the problems during the pre-acquisition phase. The list of nineteen problems is included 
in Appendix B. 
An attempt was made to identify a parsimonious set of variables to determine 
the underlying dimensions governing the full set of nineteen pre-acquisition problems. 
EF A using varimax rotation was used to extract the underlying factors. The EF A 
initially produced 5 factors for the 19 pre-acquisition problems. 
A content analysis (Cavusgil and Zou, 1994; Despande, 1982) was conducted to 
remove items that had inconsistent substantive meanings with the factor or that had low 
factor loadings from further analysis. This purification process resulted in the 
elimination of three pre-acquisition problems: increased personal pressure to conclude 
the deal, maintaining the confidentiality of the negotiation, and collecting information 
about the acquired firm. The remaining 16 pre-acquisition problems were again factor 
analysed and produced five non-overlapping factors, as shown in Appendix C. Five 
factors explained a total of 69.77 percent of the observed variance (all the factors are 
above the acceptable lower limit of 0.60 with Cronbach's a ranging from 0.62 to 0.87). 
The interpretation of each of these factors is also discussed in Appendix C. The five 
factors representing pre-acquisition problems experienced can be summarized in the 
following way: Factor 1: Tax, accounting, legal and regulatory issues; Factor 2: 
National and corporate cultural issues; Factor 3: Negotiation issues; Factor 4: 
Communication issues; Factor 5: Deal structuring issues. 
3.6.2.3 Acquisition Experience of Acquiring Firm 
The respondents were also asked to indicate the extent of acquisition experience on a 
Likert-type scale of 1 (indicating 'no experience') to 5 (indicating 'great experience'). 
"Great experience" was determined by considering those scoring 4 and 5. "Little 
experience" was determined by considering those scoring 3, 2 and 1. A dummy variable 
was created where '1' indicates an acquirer with great experience and '0' indicates 
acquirer with little experience. 
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3.6.3 DETERMINANTS OF EMPLOYEE RETENTION 
3.6.3.1 Top Management Retention 
First, respondents were asked to indicate the importance of retaining top management (1 
= 'not important' to 5 = 'extremely important'). A frequency distribution revealed that a 
total of 46 acquirers wished to retain the top management team of the acquired fum. 
This was determined by considering those scoring 4 and 5. Thus, the subsample consists 
of 46 cross border acquisitions. The top management retention ofthe acquired fIrm was 
measured using an item adapted from Shanley (1994). Respondents were the asked to 
indicate the extent to which the prior top management team of the acquired fIrm had 
been retained one year after acquisition, on a Likert-type scale anchored from 1 ('no 
retention') and 5 ('full retention'). This contract has been reversed in order to make the 
construct consistent with the hypothesised relationship. Thus, the original scale '5 = 
complete turnover' becomes' 1 = complete turnover" and, the original scale' 1 = little or 
no change' becomes '5 = full retention'. This reversed construct of top management 
retention has been used in subsequent analysis. 
3.6.3.2 Post-Acquisition Autonomy of the Acquired Firm 
The degree of organisational autonomy granted to the acquired company in the post 
acquisition period was measured using an instrument adapted from that previously 
utilised by Datta and Grant (1990) and Schoenberg (2004). Respondents were asked to 
indicate the locus of decision making (1 = acquiring fIrm; 2 = acquired company, 3 = 
jointly) for 18 separate operational and strategic decisions affecting the acquired fIrm 
(listed in Appendix B). All of the eighteen decision items loaded strongly (>0.6) onto a 
single component. An aggregate measure of autonomy was calculated by averaging the 
factor scores on all the items. Results for this measure were compared with responses 
on the single-item measure developed by Hambrick and Cannella (1993) to assess 
"overall autonomy," which also was included in the survey. The two measures were 
highly correlated (r = 0.91, P < 0.001). 
3.6.3.3 Acquirer's Commitment to the Acquired Firm 
Indication of acquirer commitment was measured using an instrument adapted from 
that previously utilized by Ranft and Lord (2000). The four items in this measure 
assessed various dimensions of the acquirer's corporate commitment to the success of 
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the acquisition. First, respondents indicated to what extent they agreed or disagreed with 
the statement that the acquirer was visibly committed to making the acquisition a 
success (1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree). The remaining items assessed other 
potential indicators of commitment: support for continued training and development of 
the acquired ftrm's employees; support for travel and liaison between the acquired ftrm 
and the acquiring ftrm; the use of positive public relations. Factor analysis of the items 
extracted a single factor. An aggregate measure of commitment was calculated by 
averaging factor scores on the four items. 
3.6.3.4 Financial Incentives 
The survey presented respondents with items assessing the use of four different types of 
fmancial incentives (following Ranft and Lord, 2000) that might be used to encourage 
employees to stay with a company. These items included (1) short-run incentives, (2) 
long-term contracts, (3) stock options, and (4) performance bonuses (Balkin and 
Gomez-Mejia, 1990; Gerhart and Milkovich, 1990). Respondents were asked to indicate 
on a ftve-point scale the extent to which each type of incentive were offered (1 = no 
extent; 5 = great extent). Factor analysis on these items (with varimax rotation) 
extracted two factors (with eigenvalues> 1). The ftrst factor consisted of short-run 
incentives and long-term contracts, i.e., each linked to a speciftc time frame for 
retaining an employee. The second factor consisted of stock options and other types of 
bonuses, i.e., linked directly to performance outcomes of the newly merged business. 
An overall score for each of the factors was calculated by averaging the scores for the 
items that loaded on each factor. Because each measure appeared to tap into a different 
type of financial incentive, both measures were used in subsequent analyses. 
3.6.4 POST-ACQUISITION MANAGEMENT ISSUES 
3.6.4.1 Level of Integration 
The operationalization of level of integration is based on Child, et aI's (2001) measure 
of degree of integration. The degree of integration was assessed using a composite 
measure linked to the occupancy of key positions by acquiring company appointees 
including those of CEO, financial director, operations director, sales and marketing 
director, R&D director, HRM, and/or other equivalent staff. The integration is the mean 
number of key positions (ranging from 0 to 7) held by acquiring company appointees 
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{where 1-2 indicates low level of integration, 3-5 indicates partial integration and 6-7 
indicates full integration}. 
3.6.4.2 Organizational Cultural Differences 
Organizational fit refers to the extent to which the combining firms are similar or 
different along several organizational dimensions prior to the acquisition. This was 
measured using five items adapted from previous studies {Chatterjee et al., 1992; Datta, 
1991; Uhlenbruck and De Castro, 2000}. The respondents were asked to determine the 
extent to which the acquired firm differed from the acquiring firm in {I} General 
management style, {2} Values, beliefs and philosophy, {3} Reward and evaluation 
systems, {4} Approach to risk taking, {5} Culture of home countries. Each item was 
measured on a Likert-type scale, anchored from 1 ('extremely different') to 5 
('extremely similar'). The EF A produced 1 factor for the 5 measures of organizational 
cultural differences. One factor explained a total of 70.69 percent of the observed 
variance. A composite measure of organizational cultural difference was calculated by 
averaging the scores for the items that loaded on single factor. 
3.6.4.3 Knowledge Transfer 
This variable captures the extent to which knowledge was transferred to and from the 
acquired and the acquiring firms. The focus on knowledge transfer both from and to the 
acquisition allows for the transfer assessment of unique capabilities of the parent firm as 
well as local knowledge ofthe target fIrm The operationalization of this variable builds 
on Capron et aI's (1998) measure of resource deployment between targets and acquirers, 
and Schoenberg's {2004} measure of transfer to and from acquired firms. Knowledge 
transfer was measured by asking respondents to indicate the extent to which knowledge 
had been transferred (since the acquisition was completed) to and from the acquired 
firm in the following areas: Research and Development, Product and Service design, 
Purchasing I Supplier relation, Service I Manufacturing operations, Marketing and 
Sales, Distribution I Outlets, Customer Service, Strategic Planning, Financial Reporting, 
Investment Appraisa~ Personnel I HRM). For each of the above activities the 
respondents were asked to indicate the extent to which benefits based on transferring 
skills had actually been achieved at the time of data collection. Each item was measured 
on a Likert-type scale, anchored from 1 ('no skill transfer') to 5 ('significant skills 
transfer'). 
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EFA produced two factors for the eleven measures of knowledge transfer, which 
explained a total of69 percent ofthe observed variance (with eigenvalues >1). The fIrst 
factor consisted of the activities Research and Development, Product and Service 
design, Purchasing / Supplier relation, Service / Manufacturing operations, Marketing 
and Sales, Distribution / Outlets, and Customer Service. The second factor consisted of 
the activities Strategic Planning, Financial Reporting, Investment Appraisa~ and 
Personnel/ HRM. An overall score for each of the factors was calculated by averaging 
the scores for the items that loaded on each factor. As each measure appears to tap into a 
different type of knowledge transfer, both measures were used in subsequent analyses. 
Factor one (a = 0.87) was named as "Knowledge transfer - Functional areas" and factor 
two (a = 0.83) as "Know ledge transfer - General management". 
3.6.4.4 Retention of Top Management 
The operationalization of this construct has been discussed in previous section i.e. top 
management retention. 
3.6.5 ACQUISITION PERFORMANCE - THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
Acquisition performance was measured using the acquiring management's assessment . 
of the extent to which the original performance expectations for the acquisition had 
been met. The instrument comprised nine financial performance criteria synthesised 
from theoretical and empirical studies of acquisition objectives (Trautwein, 1990; 
Walter and Barney, 1990). Each item was measured on a Likert-type scale, anchored 
from 1 ('not met') to 5 ('fully met'). 
An attempt was made to identify a parsimonious set of variables to determine 
the underlying dimensions governing the full set of nine measures of acquisition 
performance. Exploratory factor analysis (EFA) using varimax rotation was used to 
extract the underlying factors. The EF A produced 3 non-overlapping factors for the 9 
measures of acquisition performance, as shown in Appendix D. Three factors explained 
a total of74.26 percent of the observed variance (with Cronbach's a ranging from 0.81 
to 0.89). The interpretation of each of these factors is also provided in Appendix D. 
These three factors can be summarized in the following way: Factor 1: Market share 
and sales growth; Factor 2: Earning per share (EPS) and Share price; Factor 3: 
Profitability. 
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This study adopted a subjective measure of performance in view of the 
established difficulties in obtaining objective measures (Very et al., 1997; Larsson and 
Finkelstein, 1999; Schoenberg, 2004). For instance, share market measures of 
acquisition performance based on abnormal returns methodology require limiting the 
sample to acquisitions made by publicly quoted fIrms. Moreover, share market gives 
information only on expected ex-ante acquisition performance rather than that actually 
achieved ex-post (Larsson and Finkelstein, 1999). Similarly, comparable accounting 
measures of performance for individual cross border acquisition are typically not 
available, due to national differences in accounting standards and difficulties in 
dis aggregating the performance of individual operating units from consolidated 
accounts (Larsson and Finkelstein, 1999). 
More positively, empirical support for the validity of subjective performance 
measures is available from a number of separate methodological studies. Dess and 
Robinson's (1984) widely cited investigation into the relationship between objective 
and subjective performance measures concluded that "the Top Management Team's 
perception of how well their firm had performed - measured in a subjective and relative 
sense - was consistent with how the firm actually performed" (Dess and Robinson, 
1984: 271). Similarly, others have found that manager's subjective performance 
assessments correlate strongly with objective measures within samples that range from 
new ventures (Brush and Vanderwerf, 1992) to intemationaljoint ventures (Glaister and 
Buckley, 1998). 
3.6.6 CONTROL VARIABLES 
A number of control variables were included in the analysis of the pre-acquisition 
evaluation of the target firm, post acquisition management and top management 
retention. The justification for the selection of different sets of control variables in each 
chapter is presented below. 
a. Pre-acquisition evaluation of target firm and acquisition performance 
The control variables included are: (1) regional origin of target flfIll, (2) attitude of 
target firm, (3) prior profitability of target firm, and (4) prior acquisition experience of 
acquiring firm. 
To the extent that acquiring firms believe that targets from particular foreign 
nationalities can provide certain requirements of the acquisition, for example, access to 
specific markets or types of technology, these targets will be chosen in preference to 
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potential targets of a different nationality when the acquisition is made. Such deliberate 
choice of location can facilitate smooth synergy realisation and acquisition outcome. 
Therefore, the regional origin of a target fIrm may influence the subsequent acquisition 
outcome. To control for the potential effect of the regional origin of the target fIrm, 
respondents were asked indicate the origin of the target fIrm in an open-ended question. 
The analysis revealed that acquisitions were either completed in Europe or in North 
America. A dummy variable was created where '1' indicates 'North America' and '0' 
indicates 'Europe'. 
Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) argued that the nature of the bid negotiations 
influences the atmosphere that surrounds an acquisition within the target and acquiring 
fIrm and raises organisational expectations of what post-acquisition life will hold. The 
nature of negotiations, therefore, may influence the subsequent acquisition 
implementation and performance. The respondents were asked to indicate in a fIve-point 
scale (following Schoenberg, 2004) the attitude of the acquired fIrm's board towards the 
acquisition (1 = no resistance to being acquired; 5 = Major resistance to being acquired). 
Prior research has shown that prior profItability of the acquired fIrm may affect 
cross border acquisition performance directly (Bleeke et al., 1993). To measure relative 
performance, an item on the survey asked respondents to indicate the profItability 
(return on capital employed) of the acquired fIrm relative to the acquiring fIrm at the 
time of acquisition (from 1 = 'very poor' to 5 = 'very good'). 
Prior research found a positive relationship between the acquisition experience 
of the acquiring fIrm and performance (Barkema, Bell and Pennings, 1996; Bruton, 
Oviatt and White, 1994; Fowler and Schmidt, 1989). Acquisition experience was 
measured in two ways. First it was computed as the number of acquisitions completed 
by the acquiring fIrm. The respondents were asked (following Zollo and Singh 2004) to 
indicate the total number of domestic and cross border acquisitions completed before 
the cross border acquisition under consideration. A company with no prior acquisitions 
is considered to have no acquisition experience and with fIve or more acquisitions is 
considered to have a great deal of experience. The respondents were also asked to 
indicate the extent of acquisition experience on a Likert-type scale of 1 (indicating 'no 
experience') to 5 (indicating 'great experience'). The two measures of acquisition 
experience have a signifIcant high positive correlation. The measure of acquisition 
experience indicated on the Likert-type scale by the respondent was used in the analysis 
of the pre-acquisition evaluation of the target fIrm and acquisition performance. 
110 
b. Determinants of top management retention 
The control variables included are relative size of the acquired firm, acquisition 
relatedness and prior profitability of the acquired firm. 
The size differences between an acquiring firm and target flfm can affect the top 
management turnover (Walsh, 1989). A very large firm is likely to have a supply of 
skilled managers to replace the managers in a smaller acquired flfm. This would not be 
the case as the size differences between the acquiring and target flfITl reduces. 
Moreover, the managers in the smaller target flfm may be less skilful when managing in 
a larger and perhaps more bureaucratic context. Consequently, target flfm top 
management retention is likely to vary negatively with an increase in the SIze 
differences between the acquiring flfm and target flfm. Relative size was 
operationalised as the ratio of the sales turnover of the acquired flfITl to that of the 
acquiring firm at the time of the acquisition (following Krishnan et a~ 1997, and 
Schoenberg, 2004). 
Walsh (1988) suggested that top management turnover following a related 
merger or acquisition would be higher that the turnover following an unrelated merger 
or acquisition. He argued that the acquiring flfITl's management team is familiar with a 
target flfm's business in a related merger or acquisitions. Consequently, the acquiring 
company can afford to lose many of the target flfITls managers. However, in an 
unrelated merger or acquisition, the acquiring flfITl might be dependent upon the target 
flfms' managers and thus the management of the acquiring flfm should be interested in 
retaining managers of the target firm (Walsh, 1989). Pitts (1976) suggested that, in 
unrelated merger or acquisition, the acquiring flfITl cannot afford to lose the product and 
market experience of the target flfITl's management. The acquisition was considered 
related if the acquirer and the acquired firm operated in the same industry, and not 
related if they are operated in different industries. The respondents were asked to 
indicate the industry acquiring flfm was operatillg in as well as the industry of the target 
flfm. To control for potential effects of relatedness, the relatedness of the acquired flfm 
and the acquirer was coded' 1 'if 'related' and '0' if 'not related' acquisitions. 
Target flfms' top managers that express open hostility with the prospect of a 
merger or acquisition are unlikely to remain in the target flfm (Walsh, 1989). To control 
for potential affect of attitude of target flfITls' manageinent, the respondents were asked 
to indicate in a five-point scale (following Schoenberg, 2004) the attitude of the 
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acquired fIrm's board towards the acquisition (1 = No resistance being acquired; 5 = 
Major resistance being acquired). 
c. Post-acquisition management and acquisition performance 
Three control variables were included in the analysis of post-acquisition management 
issues and performance: (1) the acquired fIrm's performance relative to the acquirer's at 
the time of the acquisition, (2) the relatedness of the acquisition and (3) the acquiring 
fIrm's acquisition experience. 
As indicated earlier, prior research has shown that prior profItability of the 
acquired firm may affect cross border acquisition performance directly (Bleeke et aI., 
1993). To measure relative performance, an item on the survey asked respondents to 
indicate the profitability (return on capital employed) of the acquired firm relative to the 
acquiring fIrm at the time of acquisition (from 1 = 'very poor' to 5 = 'very good '). 
Prior research suggests that related acquisitions should be more successful than 
unrelated ones because both tangible and intangible resources can be more easily 
combined when a firm extends its activities into a related area (Bettis 1981; Lubatkin 
1987). To control for potential effects of relatedness, the relatedness of the acquired 
firm and the acquirer was included in the analysis and was coded as a binary variable. 
The acquisition was considered related if the acquirer and the acquired fIrm operated in 
the same industry as indicated by the respondent (Lubatkin, Merchant, and Srinivasan 
1993). 
As mentioned earlier, previous research found a positive relationship between 
acquisition experience of acquiring fIrm and performance (Barkema, Bell and Pennings, 
1996; Bruton, Oviatt and White, 1994; Fowler and Schmidt, 1989). To control for 
potential affect of acquisition experience, the respondents were asked to indicate the 
extent of acquisition experience on a Likert-type scale of 1 (indicating 'no experience') 
to 5 (indicating 'great experience'). The measure of acquisition experience indicated on 
the Likert-type scale by the respondent was used in the analysis of post-acquisition 
management issues and performance. 
3.7 SAMPLE DESCRIPTION AND RESPONSE RATE 
Based on the results of the website search and telephone enquiries, a list of key 
informants and potential survey participants was assembled. This procedure produced a 
population of 798 fIrms. After contacting executives at these fIrms, 207 firms were 
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eliminated because they had a policy of not participating in survey research, or the 
executives indicated that they did not have time or the capacity to take part in the study. 
This resulted in a fmal sampling frame of 591 international acquirers. 
In April 2006, 591 questionnaires each with a covering letter and return 
envelope were posted to potential survey participants. To provide motivation for 
accurate responses, the respondents were guaranteed anonymity and were promised a 
summary report of research findings if requested. After three reminders (by means of 
telephone, e-mail, or follow-up post), 69 questionnaire were returned, of which 65 were 
fully completed and usable, effectively a response rate of 11 %. 
Given the well-documented difficulties of obtaining questionnaire responses 
from executives (Harzing, 1997) and the decreasing rate of response from executives 
(Cycyota and Harrison, 2006), the study's response rate of 11 % can be considered 
satisfactory. This response rate is similar to that reported in other academic studies of 
executives. For instance, Graham and Harvey (2001) achieved a response rate of nearly 
9% from CFOs, and Mukherjee, Kiymaz and Baker (2004) obtained an 11.8% response 
rate in a survey mailed to 636 CFOs who were involved in acquisitions management. 
Moreover, some studies have reported lower response rates than that reported in this 
study. For example, Koch and McgGrath's (1996) study had a 6.5% response rate. 
Likewise, Lepak et a!. 's (2003) study was successful in obtaining only a 6.5% response 
rate. 
The responses can be assumed to be reliable as they were received from top 
level executives who had been directly involved in managing the international 
acquisition process. An examination of the job titles revealed 12 Chief Executive 
Officers, 16 Finance Directors or Chief Financial Officers, 23 Business Development 
Directors, 8 Managing Directors, 6 Executive Directors. The sample represents 
acquisition activity on two continents: North America and Europe. In North America, 
the acquired firms are from the USA and Canada (21 and 9 respectively). Europe is 
represented by 35 acquisitions. 
A number of survey biases may have affected the validity of the survey 
responses. The following sections discuss these biases regarding the current study. 
3.8 NON RESPONSE BIAS 
Non response bias arises when respondents provide different responses than would have 
been provided by members of the population that did not respond to the survey 
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(Schwab, 1999). For example, key informants for cross border acquisitions that have 
underperformed may decide not to respond. In this scenario, the results may not 
correctly reflect the conduct of poor performing acquisitions and restricts performance 
variance among informants that do respond. 
Given that the response rate was 11 %, tests were conducted to check for 
potential non response bias. Participating firms were compared to non-participating 
fIrms in terms of the transaction value and total sales. The average transaction value of 
cross border acquisitions included in the sample was £251 million, which is not 
significantly different from the average transaction value (£218 million) for acquisitions 
of non-participating firms (t=0.406, p=0.685). 
In addition, late respondents were compared to early respondents. Late 
respondents can be assumed to be similar to non-respondents, as they may not have 
responded if a second fax or e-mail had not been sent (Schwab, 1999). 
Table 3.1: Comparisons of early and late respondents 
Early Respondents Late Respondents 
T-test (n = 39) (n = 26) 
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
Prior performance 4.22 1.23 3.97 1.45 0.57 
Relative size 5.32 2.15 5.10 1.75 0.47 
Level of integration 2.51 0.87 2.16 1.12 0.14 
Organizational culture 2.89 0.95 2.69 1.34 0.72 
Knowledge transfer - Functional 2.47 0.78 2.17 0.89 1.23 
Knowledge transfer - General 3.10 0.89 3.23 1.43 0.76 
management 
Autonomy 1.88 0.34 1.74 0.21 -0.57 
Comparing late respondents to early respondents makes it possible to examine potential 
differences in terms of selected variables that are used in the current study. Thus, to 
further assess the generalizability of the sample, additional t-tests were conducted to 
compare the means between early and late respondents. Table 3.1 shows the comparison 
of the early and late respondents in terms of mean difference. 
3.9 RETROSPECTIVE BIAS 
Using survey research to examine events from the past requires respondents to recollect 
information. This potentially exposed the study to retrospective bias because some 
114 
information may be lost or distorted over time. In addition to using a research design 
and survey instrument intended to prevent such bias as much as possible, responses 
concerning acquisitions made in 2004 were compared to acquisitions made in 2000 in 
order to assess potential retrospective bias. 
The t-tests for mean differences were calculated as shown in Table 3.2. There 
were no statistically significant differences in means between responses concerning 
acquisitions made in 2000 compared to acquisitions made in 2004. Collectively, these 
fmdings suggest that retrospective bias does not influence the current study. 
Table 3.2: Comparisons of 2000 and 2004 acquisitions 
2000 2004 T-test (n = 18) (n = 25) 
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
Prior performance 3.19 1.65 3.37 1.13 0.77 
Acquisition experience 4.10 1.71 3.93 1.36 0.39 
Relative size 4.58 1.48 4.20 1.56 0.73 
Level of integration 2.51 0.87 2.16 1.12 -0.39 
Organizational culture 2.34 1.53 2.18 1.12 0.72 
Knowledge transfer· Functional 3.19 1.19 3.03 1.35 0.57 
Knowledge transfer - General 
management 3.45 
1.23 3.21 1.65 0.79 
Autonomy 1.56 0.34 1.34 0.35 -0.27 
3.10 RESEARCH FRAMEWORK 
The conceptual framework is illustrated in Figure 3.1. The acquisition process starts 
with acquisition intent followed by the pre-acquisition management process. The key 
employees are identified and retained by offering incentives after the pre-acquisition 
management phase. Then, the post-acquisition management process starts. The study 
conjectures that cross border acquisition performance is determined by the pre-
acquisition evaluation of the target firm and post-acquisition management issues. 
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~ 
PRE-ACQUISITION MANAGEMENT 
• Evaluation of Target Firm 
! ACQUISITION 
PRE-ACQUISITION MANAGEMENT PERFORMANCE 
• Pre-Acquisition Problems Experienced • Market Share & 
! Sales Growth 
EMPLOYEE RETENTION • EPS & Share 
Price 
• Importance of Employee Retention 
• Profitability 
• Determinants of Top Management Retention 
1 
POST-ACQUISITION MANAGEMENT 
• Level of Integration 
• Organizational Cultural Differences 
• Knowledge Transfer 
• Top Management Retention 
Figure 3.1: The conceptual framework - The impact of the pre-acquisition evaluation of target firm 
and post- acquisition management process on cross border acquisition performance 
3.11 SUMMARY 
This chapter presented the research methodology adopted. To examine the effect ofpre-
acquisition and post-acquisition management issues on acquisition performance, this 
study required the collection of primary data. The study used a cross-sectional research 
design to investigate the impact of pre- and post-acquisition issues on acquisition 
performance. A survey instrument was constructed, which was largely comprised of 
items based on scales that have been developed and used by researchers in previous 
international business and acquisition research. The chapter also discussed the way this 
study examined the biases that could affect the validity of the survey responses. 
116 
This chapter has presented the research methodology employed to address the 
research question. The next chapter will present the recent trends in cross border 
acquisition undertaken by UK firms. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
RECENT TRENDS IN UK CROSS BORDER M&As 
4.0 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter reviews recent trends in cross border M&As and provides a description of 
the sample characteristics of the study. At fIrst, the chapter presents secondary data on 
recent trends in UK cross border M&As in order to better locate the fIndings of the 
study from primary data. The following section presents the type of cross border 
acquisitions undertaken by UK fIrms during the current takeover boom, the process 
undertaken in their management and the outcomes achieved. 
Cross border M&As involving UK companies are becoming a much more 
regular feature of M&As. The scale of cross border mergers and acquisitions has 
increased rapidly in recent years. The UK is more involved in this process than any 
other EU country: UK-based multinational companies have purchased more frrms 
abroad than any other nationality, while Britain has also been the largest seller of frrms 
to foreign multinationals (European Industrial Relations Observatory, 1998). 
This chapter starts with a review of the recent trends in cross border M&As 
involving UK companies in terms of number, value, area, sectoral and industrial 
distributions during the period 1996-2005. 
4.1 OVERALL TRENDS OF UK CROSS BORDER M&AS 
Over the past ten years there has been a great deal of cross border M&A activity 
involving UK companies. Between 1996 and 2005, UK companies acquired 7026 
foreign companies. Figure 4.1 presents the annual number of cross border M&As 
involving UK companies during the 1996-2005 period. 
The number of cross border deals increased each year from 1996 peaking in 
2000 with 1008 deals. The number of deals declined rapidly in the following two years. 
The decline in cross border M&As in 2001 and 2002 was experienced globally (Export 
development Canada, 2003). Since 2002 cross border deals by UK companies have 
risen each year rising to 653 in 2005. 
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Figure 4. I: Number of completed cross border M&As involving UK companies 
In terms of values, UK companies acquired £520 billion worth of foreign companies 
from 1996 to 2005. Figure 4.2 shows the value of cross border M&As involving UK 
companies for the ten year period. 
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Figure 4.2: Value of cross border M&As involving UK companies 
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The value of cross border deals increased each year from 1996, peaking in 2000 at 
£1 81billion, which accounts for 35 percent of the total deal value during 1996-2005. In 
2001, the deal value sharply declined and continued to decline in subsequent years until 
experiencing a slight increase in 2005. This decline in the value of cross border M&As 
was experienced globally. 
4.2 AREA ANALYSIS OF CROSS BORDER M&AS 
Table 4.1 shows the distribution of UK cross border M&A activity by target areas. UK 
companies invested most heavily in developed countries through the acquisition of 
foreign companies. Over the last period, European Union (EU) companies were the 
most significant targets for UK companies, with about 38% of all deals completed 
within the EU region. Attention has also been increasingly directed towards US and 
Canadian companies. Between 1995 and 2005, UK companies acquired 2005 US firms, . 
which accounted for 29% of all cross border deals. Asia Pacific was the third most 
significant target for UK companies. These three regions accounted for approximately 
82% of all the M&A deals. 
Table 4.1: Total number of completed UK cross border deals during 1996-2005 
Areas Total no of deals % of total Cumulative % 
USA & Canada 2005 29 29 
European Union!)) 2672 38 67 
Asia Pacific[2) 1035 15 82 
Others 1314 18 100 
Total 7026 100 
Source: Thomson One Banker Database (2006) 
[I] From 1996 the EU also includes Austria, Finland and Sweden. From 2004 the EU 
also includes Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, 
Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. 
[2] Asia pacific includes Asia, Australia and New Zealand 
The trend of cross border M&A activity by UK frrms across the Triad over the 10 years 
is shown in Figure 4.3. Each year the greatest number of cross border deals was 
completed within the EU, followed by USA & Canada, then Asia Pacific. During the 
second half of the period, however, more M&A activity has been directed towards EU 
companies and in the Asia Pacific region. 
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Figure 4.3: Area analysis of cross border activity by UK companies, 1996-2005 
4.3 SECTORAL TRENDS ACROSS THE TRIAD 
a 
Cross border M&As have occurred in a large number of sectors. The sectoral 
distribution of cross border deals across the Triad is shown in TabIes 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4. 
The USA and Canada 
Table 4.2 shows the sectoral distribution of cross border deals in the USA and Canada. 
During the period 1996-2005, the share of the manufacturing sector in all cross border 
deals was the largest foUowed by the service sector. UK companies completed 52 
percent of all deals in the manufacturing sector over the period. This share was fairly 
constant over the period, except for a sharp decrease from 51 % in 200 I to 39% in 2002. 
However, the percentage of deals then gradually increased from 49% in 2003 to 56% in 
2005. 
Table 4.2: Sectoral distribution ofCBM&As in USA & Canada (%) 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 1996-05 
Primary 3.5 4.9 3.7 5.8 5.5 3.6 6.3 4.4 7.3 1.9 4.7 
Manufacturing 56.3 52.5 56.3 53.0 55.1 51.1 38.9 49.6 50.6 56.1 52.5 
Services 40.2 42.6 40.0 41.0 39.4 45 .3 54.9 45.9 42.1 42.0 42.7 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: Thomson One Banker Database (2006) 
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During the period, about 43% of all deals were completed in the service sector by UK 
companies. The share of the service sector in all cross border deals increased slightly 
from 40% in 1996 to 45% in 2001. The percentage of service sector deals increased 
dramatically from 45% in 2001 to 55% in 2002, mirroring the decline of manufacturing; 
with subsequent deals declining to 46% in 2003 and 42% in 2005. 
The European Union 
The sectoral distribution of cross border deals in the EU is shown in table 4.3. During 
the period 1996-2005, the share of the manufacturing sector in all cross border deals 
was the largest followed by the service sector. UK companies completed about 51 
percent of all deals in the manufacturing sector over the period and about 46% in the 
service sector. 
Table 4.3: Sectoral distribution of Cross border M&As in EU (%) 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 1996-05 
Primary 2.4 3.4 2.5 2.1 1.9 3.4 3.S 3.4 2.S 3 2.4 
Manufacturing 51.2 50.5 47 50.9 47.7 46.4 50.3 45.4 49.4 49 51.2 
Services 46.4 46.1 50.5 47 50.4 50.2 46.2 51.2 48.1 48 46.4 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: Thomson One Banker Database (2006) 
Asia Pacific 
Table 4.4 presents the sectoral distribution of cross border deals in the Asia Pacific 
region. During the 1996-2005 period, in contrast to the other two regions of the Triad, 
the share of the service sector in all cross border deals was the largest followed by the 
manufacturing sector. UK companies completed about 52 percent of all deals in the 
service sector over the period. The share of the service sector in all cross border deals 
gradually increased from 47% in 1996 to 60% in 2005. In contrast, the percentage of 
deals in the manufacturing sector slightly decreased from 40% in 1996 to 35% in 2005. 
Table 4.4: Sectoral distribution of cross border M&As in Asia Pacific (%) 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 1996-05 
Primary 13.0 9.1 6.1 5.8 5.2 6.0 12.0 8.9 7.9 5.3 7.5 
Manufacturing 40.3 45.0 47.0 43.0 42.0 28.0 40.0 46.0 42.0 35.0 40.5 
Services 46.8 45.0 45.0 51.0 53.0 66.0 48.0 46.0 50.0 60.0 51.8 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: Thomson One Banker Database (2006) 
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4.4 SECTORAL DISTRIBUTION: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
Figure 4.4 shows the sectoral distribution of cross border M&As across the Triad 
involving UK companies over the 1996-2005 period. The share of the manufacturing 
sector is less in the Asia Pacific region than in the EU and the USA and Canada. In 
contrast, the share of the service sector is higher in the Asia Pacific region than in the 
EU and the USA and Canada. 
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Figure 4.4: Sectoral distribution of UK CBM&As across the Triad (%), 1996-2005 
Overall, UK companies tend to acquire more manufacturing companies in the EU and 
USA and Canada than in the Asia Pacific. On the other hand, UK companies tend to 
acquire more service companies in the Asia Pacific than in the EU, and USA and 
Canada. 
4.5 INDUSTRIAL DISTRIBUTION ACROSS THE TRIAD 
The USA and Canada 
The industry distribution of UK cross border M&A activity in the USA and Canada by 
time period is shown in Table 4.5. Over the period most M&A activity was in high 
technology and industrials. The high technology sector accounted for about one quarter 
of all cross border deals by UK companies and industrials about 17%. 
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Table 4.5: Industry distribution ofCBM&As by UK companies in USA & Canada 
(% of completed deals) 
1996·1998 1999·2001 2002·2005 Total 1996·2005 
No % No % No % No % 
Consumer Products and Services 85 14.3 129 15.9 89 14.8 303 15.1 
Energy and Power 24 4.05 41 5.05 30 5 95 4.74 
Financial services 32 5.4 41 5.05 50 8.33 123 6.13 
Healthcare 35 5.9 43 5.3 46 7.67 124 6.18 
High Technology 103 17.4 201 24.8 133 22.2 437 21.8 
Industrials 129 21.8 131 16.1 81 13.5 341 17.0 
Materials 80 13.5 71 8.74 58 9.67 209 10.4 
Media and Entertainment 58 9.78 76 9.36 48 8 182 9.08 
Real Estate 3 0.51 4 0.49 II 1.83 18 0.9 
Consumer Staples 16 2.7 20 2.46 21 3.5 57 2.89 
Retail 14 2.36 25 3.08 II 1.83 50 2.49 
Telecommunications 14 2.36 30 3.69 22 3.67 66 3.29 
Total 593 812 600 2005 100 
Source: Thomson One Banker Database (2006) 
The third most active sector was Consumer products and services, which accounted for 
about 15% of all cross border deals during the period 1996-2005. Materials were the 
fourth most attractive sector in the USA and Canada, accounting for about 10% of the 
total M&A activity. 
The European Union 
Table 4.6 presents the industry distribution of UK cross border deals in the EU during 
the period 1996-2005. Industrials, high technology, consumer products, services and the 
retail sector are industries where most cross border M&As occurred. 
About one third of all cross border deals were completed in the two sectors of 
industrials and high technology. Consumer products and services was the third most 
active sector in terms of cross border activity in the EU, with 15% of all deals. 
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Table 4. 6: Industry distribution of CBM&As by UK companies in the EU 
(% of completed deals) 
1996·1998 1999·2001 2002·2005 Total 1996·2005 
No % No % No % No % 
Consumer Products and Services 118 14 181 19 107 12 406 15.2 
Energy and Power 23 2.8 23 2.4 28 3.1 74 2.77 
Financial services 53 6.5 51 5.3 57 6.3 161 6.03 
Healthcare 32 3.9 25 2.6 52 5.8 109 4.08 
High Technology 100 12 209 22 139 15 448 16.8 
Industrials 150 18 131 14 180 20 461 17.3 
Materials 119 15 79 8.3 80 8.9 278 10.4 
Media and Entertainment 74 9.1 88 9.2 92 10 254 9.51 
Real Estate 31 3.8 31 3.2 39 4.3 101 3.78 
Consumer Staples 17 2.1 37 3.9 29 3.2 83 3.11 
Retail 66 8.1 57 6 60 6.7 183 6.85 
Telecommunications 34 4.2 44 4.6 36 4 114 4.26 
Total 817 956 899 2672 100 
Source: Thomson One Banker Database (2006) 
Asia Pacific 
The industry distribution of UK cross border M&As activity in the Asia Pacific is 
shown in Table 4.7. Financial services, media and entertainment, consumer products 
and services, and high technology industries experienced the highest proportion of cross 
border M&As over the period. 
Financial services accounted for 14% of Asian compames acquired by UK 
companies. The number of cross border deals in fmancial services significantly 
increased from 31 in the period 1996-1998 to 60 in the period 2002-2005. 
The materials sector was the second most active in the Asia Pacific, accounting 
for 13% of all the cross border deals. The share of cross border deals in consumer 
products and services, high technology and, media and entertainment is relatively 
similar over the period. Each of these sectors accounted for 11 % of all cross border 
deals. The number of deals has gradually increased over the periods in consumer 
products and the high technology sectors. On the other hand, the number of deals has 
decreased during the period in the media and entertainment sector. 
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Table 4.7: Industry distribution ofCBM&As by UK companies in the Asia Pacific region 
(% of completed deals) 
1996-1998 1999-2001 2002-2005 Total 1996-2005 
No % No % No % No % 
Consumer Products and Services 31 12 43 12 44 11 118 II 
Energy and Power 23 8.9 21 5.7 34 8.3 78 7.5 
Financial services 31 12 49 13 60 15 140 14 
Healthcare 8 3.1 7 1.9 14 3.4 29 2.8 
High Technology 21 8.1 46 12 52 13 119 II 
Industrials 38 15 30 8.1 37 9.1 105 10 
Materials 41 16 32 8.7 57 14 130 13 
Media and Entertainment 25 9.7 49 13 39 9.6 113 11 
Real Estate 4 1.6 ·9 2.4 5 1.2 18 1.7 
Retail 7 2.7 20 5.4 12 2.9 39 3.8 
Consumer Staples 12 4.7 32 8.7 35 8.6 79 7.6 
Telecommunications 15 5.8 31 8.4 19 4.7 65 6.3 
Total 258 369 408 1035 
Source: Thomson One Banker Database (2006) 
4.6 THE SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE STUDY 
The sample characteristics of the study are presented in this section. Specifically, the 
section provides a description of the types and area distribution of cross border 
acquisitions undertaken by UK firms in the recent takeover boom. In addition, a 
description ofthe process undertaken in managing the cross border acquisitions and the 
outcomes achieved is provided. 
a. Area distributions of cross border acquisitions 
Table 4.8 shows area distribution of UK cross border activity by sample and population. 
In the case ofthe cross border sample, UK companies invested most heavily in Europe. 
Table 4.8: Area distributions ofthe UK cross border acquisitions 
Areas % of total sample % of total population 
USA & Canada 46 29 
Europe 53 38 
Asia Pacific 0 15 
Others 0 18 
Total 100 
Similarly, in the case of the cross border population, UK companies invested most 
heavily in European Union. However, in terms of percentage, 53% of the sample 
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companies have invested in Europe, whereas a lower percentage (38 percent) of fIrms in 
the population has invested in European Union. 
Table 4.8 also shows that 46 percent of the sample fIrms invested in USA & 
Canada compared to 29% of fIrms in the population. A total of 15 percent of the fIrms 
in the population invested in the Asia PacifIc region. In contrast, no sample fIrms 
invested in the Asia pacifIc region. 
Table 4.9: Target country distribution of the sample finns 
Countries Freguencl:: Percent Cumulative 2ercent 
USA 21 32.3 32.3 
Canada 9 13.8 46.2 
Netherlands 5 7.7 53.8 
Sweden 4 6.2 60.0 
Germany 9 13.8 73.8 
Spain 2 3.1 76.9 
France 4 6.2 83.1 
Belgium 3 4.6 87.7 
Italy 3 4.6 92.3 
Russia 3 4.6 96.9 
Switzerland 2 3.1 100 
Total 65 100 
Table 4.9 shows the target country distributions of the sample fIrms. About 32 percent 
of these target fIrms are from the USA followed by about 14 percent of fIrms from 
Canada. In Europe, about 14 percent of target fIrms are from Germany followed by 
about 8 percent from the Netherlands. The percentage of target fIrms from other 
European countries varies from about 3 to 6 percent. 
b. Sector distribution of cross border acquisitions 
Table 4.10 shows the sectoral distribution of the sample fIrms. In the sample, the service 
sector has the largest share of cross border deals, followed by the manufacturing sector. 
Table 4.10: Sectoral distributions of UK. cross border acquisitions (N = 65) 
Sector % of total sample % of total population 
Primary 10.8 4.8 
Manufacturing 38.5 49.1 
Service 50.5 46.1 
. Total 100 
In contrast, the share of the manufacturing sector in the total population is the largest 
followed by the service sector. About 38 percent of the sample acquired fIrms were 
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operating in the manufacturing sector, compared to a 48 percent of acquisitions in the 
popUlation. 
Table 4.11 presents the industry distribution of the cross border acquisitions. 
The share of consumer products and services in the sample of acquired fIrms as well as 
in the total population is the highest. The share of acquisitions in the telecommunication 
sector in the sample is about 14 percent, whereas it is only 5.2 percent in the total 
population. 
Table 4.11: Industry distributions of UK cross border acquisitions (N = 65) 
Industries % of total % of total 
sample population 
Consumer Products and Services 17.9 16.6 
Energy and Power 11.0' 6.6 
Financial services 5.3 8.9 
Healthcare 4.2 8.1 
High Technology 12.8 16.1 
Industrials 12.7 11.2 
Materials 13.0 10.9 
Media and Entertainment 3.6 7.9 
Real Estate 1.5 4 . .3 
Retail 2.1 5.6 
Consumer Staples 2.1 2.9 
Telecommunications 13.8 5.2 
Total 100 100 
c. Typology of cross border acquisitions undertaken 
Table 4.12 shows for the sample the acquired company size by sales turnover. Over 90 
percent of the acquired fIrms are small and medium size enterprises (SMEs). Only 10 
percent of the acquired fIrms are large enterprises. Norburn and Schoenberg'S (1994) 
sample of UK cross border acquisitions was also largely composed of UK fIrms that had 
acquired foreign SMEs (70 percent) in Europe. 
Table 4.12: Acquired company size by sales turnover (N = 65) 
Sales turnover Percent Cumulative percent 
0-10 million 44.6 44.6 
10-50 million 46.2 90.8 
50+ million 10.5 100 
Total 100 
The nature ofthe cross border deals is presented in table 4.13. About 89 percent of the 
deals are friendly (agreed). In contrast, only 11 % of cross border deals in the sample 
were contested. 
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Table 4.13 Nature of cross border acquisition deals (N = 65) 
Agreed 
Contested 
Total 
Percent 
89.2 
10.8 
100 
Cumulative percent 
89.2 
100 
Table 4.14 shows the industry relatedness between the acquired and acquiring fIrm. 
About 88 percent of deals were in related industries compared to only 12 percent of 
deals in umelated industries. This is consistent with Norbum and Schoenberg's (1994) 
sample, where 87 percent of UK fIrms made acquisitions in horizontally related 
product-markets. It appears that UK fIrms have a tendency to acquire foreign fIrms 
operating in the same industry. 
Table 4.14: Industry relatedness of the acquired firm (N = 65) 
Percent Cumulative percent 
Related 87.7 87.7 
Unrelated 12.3 100 
Total 100 
Table 4.15 shows the ownership structure of the acquired and acquiring fIrms. About 61 
percent of acquired fIrms were priva~ely managed companies (owner-managed and not-
owner managed). In contrast, only about 15 percent of acquiring fIrms were privately 
managed companies. About 74% of acquiring companies were publicly quoted 
companies compared to only 12 percent acquired fIrms. Clearly, for the most of the UK 
fIrms acquired privately managed foreign fIrms. This is similar to Norbum and 
Schoenberg (1994) whose sample had a high percentage (66 percent) of foreign private 
acquired fIrms. 
Table 4.15: Ownership structure of the acquired and acquiring firm (N = 65) 
Publicly quoted company 
Division/Subsidiary of quoted company 
Private, owner-managed 
Private, not owner-managed 
Total 
Acquired firm 
(%) 
12.3 
26.2 
44.6 
16.9 
100 
Acquiring firm 
(%) 
73.8 
10.8 
7.7 
7.7 
Table 4.16 shows the prior profItability of the acquired fIrms in the sample. Only 21 
percent of the acquired fIrms were poorly performing, compared with about 50 percent 
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of the acquired fIrms that had good performance. This suggests that UK fIrms tend to 
acquire well performing foreign fIrms. This is consistent with Angwin and Savill (1997) 
who found that acquiring fIrm desired to purchase fmancially healthy target fIrms. 
Table 4.16: Prior profitability of the acquired finn (N =65) 
Percent Cumulative percent 
Poor 21.1 21.1 
Average 29.2 50.3 
Good 49.7 100 
Total 100 
Overall, the sample statistics suggest that UK fIrms mostly acquired privately managed 
SMEs operating in the same industry. Moreover, the sample of UK fIrms tended to 
acquire profItable fIrms that had a friendly attitude towards the deal. 
d. Cross border acquisition management process 
This sub-section provides a brief description of the overall management process 
undertaken by the UK frrms in managing foreign acquired frrms. SpecifIcally, sub-
section presents a description on top management turnover, communication method 
used and, level of integration. 
Table 4.17 shows the change in the top management of the acquired frrm. The 
acquired frrms' top management was not changed or changed a little in approximately 
71 percent of the acquired frrms. SignifIcant turnover occurred in only about 23 percent 
of the acquired frrms' top management teams. This tends to indicate that the UK frrms 
considered the top management teams of the acquired frrms to be a valuable human 
asset, retaining them after completing the acquisition. 
Table 4.17: Change in top management of the acquired finn (N = 65) 
Percent Cumulative percent 
No change 40.0 40.0 
Little change 30.8 70.8 
Moderate turnover 6.2 76.9 
Major turnover 16.9 93.8 
Complete turnover 6.2 100 
Total 100 
Table 4.18 presents the rank order, based on the mean measure, of communication 
methods used by UK frrms to communicate with the managers of the acquired company 
during the integration process. The most frequently used communication method by UK 
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frrms includes ''use of frrst name" (ranked 181), ''phone conversation" (ranked 2nd) and, 
.. E-mail message" (ranked 3rd). The highest ranked communication methods tends to 
suggest that UK frrms emphasized frequent use of informal communication methods 
compared to formal communication methods such as ''written memos" (ranked 5th), 
"establishing notice board to present mission and vision statement" (ranked 7th) and, 
"longer more detailed reports or studies" (ranked 8th). 
Table 4.18: Communication method used by UK finns 
Rank Communication method used Mean S.D 
1 Use of first name 4.65 0.92 
2 Phone conversations 4.30 1.04 
3 E-mail messages 4.22 1.04 
4 Holding regular meeting at all levels 3.86 1.16 
5 Written memos 3.02 1.22 
6 Socialize outside work 2.87 1.19 
7 Establishing notice board to present 2.75 1.29 
mission and vision statement 
8 Longer more detailed reports or studies 2.71 1.24 
N - 65; S.D - Standard deviation; The mean is average on a scale of 1 (-
'Hardly ever') to S (== 'very frequently') 
Table 4.19 shows the level of integration of the acquired frrm within the acquiring firm. 
For about 68% of the sample frrms there was little integration, with only 3 percent of 
the sample frrms fully integrated with the acquiring frrm. About one-third of the 
acquired firms were partially integrated with the acquiring frrms. Overall, this suggests 
that UK frrms tend to adopt a ''preservation'' type integration strategy more than a 
"absorption" type integration strategy. 
In genera~ UK frrms appear to adopt a preservation type integration strategy in 
which the top management team is retained, while communicating informally during the 
integration process. 
Table 4.19: Level of integration of the acquired finn (N=65) 
Percent Cumulative percent 
Little integration 67.7 67.7 
Partial integration 29.2 96.9 
Full integration 3.1 100 
Total 100 
e. Cross border acquisition outcome 
Table 4.20 shows the outcome of the acquisition for the sample frrms. About 84 percent 
of the acquisitions were considered successful by the management of the acquiring 
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fIrms. The success rate is considerably higher than those reported in previous studies 
(e.g., Datta and Puia, 1995; Aw and Chatterjee, 2004). The fact that only one out of the 
65 acquired fIrms were subsequently divested indicates that the reported success rate is 
not unrealistic. The reason for the divestment was to "separate businesses that has 
different capital requirements". 
4.7 Conclusions 
Table 4.20: The outcome of the acquisition (N = 65) 
Little success 
Modest success 
Successful 
Very Successful 
Total 
Percent 
2.6 
13.0 
34.4 
50.0 
100 
Cumulative percent 
2.6 
15.6 
50.0 
100 
Increasingly companies have expanded beyond their domestic markets to participate in 
the global market place. In so doing, companies can choose, for example, to export, 
establish new operations or acquire existing companies. Cross border M&As are now a 
much more regular activity of companies in the UK. Between 1996 and 2005, UK 
companies acquired 7026 foreign companies. In terms of value, UK companies acquired 
£520 billion worth of foreign companies over the period. The highest number of 
transactions was completed during the period 1999-2001. 
The area analysis shows that EU companies are the most signifIcant target for 
UK companies followed by the USA and Canada. The number of deals has also 
gradually increased in the Asia PacifIc region over the last ten years. In tenns of sectoral 
distribution, UK companies tend to acquire more manufacturing companies in the EU 
and the USA and Canada than in the Asia Pacific. In contrast, UK companies tend to 
acquire more service sector companies in the Asia Pacific region than in the EU and the 
USA and Canada. In the USA and Canada, the most active industrial sector groupings 
were in high technology and industrials. Similarly, industrials and high technology were 
the most active industrial sectors in the EU. In contrast, the financial services sector was 
the most active industrial sector in the Asia PacifIc region. In short, UK companies have 
acquired EU and North American technology over the last decade, whereas UK 
companies have tended to acquire Asian fmancial services over the same period. 
The analysis of the sample reveals a number of distinctive characteristics. The 
analysis of the sample reveals that UK fIrms acquired either European or North 
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American firms. The greatest numbers of acquisitions were in the USA followed by 
Germany, Canada and the Netherlands. The sectoral distribution shows that UK firms 
tend to acquire most firms in the service sector, followed by the manufacturing sector 
and the primary sector. The industry distribution shows that UK firms acquired most 
fIrms in the consumer product and service sectors followed by the telecommunication 
sector and high technology sector. Analysis of the cross border acquisition types shows 
that UK firms mostly acquired privately managed SMEs operating in the same industry. 
Moreover, UK firms tend to acquire profitable firms that have a friendly attitude 
towards the deal. 
Analysis of the overall management process reveals a number of distinctive 
approaches. UK firms tend to adopt a preservation type integration strategy in which top 
management were retained and top managers were frequently communicated with 
informally during the integration process. A high percentage of acquisitions were 
considered successful by the management of the acquiring firm. Further evidence of 
acquisition success for the sample firms is the fact that only one acquired fll1l1 was 
subsequently divested. 
This chapter has examined the recent trends in UK cross border acquisitions, the 
process undertaken in their management and overall outcome achieved. The next 
chapter will explore the specific reasons for UK fll1l1s engaging in cross border 
acquisitions. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
MOTIVES FOR CROSS BORDER ACQUISITIONS 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
Cross border mergers and acquisitions (CBM&As) have become the dominant means of 
internationalisation, accounting for approximately 60% of all foreign direct investment 
inflows (Hopkins, 1999). Consistent with this, cross border acquisitions now represent 
over 25% of all global M&As transactions, a considerable rise from the proportion of 
15% ten years ago (Schoenberg and Seow, 2005). In 2003, firms invested over $297 
billion in cross border M&As, with the European Union accounting for over 40% ofthis 
activity. British companies have consistently been the most active cross border 
acquirers within this region. In 2005, British companies spent nearly £62 billion on 
foreign firms (Armitstead, 2006). The total values of acquisitions abroad was nearly a 
third higher than in 2004 and double the levels of the previous two years, according to 
data compiled by Thomson Financial. 
Yet, in parallel to this rise in activity, there has been increasing recognition of 
the poor performance of many cross border M&As. An examination of CBM&As 
performance studies (see Eun, Kolodny and Scheraga 1996; Danbolt, 2004) reveals that 
target firms are clear winners. This may justify the reasons for target firms to engage in 
cross border deals. But as the empirical literature suggests the bidding firms in cross-
border deals do not always win, it is difficult to conclude that the huge growth of cross 
border M&As activities has been for fmancial benefit only. Therefore, it has become an 
empirical necessity to discover what motivates the bidding firms to acquire foreign 
targets. 
This chapter examines the reasons why firms engage in cross border 
acquisitions. Specifically, the objectives ofthis study are: 
a) To identify the relative importance of factors motivating the decision to acquire 
foreign target firms by UK acquiring finns. 
b) To provide a parsimonious set of factors influencing CBM&As for the sample. 
c) To test hypotheses on the way in which the relative importance of factors 
motivating CBM&As may vary with the sample characteristics. 
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The rest of the chapter is set out in the following way. The next section reviews the 
literature relating to motives for CBM&As. The third section develops the hypothesis of 
the study. The fmdings and discussion are in the fourth section. A summary and 
conclusions are provided in the last section. 
5.2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
Most of the prior literature describes M&As as ways predominately to achieve 
additional market share or synergies (Walter and Barney, 1990; Schmitz and Sliwka, 
2001). Such motives indicate that M&As are means to realise the strategies of the 
acquiring or merging parties. Discussing M&A motives from other perspectives adds 
additional dimensions to the picture: agency theory (Kesner et al., 1994), hubris 
(Weston and Weaver, 2001; Berkovich and Narayanan, 1993; Rol~ 1986; Seth et al., 
2000) and empire building (Trautwein, 1990) indicate the existence of more than one 
motive for M&As. Hitt et al. (2001a) also suggested multiple motives for firms to 
complete CBM&As. 
Several of the same motives are identified by various authors, while some of 
them overlap. The main motives discussed in the literature include the following: 
5.2.1 TO FACILITATE FASTER ENTRY INTO FOREIGN MARKET 
As compared to internally generated product developments and new business, 
acquisitions allow the firm to enter a new market more rapidly. It is argued that in 
general it is expensive, difficult and time consuming to build up a global organization 
and a competitive presence due to issues such as differences in culture, liability of 
foreignness, different business practices and institutional constraints. Cross-border 
M&As offer significant time saving in this respect. For example, cros~-bordcr M&As 
allow immediate access to a local network of suppliers, marketing channels, clients and 
other skills. Heineken, the Dutch Brewing group, acquired an 88 percent stake in 
Cruzcampo, Spain's largest brewer (Willman and Bickerton, 1999). With its existing 
ownership of the El Aguila brewing operation, this cross border acquisition resulted in 
Heineken having 37 percent of Spain's beer market (the third largest in the Europe). 
Heineken's intention was to integrate Cruzecampo with El Aguila and increase the 
distribution of its own premium lager beer through the combined firm's channels. 
Executives at Heineken believed that its acquisition and subsequent integration of the 
assets it owned in Spain would result in much faster market penetration by its own 
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premium product than would be possible using only Heineken-specific distribution 
channels. 
Martin, Swaminathan and Mitchel (1998) have suggested that CBM&As can be 
used to access new markets as well as expanding the market for a firm's current goods. 
Similar conclusions have been drawn by Datta and Puia (1995) who stated that 
CBM&A activity provides the opportunity for instant access to a market with 
established sales volume. UNCTAD, 2000) also indicated that cross-border mergers 
provide the fastest means for international expansion compared to greenfield investment 
or a joint venture. For instance, in the world fmancial services sector, Merrill Lynch 
paid $5.3 billion to buy Mercury Asset Management, a London based money manager 
(Raghavan and Callan, 1997). At the time (1997), this was the largest cross border 
acquisition by a US based securities firm. This transaction made Merrill the fourth 
largest asset manager in the world. Thus, the acquisition of Mercury resulted in a 
significant global presence for Merrill that would have required many years to develop 
through internally generated efforts. 
Research on entry mode choice also suggests that acquisition is more 
appropriate for a faster entry into new market compared to greenfield investment 
(Shimizu, et al., 2004). If the investor has a short amount of time to penetrate the 
foreign market, the only available choice will be acquiring an existing firm. In fact, 
greenfield entries require a much slower and more moderated approach. Hennart and 
Park (1993) found that the timing of the investment influenced the mode of entry 
choice. Specifically, if the target market has a. high growth rate, the choice of an 
acquisition allows the investor to penetrate it more quickly. 
5.2.2 INCREASE MARKET POWER 
Market power exists when the firm can sell its products above the existing competitive 
market prices or when it's manufacturing distribution, and service costs are lower than 
those of competitors. Market power is a product of the firm's size, the degree of 
sustainability of its current competitive advantage, and its ability to make decisions 
today that will yield new competitive advantages for tomorrow (Ritt et al., 200Ia). 
Cross border acquisitions are used to increase market power when the firm 
acquires: (a) a company competing in the same industry and often in the same segments 
of the primary industry, (b) a supplier or distributor, or (c) a business in a highly related 
industry (Hitt et al., 2001a). Ifa company operates within a concentrated market where 
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there are fewer competitors, merging via horizontal integration could provide the 
company with even more market power. Having more market power also means having 
the ability to impact and/or control prices. Through vertical acquisitions, fIrms seek to 
control additional parts of the value-added chain. Acquiring either a supplier or a 
distributor or an organization that already controls more parts of the value chain than 
does the acquiring firm can result in additional market power. Market power can also be 
gained when the firm acquires a company competing in an industry that is highly 
related. 
5.2.3 ACCESS TO AND ACQUISITION OF NEW RESOURCES AND TECHNOLOGY 
A number of studies have examined the motivation for cross border M&As from the 
resource-based and organizational learning perspectives (Barkema and Vermeulen, 
1998; Madhok, 1997; Vermeulen and Barkema, 2001). These studies suggest that cross 
border M &As are motivated by an opportunity to acquire new capabilities and learn 
new knowledge. Today's products rely on so many different critical technologies that 
most companies can no longer maintain cutting edge sophistication in all of them 
(Ohmae, 1989). 
Tapping external sources of know-how becomes imperative. Acquisition of an 
existing foreign business allows the acquirer to obtain resources such as patent-
protected technology, superior managerial and marketing skills, and special government 
regulation that creates a barrier to entry for other frrms. Shimizu et al. (2004) endorses 
this by suggesting that frrms may engage in M&As to exploit intangible assets. This line 
of reasoning is consistent with Caves (1990) who argues that acquisition of a foreign 
competitor enables the acquirer to bring under its control a more diverse stock of 
specific assets which enables it to seize more opportunities. 
5.2.4 DIVERSIFICATION 
Diversification is a well documented strategy for frrm expansion and has been 
suggested as one of the dominant reasons for cross-border M&As. Sudarsanam (1995) 
notes that diversifIcation is generally defmed as enabling the company to sell new 
products in new markets. This implies that the target company in an acquisition operates 
in a business unrelated to the buyer frrm. 
It is argued that international acquisitions not only provide access to important 
resources but also allow frrms an opportunity to reduce the costs and risks of entering 
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into new foreign markets. Seth (1990a) reported that geographical market 
diversification is a source of value in cross border acquisitions. This is because the 
sources of value such as those associated with exchange rate differences, market power 
conferred by international scope, ability to arbitrage tax regimes, are unique to 
international M&As. Moreover, as economic activities in different countries are less 
than perfectly correlated, portfolio diversification across boundaries should reduce 
earnings volatility and improve investors' risk-return opportunities. 
Firms may make cross-border M&As on the basis that industry returns across 
economies may be less correlated than within an economy (Vasconcellos and Kish, 
1998). As intensified global competition and rapid technology development have led 
firms to focus on their core activities, the need for product diversification has become 
less important (Morck and Yeung, 1999), although geographical diversification plays a 
role. 
5.2.5 IMPROVED MANAGEMENT 
Sirower (1997) noted that managers try to maximize shareholder value by either 
replacing inefficient management in the target firm or seeking synergies through the 
combination of the two firms. Gaughan (1991) claims that some M&As are motivated 
by a belief that the acquiring firm's management can better manage the target's 
resources. The acquirer may feel that its management skills are such that the value of 
the target would rise under its control. 
The improved management argument may have particular validity in the case of 
large companies making offers for smaller companies. The smaller companies, often led 
by entrepreneurs, may offer a unique product or service that has sold well and facilitated 
the rapid growth ofthe target. As the target grows, however, it requires a very different 
set of management skills than proved necessary when it was a smaller business. The 
growing enterprise may find that it needs to oversee a much larger distribution network 
and may have to adopt a very different marketing philosophy. Many decisions that a 
larger firm make require a vastly different set of managerial skills than those of smaller 
company as a result of the dramatic growth. The lack of managerial expertise may be a 
stumbling block in the growing company and may limit its ability to compete in the 
broader market place. These managerial resources are an asset which the larger firm can 
offer the target (Gaughan, 1991). 
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5.2.6 SYNERGY 
Bradley, Desai and Kim (1988) and Trautwein (1990) argue that frrms engage in M&As 
in order to achieve synergies. Synergies stem from combining operations and activities 
such as marketing, research and development, procurement and other cost components, 
which were hitherto performed by separate firms. It is argued that by combining 
operations and activities, M&As can increase a firm's capacity and opportunity to 
reduce costs through economies oflarge-scale production, pooling resources to produce 
a superior product and generate long-run profitability. 
Gaughan (1991) argues that synergy is probably the most common argument for 
entering a merger according to most theorists. Synergy is often characterised as 1 + 1>2, 
meaning that the ability of a corporate combination to be more profitable than the 
individual profit of the frrms that were combined i.e. NPV FirmAB > NPV FirmA + NPV 
FirmB. Brealeyand Myers (2003) defme synergy as the capability to make a corporate 
combination more profitable than the profit of the two individual firms. Likewise, 
Sirower (1997) holds that synergy increases competitiveness and resulting cash flows 
beyond what the two companies are expected to accomplish independently. There are 
many opinions regarding how to obtain synergy effects. Gaughan (1991), among others, 
mentions replacement of inefficient management, whereas others points to economies of 
scale and more efficient marketing and administration as means to gain synergies. There 
are two main types of synergy - operating and financial. The former entails efficiency 
gains that are often the result of a horizontal or a vertical merger. The latter invo lves the 
lowered costs of capital that can be obtained through combining two or more 
compames. 
In the specific context of CBM&As, the literature on corporate foreign 
investment describes various means by which they may create value. Acquiring an 
existing foreign facility provides a means for the rapid exploitation of the potential for 
synergistic gain compared with de novo entry. Porter (1991) suggested that one source 
of operating synergy comes from the potential to transfer valuable intangible assets, 
such as transfer of skills, between the combining firms. !fa firm has know-how that can 
be used in markets where the sale or lease of such knowledge is inherently "inefficient", 
then the firm will tend to exploit it through its own organization. Although different 
versions are developed by various scholars (e.g., Williamson, 1975; Rugman, 1982), all 
assume that transacting in the international market entails substantial costs which will 
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reduce the value of proprietary information. Faced with this cost, a fIrm will be likely to 
internalize the transaction and use the proprietary information within its expanded 
organization. Gains may also be realized form "reverse internalization": fIrms acquire 
skills and resources from CBM&As that are expected to be valuable in their home 
markets. A related source of synergistic gains in cross border acquisitions focuses on 
market development opportunities. In order to efficiently utilize their "excess" resources 
for long-run profItability, fIrms will invest abroad when growth at home is limited or 
restricted and in the presence of trade barriers which restrict exports. 
In identifying the motives for cross border M&As, researchers have also used 
the fInancial synergy approach. Financial synergy can be achieved by lowering the costs 
of internal fmancing (Weston et al., 2001). Acquiring target fIrms with high levels of 
cash may be a cost effective solution for fums aiming to lower their cost of capital. 
Hence acquisitions that involve targets with high levels of cash are likely to be 
motivated by synergy. Finally, reducing the cost of capital is useful as an argument for 
cross border M&As in two ways. First; the acquiring fum obtains access to the acquired 
fIrm's fInancial network. Second; the prestige of being a large internationalised flfm 
may sometimes lower the rate of interest (Seth, et. at, 2000). 
5.2.7 MANAGERIAL MOTIVE 
The managerialism hypothesis suggests that managers embark on M&As in order to 
maximize their own utility at the expense of their flfm's shareholders (Seth, Song and 
Pettit, 2000). Managers can have private or personal reasons for their behaviour and 
make investments which from an economic point of view may seem irrational, but for 
the individual can be of high value. The empire-building theory maintains that managers 
want flfm growth for personal reasons and acquisitions provide this growth. An 
important aspect of this is the wage explanation, whereby the salary paid to managers is 
a function of the size of the company (Mueller, 1969). Motives like power and prestige 
are also stressed (Ravenscraft and Scherer, 1987), for instance, managers in large 
companies have an easier route to senior positions on important committees and the 
board of directors (pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). 
Managers may engage in conglomerate mergers in order to decrease their 
employment risk, which is largely un-diversifiable. The risk consists of loosing their 
job, professional reputation, etc. The risk associated with managers' income closely 
relates to the flfm's risk (Amidhud and Lev, 1981). Another factor creating incentives to 
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acquisitions is free cash flows, meaning cash flows more than required to fund all 
projects that have a positive net present value discounted at the relevant cost of capital. 
This cash flow belongs to the shareholders, but used for investment instead, managers 
cause their firms to grow beyond the optimal size. A solution to this problem lies in 
issuing debt in exchange for stock, so the contract forces the managers to payout future 
cash flows (Jensen, 1986). The managers' time horizons relate to their tenure and tend to 
be shorter than the shareholders' time horizons. Managers will not have an interest in 
cash flows that cover the period after the end of their term of office (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). 
While managerialism has been proposed as a motive for domestic M&As, it may 
also be relevant for cross border M&As if managers have the incentive and the 
discretion to engage in M&As aimed at empire building (Seth, Song and Pettit, 2000). 
In an integrated capital market, firm-level diversification activities to reduce risk are 
generally considered non-value maximizing as individual shareholders may duplicate 
the benefit from such activities at lower cost. However, managers may still seek to 
stabilize the firms' earnings stream by acquiring foreign (rather than domestic) firms, 
given low correlations between earnings in different countries. Foreign acquisitions may 
be more satisfactory vehicles for risk reduction than domestic acquisitions, and in the 
absence of strong governance mechanisms to control managerial discretion, managers 
may overpay for these acquisitions. 
5.3 HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
The literature gives little indication of what to expect in terms of the relative importance 
of a set of motivating factors for cross border acquisition. It may be conjectured, 
however, that the relative importance of the motives would vary with the underlying 
key characteristics of the sample. For the purposes of this study these characteristics are 
identified as regional origin of the target firm, sector of operation and pre-acquisition 
performance of the target firm. 
Regional origin of the targetfirm 
There is no prior literature that provides an extensive examination of the strategic 
motives of cross border acquisition according to the choice of nationality of the foreign 
frrm. Foreign frrm choice will presumably hinge on the tasks to be accomplished by the 
acquisition and the particular characteristics required from a target. To the extent that 
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UK fIrms believe that targets from particular foreign nationalities can provide certain 
requirements of the acquisition, for example, access to specific markets or types of 
technology, these targets will be chosen in preference to potential targets of a different 
nationality when the acquisition is made. The fundamental motive for the acquisition 
may then be expected to vary according to the nationality of the foreign target. This 
leads to the frrst hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: The relative importance of strategic motives for CBM&As will vary with 
the regional origin of the target frrm 
Industry of operation 
The motives for carrying out M&As from the acquiring frrm's perspective tend to be 
different across various industries (see Walter and Barney, 1990; Brouthers et aI., 
1998). Recently, Kreitl and Oberndorfer (2004) argued that motives vary across 
industry and time and found that more emphasis was placed on certain motives in 
engineering consulting firms than in other manufacturing sectors. Several of the 
strategic motives appear to lend themselves more readily to acquisitions in the 
manufacturing sector, for example, product rationalization and economies of scale, and 
transfer of complementary technology/exchange of patents, than they do to acquisitions 
in the service sector where risk sharing, shaping competition and the use of acquisition 
to facilitate cross border expansion appear to be more relevant. To the extent that this is 
the case it would be expected that strategic motivation would vary with the industry 
sector of the acquisition, which is reflected in the second hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: The relative importance of strategic motives for CBM&As will vary with 
the industry of the target frrm. 
Pre-acquisition performance of the target firm 
An acquiring company can correct an efficiency problem in the target frrm, which will 
increase the target's value and creates synergistic gains. To detect a situation in which 
the target's inefficiencies can be improved the target's performance prior to the 
acquisition is examined for inefficient management. According to Servaes (1991) the 
largest synergistic gains are possible when an efficient frrm acquires an inefficient fum. 
Therefore, an acquirer may be motivated to acquire a poorly performing foreign fIrm 
with a view to turning it around, for example by replacing inefficient management of 
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the acquired firm. On the other hand, an acquirer may be motivated to acquire a 
profitable foreign firm in order to realize synergic benefits such as economies of scale 
or cost reduction. The fundamental motive for the cross border acquisition may then be 
expected to vary according to the pre-acquisition performance of the target frrm. This 
leads to the third hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: The relative importance ofthe strategic motivates for CBM&As will vary 
according to the pre-acquisition performance of the target firm. 
5.4 FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 
5.4.1 RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF THE STRATEGIC MOTIVES 
The rank order of the twenty strategic motives for cross border acquisition by UK 
companies, based on the mean measure of importance, is shown in Table 5.1. The 
median measure is exceeded by nine acquisition motives, of which ''to enable presence 
in new market" (3.55), ''to enable faster entry to market" (3.54), ''to facilitate cross 
border expansion" (3.52), "gain new capabilities" (3.42), "gain strategic assets" (3.26), 
and "increase market power" (3.09) constitute the first six with the highest degree of 
importance. It is clear from the Table 5.1 that the managers perceived their motives for 
international expansion to be strongly influenced by growth-oriented factors. The 
highest ranked strategic motives are concerned with relative competitive positions in 
new markets. 
Considering the motives in terms of their underlying theoretical explanations, it 
is apparent that, for this sample the main strategic motives are underpinned by the 
theories of strategic positioning and the resource based view (RBV). The first three 
ranked motives are concerned with improving the firm's competitive position through 
the use of acquisitions that may be characterized as most importantly allowing the UK 
f)fms to enter new foreign markets at speed and/or consolidating existing market 
positions. 
The leading set of motives also lends support to the RBV of acquisitions, 
particularly when it is recognized that the acquisition takes place because the acquirer 
lacks the necessary capabilities or assets required for remaining competitive in the 
foreign market. Where one firm wishes to acquire a capability that it does not have but 
is possessed by a target f)fm (such as tangible resources, for example, capitaL 
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machinery and land, and intangible resources, for example, capabilities, organizational 
culture, and know-how) then an acquisition may facilitate obtaining these capabilities. 
Table 5.1: Relative Importance of Strategic Motives for CBA by UK Companies 
Rank Motivation Mean Standard deviation 
To enable presence in new markets 3.55 1.392 
2 To enable faster entry to market 3.54 1.668 
3 To facilitate international expansion 3.52 1.511 
4 Gain new capabilities 3.42 1.223 
5 Gain strategic assets 3.26 1.350 
6= Increase market power 3.09 1.444 
6= Gain efficiency through synergies 3.09 1.400 
8= Acquire complementary resources 3.08 1.315 
8= Increase market share 3.08 1.461 
10 Enable product diversification 2.86 1.488 
11 Obtain non-manufacturing scale economies 2.31 1.198 
12 Obtain economies of large scale production 2.17 1.269 
13 To reduce risk of the business 1.95 1.067 
14 Cost reduction 1.92 1.136 
15 Elimination or reduction of competition 1.66 1.020 
16 Enable the overcoming of regulatory restrictions 1.63 1.098 
17 Turn around failing acquired firm 1.62 1.041 
18= Redeploy assets to the acquisition 1.54 0.772 
18= Replace inefficient management of acquired firm 1.54 0.867 
20 Tax reasons (savings) 1.32 0.773 
Notes: N = 65 
The mean is the average on a scale of 1 (='no importance') to 5 (= 'very important'); 
"=" shows the motives having same rank in terms of mean values. 
The most important acquisition motive for the surveyed ftrms was to enable presence in 
new markets. Thus, expanding the acquiring firm's market portfolio to reach new 
markets was obviously a top priority for the surveyed firms. The importance of presence 
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in new markets supports Ingham et al. 's (1992) study of British firms where the 
penetration of new geographic market was ranked second. 
To enable faster entry to market was highly ranked. Cross border mergers and 
acquisitions are the fastest means for firms to expand their production and markets 
internationally (Chen and Findlay, 2003). When time is crucial, acquiring an existing 
firm in a new market with an established distribution system is far more preferable to 
developing a new local distribution and marketing network. For a latecomer to a market 
or a new field of technology, cross border M&As can provide a way to catch up rapidly. 
With the acceleration of globalisation, and enhanced competition, there are increasing 
pressures for UK firms to respond quickly to opportunities in the fast changing global 
economic environment. Thus, for UK companies seeking to compete in nations outside 
their home base, acquiring a firm is a much faster way to reach this objective as 
compared to the time required to establish a new facility and new relationships with 
stakeholders in a different country. 
The third ranked motive was to facilitate international expansion. The desire to 
expand from the national domestic market activity is not surprising for the UK firms as 
the search for new markets and market power are a constant concern for fums in the 
increasingly competitive environment. In conditions of rapid change and high 
innovation costs, expansion through external means has become an absolute necessity 
(Child et aI., 2001). A. company can expand through greenfield or mergers and 
acquisitions. When expanding abroad via direct investment, fums face greater risks than 
local firms due to their lack of familiarity with the host market. Thus, the firm often 
prefers the lower risk of acquisition once a foreign firm is thought suitable for the 
purpose of international expansion (Caves, 1996). 
Other important motives for cross border M&As for UK acquiring firms are to 
acquire strategic assets and capabilities which encompass technology, improving R&D 
capabilities and management know-how. This finding is consistent with Granstrand and 
Sjolander (1990) who suggested that firms with low skills may enter the foreign market 
via M&As, which allow the firms to obtain the new technological resources and other 
strategic assets. Caves (1990) endorses this by suggesting that foreign acquisitions may 
be motivated by the quest to bring a more diverse collection of specific assets under the 
acquirer's control and to enable more opportunities to be seized. This explanation is 
also in line with the views of Hill, Hwang and Kim (1990) who pointed out that foreign 
acquisition by MNCs may be motivated by strategic objectives. Bresman, Birkinshaw 
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and Nobel (1999) also suggest that cross-border M&A is an effective way to expand the 
knowledge base of a fIrm. 
The ranking of the motives revealed that British CBM&As are not driven by 
diversifIcation motives (rank 10 and 13) or the motive to reduce costs (rank 11 and 14). 
Firms usually pursue diversifIcation in order to reduce earnings volatility and improve 
investors' risk-return opportunities. However, one of the disadvantages of acquisitions 
that are motivated by diversifIcation is the tendency to stretch the acquiring company's 
management (Gaughan, 1991). The ability to successfully manage a fIrm in one 
industry does not necessarily extend to other businesses. Moreover, the acquiring 
company is providing a service (i.e. diversifIcation) to stockholders that they can 
accomplish better themselves (Levy and Sarnat, 1970). For instance, a steel company 
that has a typical pattern of cyclical sales may consider acquiring a pharmaceutical 
company exhibiting a recession-resistant sales pattern. Financial theory states that the 
managers of the steel company are doing their stockholders a disservice through 
acquisition of the other company. If stockholders in the steel company wanted to be 
stockholders in the pharmaceutical fIrm, they could easily adjust their portfolio to add 
shares of the pharmaceutical fIrm. Stockholders can accomplish such transactions in a 
far less costly manner than through a corporate acquisition. 
To enable the overcoming of regulatory restrictions (ranked 16) appears not to 
be an important motivation for British cross border acquisitions. This is not surprising 
as most of the regulatory restrictions were removed before 2000 (the acquisitions were 
completed in the 2000 to 2004 period). Regulatory reform and deregulation in the 1990s 
in industries such as telecommunications (the WTO agreement on basic 
telecommunications services came into effect in 1998), electricity and fInance played a 
signifIcant role in the remarkable increases in M&As in both developed and developing 
countries (UNCT AD, 2000). The promotion of regional integration in the 1990s, as in 
Europe and North America, provided opportunities for expansion through cross border 
M&As. However, regulatory restrictions appear now to be less important factors for 
making an acquisition overseas. 
The motive of tax reasons (savings) is ranked lowest indicating CBM&As by 
UK fIrms are not driven by tax reasons. Weston et al. (2001) suggested that the 
synergies resulting from tax savings is not suffIciently signifIcant to motivate an 
acquisition which appears to be supported by this study. 
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5.4.2 FACTOR ANALYSIS OF STRATEGIC MOTIVES 
Due to potential conceptual and statistical overlap, an attempt was made to identify a 
parsimonious set of variables to determine the underlying dimensions governing the full 
set of twenty strategic motives. Exploratory factor analysis (EF A) using varimax 
rotation was used to extract the underlying factors. The EF A initially produced seven 
factors for the 20 strategic motives. 
A content analysis (Cavusgil and Zou, 1994; Despande, 1982) was conducted to 
remove items that had inconsistent substantive meanings with the factor or that had low 
factor loadings from further analysis. This purification process resulted in the 
elimination of three motives: Enable the overcoming of regulatory restrictions, tax 
reasons (savings) and, to reduce risk of the business. The remaining 17 motives were 
again factor analysed and produced six non-overlapping factors, as shown in Table 5.2. 
Six factors explained a total of 71.50 per cent of the observed variance (with 
Cronbach's a ranging from 0.54 to 078.). The remainder of this section discusses the 
interpretation of each of these factors. 
Factor 1: Synergies. The first factor had high positive loadings on the following four 
strategic motives: obtain economies of large scale production, obtain non-
manufacturing scale economies, gain efficiency through synergies, and cost reduction. 
This first factor was, therefore, interpreted to be a motive related to synergies. 
FactoI' 2: Market development. This factor had high positive loading on three strategic 
motives: to facilitate international expansion, to enable presence in new markets, and to 
enable faster entry to market. It was interpreted that this second factor reflects market 
development. 
FactoI' 3: Target improvement. This factor had high positive loading on three strategic 
motives: tum around failing acquired frrm, replace inefficient management of acquired 
frrm, and redeploy assets to the acquisition. This factor was interpreted as a motive to 
improve the target. 
FactoI' 4: Market power. The fourth factor had high positive loading on the three 
strategic motives: increase market power, increase market share, and elimination or 
reduction of competition. Therefore, this factor was interpreted as a motive related to 
market power. 
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Factor 5: Acquiring strategic resources. This factor had high factor loading on three 
strategic motives: acquiring complementary resources, gain strategic assets, and gain 
new capabilities. This factor was interpreted as a motive to acquire strategic resources. 
Factor 6: Product diversification. This factor had high factor loading on one strategic 
motive: enable product diversification. This factor was interpreted as a motive for 
product diversification. 
Table 5.2: Factor analysis of strategic motives for cross border acquisitions 
Factors 
Factor 1: Synergies 
Obtain economies oflarge scale 
production 
Obtain non-manufacturing scale 
economies 
Gain efficiency through synergies 
Cost reduction 
Factor 2: Market Development 
Factor 
loads 
.858 
.773 
.773 
.493 
To facilitate international expansion .774 
To enable presence in new markets .773 
To enable faster entry to market .697 
Factor 3: Target Improvement 
Turn around failing acquired finn 
Replace inefficient management of 
acquired firm 
Redeploy assets to the acquisition 
Factor 4: Market Power 
.841 
.768 
.489 
Increase market power .813 
Increase market share .681 
Elimination or reduction of competition .574 
Factor 5: Acquiring Strategic 
Resources 
Acquire complementary resources .698 
Gain strategic assets .671 
Gain new capabilities .663 
Factor 6: Product Diversification 
Enable product diversification .882 
% Variance Eigenvalue 
explained 
3.61 21.27 
2.77 16.29 
1.84 10.84 
1.42 8.40 
1.30 7.66 
1.19 7.02 
Cumulative 
percent 
21.27 
37.57 
48.41 
56.81 
64.48 
71.50 
Cronbach's 
alpha 
0.78 
0.68 
0.62 
0.68 
0.54 
N/A 
Notes: Principal component factor analysis with varimax rotation. K-M-O Measure of sampling adequacy == 
0.649. Bartlett's test ofSphericity== 379.071,p< 0.000. 
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5.4.3 STRATEGIC MOTIVATION AND SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS 
To further investigate the underlying nature and pattern of the strategic motivation for 
this sample of cross border acquisitions, the analysis was developed by considering the 
strategic motives in terms of the characteristics of the sample. For each of the relevant 
characteristics ofthe sample under consideration, the means and standard deviations of 
the five factors and the individual strategic motives comprising each factor, the rank 
order of the individual strategic motives and the appropriate test statistic for comparing 
differences in mean scores are reported in Table 5.3 to 5.5. 
Strategic motives and origin of the target firm 
The rank order of strategic motivation according to the geographical region of the 
acquisition, North America or Europe, is shown in Table 5.3. Some ofthe motives have 
a similar rank; however, there are several differences in rank order according to the 
location of the acquisition. The joint highest ranked motive for North American 
acquisitions is to gain new capabilities while for European acquisitions this motive is 
ranked sixth. UK firms appear to believe that North American ftrms provide access to 
speciftc capabilities more readily than do European firms. Acquisition of new 
capabilities appears to be an essential step, because today's products rely on so many 
different critical technologies that most companies can no longer maintain cutting edge 
sophistication in all of them (Ohmae, 1989). In this respect it appears that North 
American firms have developed these capabilities more than European firms. 
The highest ranked motive for European acquisitions is to enable presence in 
new markets whereas for North American acquisitions this motive is ranked fourth. It 
appears that it is more of a priority for UK firms to gain presence in the Europe than in 
North America. The desire to access the European market tends to support the survey 
fmdings of Jansson et al., (1994) in which "nearness and potential of the single market" 
was identified as the main reason for cross border M&As in Europe by UK 
manufacturing fIrms. 
Similar variations exist in the case of other motives such as increase market 
share, enable product diversiftcation, and replace inefficient management of acquired 
fIrm. For acquisitions in Europe, the motive to increase market share is ranked fifth; in 
contrast, the same motive is ranked tenth for North American acquisitions. It appears 
that for UK frrms it is relatively more important to increase market share in the 
European market than in North America. This ftnding supports a survey reported by 
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KPMG management consulting (1998) where increasing market share was identified as 
one ofthe most important motives for M&As in Europe by UK firms. 
Table 5.3: Strategic motives for cross border acquisitions: Origin of the target firm 
Factors Group Rank Mean SO T-value 
Factor 1: Synergies North America 2.21 0.93 
-1.13 Europe 2.49 1.00 
Obtain economies of large scale North America 13= 1.82 1.15 
-1.99" production Europe 11 2.43 1.30 
Obtain non-manufacturing scale North America 11 2.32 1.15 0.08 
economies Europe 12 2.30 1.24 
Gain efficiency through synergies North America 9 2.89 1.42 
-.99 Europe 6= 3.24 1.38 
Cost reduction North America 13= 1.82 1.15 
-0.62 Europe 13 2.00 1.13 
Factor 2: Market Development North America 3.51 1.17 
Europe 3.55 1.22 -0.15 
To facilitate international expansion North America 3 3.46 1.52 
-0.27 Europe 2 3.57 1.51 
To enable presence in new markets North America 4 3.43 1.37 
-0.63 Europe 1 3.65 1.41 
To enable faster entry to market North America 1= 3.64 1.74 0.43 Europe 4 3.46 1.62 
Factor 3: Target Improvement North America 1.71 0.77 
Europe 1.45 0.57 1.56 
Turn around failing acquired firm North America 15 1.79 1.13 1.12 Europe 16 1.49 0.96 
Replace inefficient management of North America 12 1.89 0.95 2.91·· 
acquired firm Europe 17 1.27 0.69 
Redeploy assets to the acquisition North America 17 1.46 0.74 
-0.67 Europe 15 1.59 0.79 
Factor 4: Market Power North America 2.51 1.09 
-0.66 Europe 2.68 1.00 
Increase market power North America 6 3.07 1.51 
-0.10 Europe 9 3.11 1.41 
Increase market share North America 10 2.75 1.48 
-1.57 Europe 5 3.32 1.41 
Elimination or reduction of competition North America 16 1.71 0.89 0.37 Europe 14 1.62 1.11 
Factor 5: Acquiring Strategic Resources North America 3.17 1.05 
-0.54 Europe 3.30 0.84 
Acquire complementary resources North America 8 2.93 1.51 
-0.76 Europe 8 3.19 1.15 
Gain strategic assets North America 7 2.96 1.45 
-1.52 Europe 3 3.49 1.23 
Gain new capabilities North America 1= 3.64 1.22 1.31 Europe 6= 3.24 1.21 
Factor 6: Product Diversification North America 
Europe 
Enable product diversification North America 5 3.21 1.61 1.64 EuroEe 10 2.59 1.34 
Notes: The mean for the factors is the mean of the factor scores; the mean for the individual motives is the 
average on a scale of 1 (= 'no importance') to 5 (= 'very important') .• p < 0.1; •• p < 0.05, p ••• < 0.01 
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For North American acquisition, the motive to enable product diversification is 
ranked fifth, whereas, for European acquisition this motive is ranked tenth. It appears 
that it is more of a priority for UK firms to enable product diversification in North 
America than in Europe. To remain competitive in the North American market, UK 
fIrms may have acquired fIrmS that enable product diversification. 
The motive to replace inefficient management of the acquired firm is ranked 
twelveth for North American acquisitions and ranked seventeenth for European 
acquisitions. It appears that for UK firms it is relatively more important to replace 
inefficient management in North American acquired fIrms than in European acquired 
fIrms. The management of UK firms may believe that they can better manage the North 
American firm's resources. 
Despite the variations in ranking, Table 5.3 shows that there is lack of support 
for hypothesis 1, in that the relative importance of the strategic motives does not vary 
significantly between the origins of target fIrm. None of the factors have mean scores 
that are statistically different. With regard to individual motives, only the relative 
importance of two - obtain economies of large scale production (p<0.05) and replace 
inefficient management of acquired fIrm (p <0.05) are found to vary significantly 
between region of the target firm The mean score for the motive - obtain economies of 
large scale production, is higher for acquisitions in Europe than those in North America. 
In the case of replace inefficient management of the acquired fIrm, the mean score is 
higher for acquisition in the North America than those in the European Union. 
It may be concluded that similar motives are driving CBM&As in the EU and 
North America, with little significant variation in terms of the relative importance of the 
motives. 
Strategic motives and sector of acquisition 
To facilitate the statistical testing ofthe strategic motives, the industry of the acquisition 
was categorised in the conventional way by distinguishing between manufacturing and 
service sectors. The strategic motivation for cross border acquisitions by sector of 
operation is shown in Table 5.4. 
The rank order of the strategic motives has a degree of similarity for the two 
sectors, however, there are some differences. For instance, the highest ranked motive for 
acquisitions in the manufacturing sector is to gain strategic assets while this motive is 
ranked tenth in the service sector. It appears that it is more of a priority for UK fIrms to 
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gain strategic assets in the manufacturing sector than in service sector. This suggests 
that UK frrms lack the necessary strategic assets to operate and compete effectively in 
the foreign manufacturing sector. Thus, acquisition allows UK frrms to obtain necessary 
and/or new technological resources and others strategic assets in order to seize 
opportunities in the foreign market (Caves, 1990). 
The highest ranked motive in the service sector is to enable faster entry into the 
market while this motive is ranked fourth in the manufacturing sector. It appears that it 
is more of a priority for UK fIrms to enable faster entry into the service sector than in 
the manufacturing sector. The importance of faster entry into the service sector supports 
Kang and Johanson's (2000) study where the growth of cross border M&As in the 
service sector e.g. telecommunications, media and fmancial services, . was seen as the 
efforts of fIrms to capture new markets quickly and to offer a more integrated global 
service. 
Increase market power is ranked third for acquisitions in the service sector 
whereas this motive is ranked ninth in the manufacturing sector. It appears that it is 
relatively more important for UK firms to increase market power in the service sector 
than in manufacturing sector. If industry competition is higher in the service sector than 
in the manufacturing sector, a UK firm may choose to acquire an existing company in 
the service sector in order to increase industry concentration. 
Thcre is moderate support for hypothesis 2, in that two of the six factors have 
mean scores that are signifIcantly different, i.e., market power (p <0.01) and product 
diversification (p <.05) both with mean scores higher in the service sector. Two of the 
three individual motives constituting the market power factor, i.e., increase market 
power (p <0.01) and increase market share (p <0.01), show means significantly higher 
for acquisition in the service sector compared to those in the manufacturing sector. The 
market power factor and the individual motives to increase market power, to increase 
market share and to eliminate or reduce competition, may be viewed as a set of largely 
defensive motives designed to consolidate and protect the UK firms' positions in 
foreign markets. Given that this set of motives is relatively more important for cross 
border acquisitions in the service sector than it is for motives in the manufacturing 
sector it may be argued that cross border acquisitions in the service sector are a more 
proactive response to competitive pressure than is the case for cross border acquisitions 
in the manufacturing sector. 
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Table S.4: Strategic motives for cross border acquisitions: Sector of acquisition 
Factors Group Rank Mean SD T-value 
Factor 1: Synergies Manufacturing 2.35 1.00 
-0.17 Service 2.39 0.96 
Obtain economies of large scale production Manufacturing 12 2.17 1.32 
-0.01 Service 12 2.17 1.22 
Obtain non-manufacturing scale economies Manufacturing 11 2.28 1.18 
-0.22 Service 11 2.34 1.23 
Gain efficiency through synergies Manufacturing 6 3.03 1.46 
-0.41 Service 9 3.17 1.33 
Cost reduction Manufacturing 13 1.94 1.21 0.16 Service 13 1.90 1.04 
Factor 2: Market Development Manufacturing 3.42 1.30 
Service 3.67 1.04 -0.84 
To facilitate international expansion Manufacturing 3 3.47 1.55 
-0.30 Service 5 3.59 1.47 
To enable presence in new markets Manufacturing 2 3.50 1.48 
-0.34 Service 4 3.62 1.29 
To enable faster entry to market Manufacturing 4 3.31 1.75 
-1.27 Service 1 3.83 1.53 
Factor 3: Target Improvement Manufacturing 1.50 0.58 
-0.82 Service 1.64 0.78 
Turn around failing acquired finn Manufacturing 16 1.53 1.02 
-0.75 Service 15= 1.72 1.06 
Replace inefficient management of acquired Manufacturing 17 1.39 0.76 
-1.52 firm Service 15= 1.72 0.96 
Redeploy assets to the acquisition Manufacturing 14 1.58 0.73 0.51 Service 17 1.48 0.82 
Factor 4: Market Power Manufacturing 2.30 1.01 
Service 2.98 0.95 -2.79··· 
Increase market power Manufacturing 9 2.64 1.43 
-3.03·" Service 3 3.66 1.26 
Increase market share Manufacturing 8 2.72 1.46 
-2.26··· Service 6 3.52 1.35 
Elimination or reduction of competition Manufacturing 15 1.56 1.05 
-0.93 Service 14 1.79 0.97 
Factor 5: Acquiring Strategic Resources Manufacturing 3.21 0.95 
Service 3.29 0.92 -0.36 
Acquire complementary resources Manufacturing 7 2.97 1.34 
-0.71 Service 7= 3.21 1.29 
Gain strategic assets Manufacturing 1 3.53 1.29 1.79 Service 10 2.93 1.36 
Gain new capabilities Manufacturing 5 3.14 1.31 
-2.13··· Service 2 3.76 1.02 
Factor 6: Product Diversification Manufacturing 
Service 
Enable product diversification Manufacturing 10 2.58 1.62 
-1.75·· Service 7= 3.21 1.23 
Notes: The mean for the factors is the mean of the factor scores; the mean for the individual motive 
is the average on a scale of 1 (= 'no importance') to 5 (= 'very important') .• p < 0.1; "p < 0.05, p ••• < 0.01 
The finding that market power as a strategic motive is relatively more important for 
cross border acquisitions in the service sector than those in the manufacturing sector is 
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consistent with McCann (1996) and Kreitl and Oberndorfer (2004). McCann (1996) 
found that the M&A-motive of increasing the firm's market share is very highly ranked 
in service sectors such as transportation and travel, fmancial services, professional 
service sectors, etc. Kreitl and Oberndorfer (2004) found market share was the third 
highest ranked motive in the consulting service sector. They argued that market share 
provides a consulting firm with name recognition and reputation for its expertise, a 
factor which reduces cost in marketing and sales. 
The individual motive constituting the product diversification factor, i.e., enable 
product diversification (p <0.05), shows means significantly higher for cross border 
acquisition in the service sector compared to that in manufacturing sector. It appears 
that it is more of a priority for UK firms to enable product diversification in service 
sector than in manufacturing sector. 
On the whole, there is moderate support for hypothesis 2, indicating that motives 
for cross border acquisitions to an extant do vary according to the sector of acquisition. 
Strategic motive and Pre-acquisition performance offoreignfirms 
The rank order of strategic motivation according to the pre-acquisition performance of 
target firms is shown in Table 5.5. Some of the motives have similar rank between 
profitable target firm and not-profitable firm, although there are some differences in 
rank order according to the pre-acquisition performance of the target firm. The highest 
ranked motive when acquiring a profitable firm is to facilitate international expansion, 
whereas this motive is ranked fourth in the case of a not-profitable firm. It appears that 
it is more of a priority for UK firms to acquire a profitable firm than to acquire a not 
profitable firm for facilitating international expansion. This is not surprising as 
acquiring a profitable firm can facilitate international expansion more easily than that of 
a not profitable firm. 
Similar variation exists in the rank order of other motives. The motive to 
increase market share is ranked sixth for acquiring a profitable firm. The same motive is 
ranked tenth for acquiring a not profitable firm. It appears that it is relatively more 
important for UK firms to acquire a profitable firm than to acquire a not profitable firm 
in order to increase market share. The market share ofa profitable firm is expected to be 
higher than that of a not profitable firm. Thus, acquiring a profitable firm can result in a 
relatively higher market share for the acquiring firm. 
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Table 5.5: Strategic motives for cross border acquisitions: Performance of target flfms 
Factors Group Rank Mean SD T-value 
Factor 1: Synergies Profitable 2.43 1.00 
Not-Profitable 2.16 0.90 0.92 
Obtain economies of large scale production Profitable 12 2.24 1.27 0.81 Not-Profitable 13 1.93 1.28 
Obtain non-manufacturing scale economies Profitable 11 2.38 1.17 0.88 Not-Profitable 12 2.07 1.28 
Gain efficiency through synergies Profitable 8 3.14 1.38 0.49 Not-Profitable 8 2.93 1.48 
Cost reduction Profitable 13 1.98 1.16 
.73 Not-Profitable 15= 1.73 1.03 
Factor 2: Market Development Profitable 3.54 1.27 
Not-Profitable 3.51 0.94 0.11 
To facilitate international expansion Profitable 1 3.60 1.55 0.74 Not-Profitable 4= 3.27 1.38 
To enable presence in new markets Profitable 2= 3.52 1.46 
-.40 Not-Profitable 1 3.67 1.17 
To enable faster entry to market Profitable 2= 3.52 1.63 
-.16 Not-Profitable 2 3.60 1.84 
Factor 3: Target Improvement Profitable 1.46 0.53 
Not-Profitable 1.91 0.96 -1.73· 
Turn around failing acquired firm Profitable 17 1.38 .667 
-2.41··· Not-Profitable 11 2.40 1.59 
Replace inefficient management of acquired Profitable 16 1.48 0.86 
-.99 firm Not-Profitable 15= 1.73 0.88 
Redeploy assets to the acquisition Profitable 15 1.52 0.70 
-.35 Not-Profitable 17 1.60 0.98 
Factor 4: Market Power Profitable 2.64 0.95 
Not-Profitable 2.51 1.30 0.35 
Increase market power Profitable 6= 3.16 1.46 0.68 Not-Profitable 9 2.87 1.40 
Increase market share Profitable 6= 3.16 1.39 0.74 Not-Profitable 10 2.80 1.69 
Elimination or reduction of competition Profitable 14 1.60 0.92 
-0.88 Not-Profitable 14 1.87 1.30 
Factor 5: Acquiring Strategic Resources Profitable 3.25 0.93 0.03 Not-Profitable 3.24 0.96 
Acquire complementary resources Profitable 9 3.10 1.24 0.25 Not-Profitable 7 3.00 1.55 
Gain strategic assets Profitable 5 3.26 1.36 
-0.01 Not-Profitable 4= 3.27 1.33 
Gain new capabilities Profitable 4 3.40 1.22 
-0.18 Not-Profitable 3 3.47 1.24 
Factor 6: Product Diversification Profitable 
Not-Profitable 
Enable product diversification Profitable 10 2.76 1.50 
-1.00 Not-Profitable 6 3.20 1.42 
Notes: The mean for the factors is the mean of the factor scores; the mean for the individual motive is 
the average on a scale of 1 (= 'no importance') to 5 (= 'very important') .• p < 0.1; •• p < 0.05, p ••• < O.oI 
Despite some variation in ranking, Table 5.5 indicates weak support for hypothesis 3, in 
that only one of the six factors has mean scores that are significantly different, i.e., 
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target improvement (p <0.1), not surprisingly the mean being higher for acquisition of 
not profitable firms. One of the three individual motives constituting the target 
improvement factor, i.e., turn around failing acquired firm, (p<O.OI) shows means 
significantly higher for cross border acquisitions of not-profitable firms compared with 
those of profitable firms. This is to be expected as an acquirer may be motivated to 
acquire a poorly performing foreign firm with a view to turning it around, for example, 
by replacing inefficient management. This result is consistent with the improved 
management hypothesis which holds that poorly managed firms have a greater 
likelihood of becoming takeover targets (Manne, 1965). Gaughan (1991) argued that 
some takeovers are motivated by a belief that the acquiring firm's management can 
better manage the target's resources. Thus, an UK acquirer may feel that its 
management skills are such that the value of the target would rise under its control. 
Brealey and Myers (2003) suggested that cash is not the only asset that can be 
wasted by poor management. Firms with unexploited opportunities to cut costs and 
increase sales and earnings are natural candidates for acquisition by other firms with 
better management. The authors also suggested that sometimes an acquisition is the 
only simple and practical way to improve management. Because the incumbent 
managers are naturally reluctant to fife or demote themselves, and stockholders of large 
public firms do not usually have much direct mfluence on how the firm is run or who 
runs it. 
Overall, there is weak support for hypothesis 3, suggesting that most of the 
motives for the cross border acquisitions vary little according to pre-acquisition 
performance of the target flfm. However, there are significant differences with respect 
to the motive of target improvement - which is to be expected. 
5.5 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This study identifies the main strategic motives driving CBM&As by UK firms. Cross 
border acquisitions are seen primarily as a means to enable presence in new markets, to 
enable faster entry to market, to facilitate international expansion, to gain new 
capabilities, and to gain strategic assets. In terms of underlying theoretical explanations, 
the main strategic motives are underpinned by the theories of strategic positioning and 
the resource based view of the firm The first three ranked motives are concerned with 
improving the firm's competitive position through the use of acquisition that may be 
characterized as most importantly allowing the UK firms to enter new foreign markets 
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at speed and/or consolidating existing market positions. The leading set of motives also· 
lends support to the RBV of acquisition, particularly when it is recognized that the 
acquisition is formed because the acquirer lacks the necessary capabilities or assets 
required to remain competitive in the foreign market. Where one firm wishes to acquire 
a capability that it does not have but is possessed by a target firm then an acquisition 
may facilitate obtaining these capabilities. 
The study also fmds that 'enable overcoming of regulatory restrictions' and 'tax 
reasons (savings)' appear to be relatively unimportant for cross border acquisition by 
UK firms. This is not surprising as most of the regulatory restrictions were removed 
before 2000 (the acquisitions were completed in the 2000 to 2004 period). Thus, 
regulatory restrictions are now less important factors when making an acquisition 
overseas. 
Due to potential conceptual and statistical overlap among the strategic motives, 
factor analysis was conducted to produce a parsimonious set of distinct, non-
overlapping strategic motives. The analysis yielded six non-overlapping factors which 
explained a total of 71.50 percent of the observed variance in the sample data. These 
factors are: synergies, market development, target improvement, market power, 
acquiring strategic resources, and product diversification. To investigate the underlying 
nature and pattern of the strategic motives for this sample of CBM&As, strategic 
motives were considered across a range of sample characteristics: regional origin of the 
target firm, sector of acquisition and pre-acquisition performance of the target firm. 
The study found lack of support for hypothesis 1, indicating that the relative 
importance of the strategic motives do not vary significantly between the regional origin 
of the target firm. The findings indicate that the relative importance of the strategic 
motives vary to a moderate extent with the sector of acquisition activity, providing 
some support for hypothesis 2. There is limited support for hypothesis 3, in that there is 
little variation in the relative importance of the strategic motives with pre-acquisition 
performance of the target firm. However, in the key motive of target improvement there 
is a significant difference in means with a significantly higher mean for not profitable 
acquisitions. 
In general there is little variation in the relative importance of the motivating 
factors across the characteristics of the sample. Where there is variation, while this is 
sometimes readily explicable, it is not always obvious. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
THE PRE-ACQUISITION MANAGEMENT PROCESS 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
During the 1990s, a strong increase in the number of high-value cross-border deals was 
observed with a significant participation of European firms (Sleuwaegen and Valentini, 
2006). Recent estimates of announced global M&A activity range from US$3.5 trillion 
to a little over US$4 trillion (Economic Outlook, 2007). 
The managerial importance of the international acquisition phenomena is made 
apparent by the size of these figures alone. As these numbers grow - so grows the 
importance of the correct valuations of a target firm. During the pre-acquisition stage, 
managers will no doubt be forced to assess both the traditionally tangible assets and the 
often more important intangible market based assets to arrive at an appropriate valuation 
of a cross border acquisition. Increasingly the question becomes how to assess potential 
international acquisitions. 
To identify an appropriate M&A target requires a thorough due diligence 
process. This process has features similar to the due diligence for domestic M&As, 
however, it is complicated by several elements (such as different institutional 
environments and different cultures) that appear even more crucial in. cross border 
M&As (Kissin and Herrera, 1990). Despite the importance of this process, relatively 
few studies have focused on the due diligence involved in cross border M&As 
(Shimizu, et aI., 2004). Moreover, little prior research has investigated the impact of the 
pre-acquisition management process on acquisition success. 
After selecting the target firm, the acquirer prepares for the negotiation. 
Successful negotiation has a tremendous impact on the success of the acquisition. Many 
companies negotiate cross border transactions routinely, however, when fmancial 
negotiations cross borders, this general advice needs elaboration to fit the context 
(Scbenius, 1998). Another country's politics, culture, and corporate governance policies 
may erect almost insurmountable obstacles. However, few studies have attempted to 
examine the negotiation process in the context of cross border acquisitions. 
In reality both the purpose and nature of the M&As selection and negotiation 
process is extremely complex (Shimizu, et al., 2004). Managers face difficulties in 
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analyzing strategic and organizational fit as they are prevented from understanding 
these factors by a series of problems inherent in the process of analyzing and 
negotiating with the target firm. Negotiating a cross border M&A is difficult because of 
lack of information and the difference in cultures (Buckley and Ghauri, 2002). 
Therefore, more research is needed to unpack the complexities ofthe due diligence and 
negotiation process in the context of cross border M&As. 
The purpose of this chapter is to investigate the pre-acquisition management 
issues in cross border acquisitions (the terms cross border acquisitions and cross border 
M&As will be used interchangeably). Specifically, the objectives ofthis study are: 
a. To identify the importance of the factors leading to a successful acquisition deal. 
b. To identify the factors evaluated by the acquiring firm during the pre-acquisition 
phase. 
c. To identify the pre-acquisition problems experienced by the acquiring firm. 
d. To investigate the link between acquisition performance and the evaluation of 
the target firm. 
e. To investigate whether prior acquisition experience leads to fewer pre-
acquisition problems. 
The rest of the chapter is set out in the following way. The next section reviews the 
literature relating to pre-acquisition management issues. The third section develops the 
hypothesis of the study. The fmdings and discussion are in the fourth section. 
Conclusions are provided in the final section. 
6.2 PRE-ACQUISITION MANAGEMENT ISSUES 
The merger and acquisition decision making process is often described as a step by step 
analytical process that starts with objectives and passes through systematic search and 
screening, strategic evaluation, fmancial evaluation, and negotiation i.e. the due 
diligence process (Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991). The underlying principle is that if 
the acquirer can identify and prepare for a wide variety of factors in the pre-acquisition 
process, it can achieve not only smooth post-acquisition integration, but also can 
maximize acquisition performance. 
a. Target selection process 
The acquisition process begins with the identification of potential targets that suits the 
acquirer's expansion strategy. Buono and Bowditch (1989) emphasize that top 
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management should vigilantly analyze goals of the acquisition, the strategic and 
organizational fit, and how to establish commitment of employees to the acquisition. 
Additionally, several researchers have identified the critical role of assembling 
information about human resource practices, organizational culture and structure, and 
making a detailed outline for anticipated organizational change, including the selection 
of a leader and management team to be in charge of the integration stage (Haspeslagh 
and Jemison, 1991; Schweiger, Csiszar and Napier, 1993). Collectively, these authors 
suggest that careful pre-acquisition planning will facilitate the implementation stage. 
To identify appropriate targets and to negotiate and effectively complete the 
acquisition requires a thorough due diligence process. This process has features similar 
to the due diligence for domestic M&As, however, it is complicated by several elements 
that appear even more crucial in cross border M&As (Kissin and Herrera, 1990). At the 
firm level, differences in accounting standards and fluctuating exchange rates bctween 
different countrics may cause further difficulties in the evaluation of the target firms' 
fmancial assets. At national and industry levels, the due diligence process must provide 
an understanding of the institutional environment in which the target frrm is situated, 
such as government regulations, to effectively respond to potential local constraints, 
particularly in specific industries such as those with high technology standards, in which 
regulations can be extremely sensitive. 
Considering the complexity and variety of the issues regarding the analysis of a 
foreign target, frrms often seek help from fmancial and legal advisors in the country 
where the target frrm is headquartered. Recent work by Angwin (2001) examines how 
managers in Europe use advisors to value the due diligence process. He conducted a 
survey of European frrms' top executives regarding national perspectives on due 
diligence. His results showed that interpretations of the due diligence process vary 
across managers of different countries. Specifically, managers from separate European 
countries stated diverse primary objectives for the due diligence process (i.e., help in the 
negotiation, insight into the existing management, evaluation of the assets, assess 
cultural fit, help to plan integration, commercial insight into the market). Moreover, he 
found that all aspects of the due diligence process were conducted by the acquiring frrm, 
although acquirers of different nationalities tended to rely on external advisors for 
specific issues (e.g., fmancial), and the extent to which advisors were used varied 
considerably. Angwin (2001) also argued that the use of advisors injects external 
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knowledge into the process. Using this app,roach should help avoid path dependence in 
learning during the due diligence process. 
Despite the importance of this process, relatively few prior studies have 
specifically focused on the due diligence involved in cross-border M&As. In contrast, 
research on alliances and joint ventures examines in depth the issue ofpartner selection 
(Gulati, 1995; Glaister and Buckley, 1997; Hitt, Dacin, Levitas, Arregle and Borza, 
2000). 
The selection of the right target flllll for acquisition can provide the acquirer 
with a strong local network of relationships in the host country. This important topic 
requires further examination. Related to this topic is the analysis of the target firm's 
social capita~ particularly in situations of foreign market uncertainty and information 
asymmetries. While there is some anecdotal research dedicated to practitioners (e.g., 
Kissin and Herrera, 1990; Sebenius, 1998; Emerson, 2001), virtually no scholarly 
research exists in this area (Shimizu, et at., 2004). Therefore, more systematic research 
is needed to unpack the complexities ofthe due diligence process in the context of cross 
border M&As. 
b. The negotiation process 
Mergers and acquisitions enable rapid global expansion, access and entry to countries 
worldwide to meet the continuously changing requirements that competing in a global 
market demands. Bringing different companies together, as with people of opposing 
points of view, can be fraught with difficulty. Effective business negotiations are thus 
critical in M&As, due to the high potential for conflict, particularly in cross-border 
activity, mismanagement and subsequent risk of failure. 
Much of the literature on business negotiations is prescriptive, providing 
recommendations on negotiation methods, approaches and styles (Weiss, 1994; Fisher 
and Ury, 1990; Hendon et at, 1999; Ghauri and Usunier, 2003) and although there is an 
increasing volume of literature on business negotiations, at present there is a scarcity of 
studies that deal with specific business negotiation issues in the context ofM&As. 
Ghauri and Usunier (2003) provide an outline of three main stages to a 
negotiation: pre-negotiation and planning, face-to-face negotiation and post-negotiation. 
The pre-negotiation stage is crucial as such a deal will have many implications for 
various stakeholders which must be thoroughly analysed, the potential partner assessed 
in-depth, any potential barriers such as economic, political or legal restrictions to a deal 
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identified. The face-to-face negotiation stage consists of information exchange and 
actual negotiation (Ghauri and Usunier, 2003). Issues of concern include who should 
negotiate and how many people the negotiating team should consist of. In the post-
negotiation stage, parties have agreed on most issues. This final stage is also critical in 
M&A negotiations owing to the legal implications on the ongoing relationship. 
Achieving a good agreement leads to a more successful implementation or successful 
achievement of expectations. 
The acquiring firm often has to pay a premium price for the acquisition to 
conclude the deal after the target firm has been selected and the initial due diligence 
process has been completed. Much of the prior literature focused on the premium paid. 
Researchers found that foreign buyers usually pay high premiums in acquiring U.S. 
firms relative to U.S. buyers (Harris and Ravenscraft, 1991; Inkpen et al., 2000). For 
instance, Inkpen et al. (2000) examined technology-based M&As of U.S. firms and 
found that European buyers paid a premium about three times higher than U.S. buyers 
did. Harris and Ravenscraft (1991) examined acquisitions of U.S. firms and found that 
the target finns of foreign buyers enjoyed higher wealth gains than did the target firms 
of U.S. buyers. In contradiction to these results, Dewenter (1995) found that there is no 
significant difference in the level of premiums paid by foreign and domestic bidders. 
Using an integrated theoretical approach based on transaction costs . and 
macroeconomics, he found that there is no significant difference in the within-industry 
mean takeover premium levels. 
c. Problems in the pre-acquisition phase 
In reality both the purpose and nature of the M&As selection and negotiation process 
are extremely complex. Managers face difficulties in analyzing strategic and 
organizational fit as they are prevented from understanding these factors by a series of 
problems inherent in the process of analyzing, negotiating with, and acquiring the other 
firm. 
Due diligence is a complex process in all M&As (Hitt et al., 2001a). However, 
in cross border M&As, the evaluation process of the potential target is even more 
complicated at all levels (Angwin, 2001). It is difficult with cross border M&As to 
obtain good quality information because of the possibility of different accounting 
conventions or regulatory requirements in a foreign country (Buckley and Ghauri, 
2002:103). 
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Negotiating a cross border M&A is also an extremely complex process 
(Hopkins, 1999) where stakes are very high, thus necessitating in-depth preparation, 
planning and execution of the negotiating process. There are invariably a number of 
controversial issues that can cause conflict, deadlock and even failure if they are not 
fully addressed at the negotiating table. These commonly include the allocation of top 
jobs, the location of the new headquarters and the percentage of the newly formed 
company allocated to each partner's shares (Devine, 2002). 
Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) spotted four problems inherent in the pre-
acquisition stage. The fIrst problem is the fragmented perspective of the many 
specialists during analysis and decision making. The next problem is the increasing 
momentum among all participants in the process to consummate the transaction. The 
third problem is the ambiguous expectations about key aspects of the acquisition 
between both sides of the negotiation. The fInal problem is the mUltiple motives among 
acquiring managers. The problems of target selection and negotiation process 
mentioned so far can be managed and dealt with effectively (Haspeslagh and Jemison, 
1991). However, despite the importance of understanding these issues in a cross border 
context, there is a paucity of comprehensive research on these processes. 
6. 3. HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
(a) Evaluation of the targetfirm and acquisition performance 
Accurate evaluations of target companies are the fIrst and leading task for acquirers. 
Many researchers have explored the determinants of acquisition performance and have 
found that the success of acquisitions hinges on synergy realization (Haspeslagh and 
Jemison, 1991; Hitt, et aI., 2001a), which in turn depends on prudent targ~t selection 
(Barney, 1988; Harrison, et aI., 1991; Ramaswamy, 1997; Singh and Montgomery, 
1987) and on effective post acquisition integration (Datta, 1991; Haspeslagh and 
Jemison, 1991). 
Ernst and Young (1994) argued that there are three components comprising the 
analytical framework for M&A evaluation criteria; industry competitive factors, 
operating strategy, and the target's competitive position. The selection ofthe right target 
fIrm for acquisition can provide the acquirer with a strong local network of relationships 
which can improve acquisition success (Shimizu, et aI., 2004). Hitt, et al. (1998) posits 
that one of the dominant attributes of successful acquisition is associated with thorough 
evaluation of the target frrrn. A successful acquirer normally engages in a careful and 
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deliberate process of analyzing and selecting the target firm. Hitt, et a!. (1998) also 
argued that by conducting a thorough evaluation acquiring firms can acquire a target 
firm with the strongest complementarities which are favourable for acquisition success. 
In contrast, one of the common attributes of unsuccessful acquirers was associated with 
inadequate target evaluation and planning for the acquisition. Hitt, et a!. (1998) found 
that inadequate evaluation and planning occurred for a variety of reasons, including 
overconfidence in the ability to manage purchased assets effectively and ignoring 
obvious problems in the target firm. 
Moreover, Marks and Mirvis (2001) advocated that successful acquirers know 
what they are looking for and conduct a thorough due diligence to ensure that the 
acquirers get what they want. The screening of the target firm covers the strategic, 
fmanciaI, human and cultural elements that can undermine an otherwise sound deal. The 
preceding discussion suggests that thorough evaluation of the target firm positively 
influences the prospect of acquisition success. This leads to the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 4: The more thorough the evaluation of the target firm the better the 
acquisition peiformance i.e. there will be a positive association between target 
evaluation and acquisition peiformance. 
(b) Acquisition experience and pre-acquisition problems experienced 
Some studies have found that acquisition experience positively impacts performance 
(Fowler and Schmidt, 1989; Bruton, Oviatt, and White, 1994), others have found no 
such relationship (Lubatkin, 1987). In contrast, Haleblian and Finkelstein (1999) 
reported evidence for a non-linear, U-shaped, relationship, which highlights possible 
negative learning effects (Gick and Holyoak, 1987) for the first few acquisition 
experiences, during which acquirers might inappropriately apply lessons learned in past 
experiences to contexts that seem superficially similar but are inherently different, 
thereby reducing the probability of success. In a similar vein, Hayward (2002) finds no 
linear impacts of prior acquisition experience on short-term stock price reactions, but a 
number ofnon-linearities in the quality of such experience (such as the average success 
of prior acquisitions). Although prior researches investigated the relationship between 
acquisition experience and performance, little research exists on the relationship 
between acquisition experience and pre-acquisition problems experienced. 
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An acquisition leads to substantial managerial and organizational challenges. 
Acquisitions, therefore, give the acquiring flrm an opportunity to learn how to 
overcome the problems following the transaction, and to learn how to deal successfully 
with the new organizational situation (Villinger, 1996). Firms might be able to learn 
how to manage acquisition processes by simply doing more of the same, and thereby 
tacitly forming and refming organizational routines (Zollo and Sing, 2004) that might 
assist in better management of pre-acquisition issues in future acquisition activity. An 
experienced acquirer is expected to be better informed about the pre-acquisition 
problems, hence, expected to be better prepared to manage those problems in the pre-
acquisition phase. Therefore, the acquirer with more acquisition experience is expected 
to face fewer pre-acquisition problems than an inexperienced acquirer. This leads to the 
following hypothesis: 
H5: An experienced acquirer will encounter fewer acquisition problems than an 
inexperienced acquirer. 
The conceptual framework is illustrated in Figure 6.1. The study conjectures that (a) 
acquisition performance is determined by evaluation of the target flrm, and (b) 
experienced acquirer encounters fewer pre-acquisition problems. 
/ Pre-Acquisition Management Proce.. '\ 
Evaluation of target firm Prior acquisition experience of the· 
acquiring firm 
> Investment and financing issues 
> Employee and business capability > Great experience 
> Legal, tax and IT compatibility > Little experience > Strategic and organizational fit 
H4+ HS-
Acquisition performance Pre-acquisition problems experienced 
> Market share & sales growth > Tax, accounting, legal and regulatory issues 
> EPS and Share price > National and corporate cultural issues 
> Profitability > Negotiation issues > Communication issues 
> Deal structuring issues 
Figure 6.1: The conceptual framework - The impact of the pre-acquisition evaluation oftarget firm 
on acquisitions acquisition performance and, the relationship between prior acquisition 
experience and pre-acquisition problems experienced. 
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6.4 FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 
6.4.1 FACTORS LEADING TO A SUCCESSFUL ACQUISITION DEAL 
The relative importance of the factors leading to a successful acquisition deal, based on 
the mean measure of importance, is presented in Table 6.1. The median measure is 
exceeded by all the factors, of which "determining the appropriate price to be paid for 
the acquired firm" (4.75), "conducting effective due diligence" (4.58), "negotiating 
effectively with the acquired firm" (4.41), "accurately forecasting the acquired firm's 
cash flows" (4.22), "identifying anticipated synergies between your firm and the 
acquired firm" (4.09), constitute the first five with the highest degree of importance. 
The leading set of factors is related with the negotiation process (rank 1 and 3) and due 
diligence (Rank 2, 4 and 5). The highest ranked factors indicate that the success of the 
acquisition deal is significantly influenced by effective due diligence and the 
negotiation process. 
Table 6.1: The relative importance of the factors leading to a successful acquisition deal 
Rank Important factors Mean Standard Deviation 
Determining the appropriate price to be paid for the acquired firm 4.75 0.75 
2 Conducting effective due diligence 4.58 0.79 
3 Negotiating effectively with the acquired firm 4.41 0.83 
4 Accurately forecasting the acquired firm's cash flows 4.22 0.96 
5 Identifying anticipated synergies between your firm and the acquired firm 4.09 1.06 
6 Anticipating reaction of the major shareholders of the acquired firm 3.56 1.40 
7 Broad involvement throughout of the acquired firm's key personnel in the 3.48 1.09 
negotiation of the acquisition 
8 Avoiding hostile takeover 3.44 2.95 
9 Obtaining advice from external advisors (e.g., investment bank) 3.16 1.25 
10 Deciding appropriate method of payment (e.g., cash or stock) 3.06 1.16 
Note: N ~ 6Sj The mean is the average on a scale of 1 (~'no importance') to 5 (~'very important') 
One of the most important factors leading to the success of the acquisition deal is 
effective due diligence. The high ranking tends to suggest that UK firms perceived the 
success of the acquisition deal to be strongly influenced by effective due diligence. 
Perry and Herd (2004) note that as the complexity of mergers and acquisitions has 
increased, the scope and effectiveness of due diligence are now key issues. Carey 
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(2000) recommends that this examination should include full fmancial information, 
candour about the company's operating performance and problems, its corporate culture 
plus an honest assessment of management talent. As due diligence provides an 
invaluable opportunity to collect comprehensive information about the target fIrm, UK 
firms appear to emphasise effective due diligence so as make a successful deal. 
Another important factor contributing to the success of the acquisition deal is the 
effective negotiation process. In general, price negotiation is the primary consideration 
in the negotiation stage. As the acquiring firm often pays a premium price, obtaining 
accurate information necessary to determine the acquisition price is pivotal. According 
to Ernst and Young (1994) a second consideration in negotiating acquisition agreements 
is the preservation of the attractive non fmancial characteristics of the company being 
acquired. These may include patents, trademarks, processes, or other proprietary assets. 
Effective business negotiations are thus critical in M&As. This study also fmds the 
importance of an effective negotiation process a critical factor contributing to the 
success of acquisition deal. 
The above fmdings appear to suggest the significance of the effective. due 
diligence and negotiation for the success of the acquisition deal. The following section 
explores the due diligence i.e. target evaluation process adopted by the acquiring firm 
and its impact on acquisition success. 
6.4.2 EVALUATING THE TARGET FIRM 
The rank order of the seventeen factors evaluated during the pre-acquisition stage, based 
on the mean measure, is shown in Table 6.2. The median measure is exceeded by eleven 
factors, of which ''the strategic relatedness between your company and the acquired 
firm" (4.28), ''the acquired firm's market position" (4.26), ''the acquired firm's 
technological competence" (4.08), ''the degree of the acquired firm's cash flow 
generating capability" (3.80), ''the acquired firm's business competence" (3.71), 
constitute the first fIve factors evaluated more thoroughly in selecting a cross border 
target. 
The UK fIrms emphasise evaluating the target fIrm's strategic and cultural 
relatedness, market position, technological and business competence, management 
capability and cash flow generating capability. The ranking of the factors suggests that 
UK firms do not see target evaluation as simply a fmancial assessment but a detailed 
investigation that tests the viability ofthe proposed acquisition. 
167 
The issue evaluated most thoroughly by UK fIrms was the strategic relatedness 
between the acquiring fIrm and the acquired firm. The strategic fit between the acquirer 
and the target is concerned with "how the distinctive competencies of the target could 
be combined with those of the suitor to create additional value" (Jemison and Sitkin, 
1986b). Thus, UK firms have emphasised identifying the strategic relatedness in order 
to increase the possibility of creating value. This fmding is consistent with Barney 
(1988) who suggested that the acquirer's acumen in identifying the realizable value 
from strategic relatedness between a firm and a target will lead to a high likelihood of 
abnormal returns. 
Table 6.2: The extent of evaluation of the issues relating to the acquired firm 
Rank Issues evaluated Mean Standard Deviation 
The strategic relatedness between your company and the acquired firm 4.28 0.91 
2 The acquired firm's market position 4.26 0.77 
3 The acquired firm's technological competence 4.08 0.87 
4 The degree of the acquired firm's cash flow generating capability 3.80 1.16 
5 The acquired firm's business competence 3.71 0.96 
6= The acquired firm's management capability 3.68 1.06 
6= The degree of cultural relatedness between your company and the 3.68 1.01 
acquired firm 
8 The future financing needs of the acquired firm 3.53 1.18 
9 The future investment needs of the acquired firm 3.51 1.16 
10 The capability of the acquired firm's workforce 3.28 1.03 
11 The extent of the debt of the acquired firm 3.11 1.57 
12 The acquired firm's fixed asset value 2.78 1.25 
13 The differences in the tax system between the UK and the acquired firm's 2.75 1.35 home nation 
14 The differences in the legal system between the UK and the acquired 2.57 1.41 firm's home nation 
15= The effectiveness of the acquired firm's HRM policies 2.51 1.10 
15= The degree of compatibility of the IT systems of both firms 2.51 1.27 
IS= The future interest payments of the acquired firm 2.51 1.54 
Notes: N .. 65; The mean is the average on a scale of 1 (= 'very little evaluation') to 5 (= 'very thorough evaluation'); 
"=" shows the issues having same rank in terms of mean values. 
Evaluation of the target firms' market position was highly ranked. This indicates that 
UK firms thoroughly assess the target fIrms' market position before making cross 
border acquisitions. As previously noted by Ernst and Young (1994), there are three 
components that comprise the analytical framework for M&A evaluation criteria; 
168 
industry competitive factors, operating strategy, and the target's competitive position. 
They suggested that these three components will determine the future acquirer's 
profitability. Accordingly, UK fIrms tend to assess the target fIrm's market position 
thoroughly in order to increase the likelihood of future profitability. 
The third ranked factor is the appraisal of the acquired fIrm's technological 
competence. Acquiring a target firm with technological competence can serve as an 
effective channel strengthening technological core competencies of the acquired firm. 
An acquisition can enable firms to gain or regain contact to the research frontier in their 
field of competence (Kamien, 1992) .. Furthermore, overlapping research fields can 
necessitate the ownership of patents to continue research activities (O'Donoghue et aI., 
1998) and M&As can be made to acquire the patent portfolio of a rival fIrm (Giuri et aI., 
2006). Thus, UK fIrms pursuing international acquisitions assess the target firms' 
technological competence so as to check the opportunity of strengthening their 
technological competencies. 
6.4.3 PROBLEMS FACED DURING THE PRE-ACQUISITION PHASE 
This section presents the problems experienced by the acquiring firm during the pre-
acquisition stage. The section also investigates the impact of understanding of pre-
acquisition problems on acquisition performance. 
Table 6.3 presents the extent of problems experienced by UK fIrms in managing 
the pre-acquisition phase. Interestingly, the median measure is not exceeded by any of 
the factors suggesting that the severity of the problems faced during the pre-acquisition 
stage ranges from moderate to low. 
"Ensuring the reliability of the information collected" and "Collecting 
information about the acquired fIrm" were ranked highest among the moderate level of 
problems experienced by UK fIrms. This fmding is not surprising given the fact that 
acquirers need much information about a target and its external environment to project 
its future cash flows and understand its assets and liabilities. Problems can be 
exacerbated for acquirers when they enter a particular country where they have no 
experience and thus little or no local information or knowledge (Very et aI., 2001). 
Thus, UK fIrms, with little experience of entering a new country, can be expected to 
face difficulty in collecting information about target firms and in ensuring the reliability 
of the information collected. 
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Table 6.3: The extent of the problems faced during the pre-acquisition phase 
Rank Pre-acquisition problems Mean Standard Deviation 
Ensuring reliability of the information collected 2.64 0.91 
2 Collecting information about the acquired firm 2.44 1.09 
3 Understanding different management styles 2.39 0.88 
4 Understanding different cultures 2.34 0.84 
5 Understanding acquired firm's tax systems 2.31 1.09 
6 Effectively structuring a deal 2.25 0.97 
7 Negotiating employment contracts of acquired firm's employees 2.23 1.02 
8 Negotiating with the acquired firm 2.22 0.91 
9 Understanding local environmental regulations 2.17 1.13 
10 Dealing with a different accounting systems 2.16 0.97 
11= Maintaining the confidentiality ofthe negotiation 2.09 1.10 
11= Understanding acquired firm's legal systems 2.09 1.01 
13 Increased personal pressure to conclude the deal 2.06 1.00 
14 Identifying acceptable firm 2.00 1.15 
IS Communicating with the acquired firm 1.89 0.96 
16 Assembling teams to conduct the acquisition process 1.80 0.71 
17 Overcoming language barriers 1.78 1.10 
18 Multiple motives for acquisition leading to difficulty in negotiation 1.73 0.89 
19 Understanding currency control regulations 1.56 0.83 
Note: N=65 
The mean is the average on a scale of 1 (= 'no problem ') to 5 (= 'major problem '); "=" shows the 
factors having same rank in terms of mean values. 
UK fIrms also faced moderate problems in ''understanding different management styles" 
and "understanding different cultures", According to Norburn and Schoenberg (1994) 
cross border acquisitions are susceptible to two separate forms of cultural problem. 
Firstly, there is the risk that the corporate cultures of the two partners will embody 
different ways of doing things, for example, differing power structures, control systems 
or attitudes to investment and risk. Secondly, cross border acquisitions may bring 
together two sets of employees whose national culture gives them fundamentally 
different views on what constitutes a desirable management style or appropriate 
organizational hierarchy. Thus, it is not surprising that UK fIrms faced some diffIculty 
in understanding different cultures and management styles in pursuing cross border 
acquisitions. This fmding suggests that entry into a new country is fraught with more 
problems than just dealing with national culture differences. 
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6.4.4 TARGET EVALUATION AND ACQUISITION PERFORMANCE 
The aim of this section is to investigate the relationship between acquisition 
performance and the evaluation of the target. The three factors related to measures of 
performance (the dependent variable) are used in subsequent analysis. Table 6.4 
presents the multiple regressions on factors of acquisition performance and factors of 
target fIrm evaluation. 
Table 6.4: Multipl~ regressions on acquisition performance and evaluation oftarget fIrm 
Market share & EPS & Share price Profitability 
Sales growth 
Modell Model 2 Modell Model 2 Modell Model 2 
Control variables 
Regional origin of target firm -0.130 -0.147 -0.159 -0.185 0.066 0.051 
Attitude of target firm 0.042 0.062 -0.099 -0.142 0.076 -0.002 
Acquisition experience -0.050 -0.031 -0.135 -0.156 -0.006 -0.024 
Prior profitability of target firm 0.391·· 0.184 0.223· 0.166 0.497··· 0.458·" 
Explanatory variables 
Investment and financing issues -0.219* 0.021 -0.078 
Employee and business capability 0.473·" -0.010 
Legal, tax and IT compatibility -0.249· -0.121 -0.024 
Strategic and organizational fit 0.254" 0.324" 0.308·· 
The model 
0.174 0.460 0.094 0.188 0.233 0.303 
Adjusted R2 0.117 0.380 0.031 0.067 0.180 0.200 
F value 3.046·· 5.753··· 1.500 1.559 4.400··· 2.933··· 
Notes: N = 65; Standardized beta coefficients: significant at ••• p < 0.01, •• p < 0.05, .p < 0.10; the t-test 
on each regression coefficient is two-tailed. Model 1 represents regression with control variables and 
model 2 represents regression with explanatory and control variables. 
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In the first step, regional origin of the target firm, attitude of the target firm, prior 
acquisition experience of the acquiring firm and prior profitability of the target frrm 
were entered as control variables (Modell). In the second step, the variables regarding 
the hypothesized extensions to this model were entered. The factors relating to the 
evaluation of the target firm are included as independent variables in model 2. All the 
independent variables (i.e. factors of acquisition performance) are used to produce three 
sets of regression equations. 
Table 6.4 shows that two out of the three regression equations relating to 
acquisition performance have significant F values (p < 0.01). In terms of explanatory 
power, the first regression equation (Market share & Sales growth as dependent 
variable) prevails with the largest adjusted R2 of the three regression equations. In the 
frrst regression equation, 38% of the variation in the acquisition performance (i.e. 
market share & sales growth) is explained by the independent variables. In the second 
and third regression equations, 6.7% and 20% variation is explained by the independent 
variables respectively. 
Market share and Sales growth as dependent variable 
In model 2, the regression on the acquisition performance factor of market share and 
sales growth shows a significant and positive coefficient on employee and business 
capability (p < 0.01) and, strategic and organizational fit (p < 0.05). The regression on 
market share and sales growth also shows significant and negative coefficients on 
investment and financing issues (p < O. I 0), and, legal, Tax and IT compatibility (p < 
0.10). 
The regression on market share and sales growth shows a significant and 
positive coefficient on the evaluation of employee and business capability. In other 
words, the more thoroughly an acquiring firm evaluates the target frrm's employee and 
business capability, the higher will be the performance of the acquisition. The target 
frrm's management capability has significant implications for building the business and 
to develop any synergies that may be available between the two companies (Kissin and 
Herrera, 1990). Park and Hitt (1997) emphasise the assessment of the target frrm's level 
of management expertise as a criterion for selecting the appropriate firm. Due diligence 
is a time to estimate the breadth and depth of managerial talent in the target frrm (Marks 
and Mirvis, 2001). A study of large combinations found that 65 percent of successful 
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acquirers reported managerial talent to be the single most important instrument for 
creating value in a deal (Anslinger and Copeland, 1996). 
Epstein (2005) suggested that fIrms involved in talent-based M&As must be 
confident that the acquired skills, competencies and knowledge will be applicable in 
both lines of business or that the combined talents of the firms will create synergies. By 
conducting a thorough evaluation the acquiring fIrm can ascertain whether the 
management and workforce can contribute to the success of the acquisition. If the 
acquisition intent is to increase the sales and market share, the acquiring fIrm is more 
likely to achieve that objective if they can assess the target fIrm's employee capability 
of promoting, advertising and selling existing or new products and services. Therefore, 
thorough evaluation of the target fIrm's employees is expected to increase the sales and 
market share. 
The positive and signifIcant coefficient on the strategic and organizational fit 
can be interpreted as the greater the extent of the evaluation of strategic and 
organizational fIt between the acquiring and target fIrm the better will be the 
performance of the acquisition. In order to achieve explicit goals from corporate 
acquisitions, acquirers need to consider the strategic and organizational fit between the 
acquirer and the target. The strategic fIt between the acquirer and the target is concerned 
with "how the distinctive competencies of the target could be combined with those of 
the suitor to create additional value" (Jemison and Sitkin, 1986a). Haspelagh and 
, 
Jemison (1991) identify maintaining consistency with the company's strategy as one of 
the major challenges in managing an acquisition, and a problem that has to be 
continually addressed. Hubbard (2001) explains that the acquired company has to be 
aligned with the strategic objective of the acquirer, whether that is market penetration, 
vertical expansion or market entry. 
Culture has serious implications for the integration of a cross-border acquisition, 
and the company's subsequent performance. Weber, Shenkar and Raveh (1996) stated 
that the acquired fIrm's management should pay at least as much attention to cultural fIt 
during both the pre-merger search process and during the post-merger integration 
process as it does to finance and strategic factors. Cartwright and Cooper (1993) suggest 
that the dismal success rate of M&As can be attributed to the incompatible cultures. 
Norburn and Schoenberg (1994) found that 65 per cent of those acquirers who had 
experienced serious problems with post-acquisition integration said that these 
difficulties had been due to cultural differences. Cultural fIt is therefore a vital success 
173 
factor for cross border acquisitions (Duncan and Mtar, 2006). These views support the 
study's fmdings that thorough evaluation of the strategic and organizational fit between 
the target firm and acquiring firms enhance acquisition success. 
Interestingly, the regression on market share and sales growth reveals a negative 
and significant coefficient on the investment and financing issues and legal, tax and IT 
compatibility. This suggest that the more the acquiring firms thoroughly evaluate 
investment and fmancing issues, and lega~ tax and IT issues the less this impacts on 
market share and sales growth performance. This fmding supports the view of Marks 
and Mirvis (1998) who found that during the pre-acquisition phase a successful acquirer 
puts emphasis on the strategic aspects of the acquisition whereas a typical acquirer puts 
emphasis on fmancial aspects ofthe acquisition. 
EPS and Share price as dependent variables 
In model 2, the regression on the acquisition performance factor of EPS and share price 
as the dependent variable shows a significant and positive coefficient on the strategic 
and organizational fit (p < 0.05). However, the remaining three explanatory variables 
are not significant. This can perhaps be explained by the fact that much of the target 
firm evaluation remains confidential. The acquiring firm's management usually does 
not disclose such confidential information to the public domain. Such information 
asymmetry will cause the stock price to be little affected. 
Profitability as dependent variable 
In model 2, the regression on the acquisition performance factor of profitability shows 
statistically significant and positive coefficients on employee and business capability (p 
< 0.05) and, the strategic and organizational fit (p < 0.05). In other words, the more 
thoroughly an acquiring firm evaluates the employee and business capability of the 
target firm, the higher will be the profitability i.e. acquisition performance. Similarly, 
the more thoroughly an acquiring firm evaluates the strategic and organizational fit of 
the target firm, the higher will be the profitability. 
In the case of the control variable, the regression on the factor of profitability 
has a significant positive coefficient on the profitability of the target firm at the time of 
acquisition (p <0.0 I). This suggests that prior profitability of the target firm positively 
influences the acquisition profitability performance. This fmding is consistent with 
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Bleeke et al. (1993) who posit that prior profitability of the acquired firm may affect 
cross border acquisition performance directly. 
Overall findings 
Two out of three regression models (Market share & Sales growth and, Profitability) 
shows a significant and positive coefficient on the strategic and organizational fit, and 
employee and. business capability. This gives reasonable support for hypothesis 4, 
suggesting that thorough evaluation of the target firm positively influences acquisition 
performance. 
The most important fmding from the regression analysis is that the thorough 
evaluation of the strategic and organizational fit is crucial to successful acquisition. 
Moreover, thorough evaluation of employee and business capability enhances the 
prospect of acquisition success. In general, evaluation of the target firm influences 
acquisition performance, however, the influence varies depending on the performance 
measure. 
6.4.5 ACQUISITION EXPERIENCE AND PRE-ACQUISITION PROBLEMS 
Table 6.5 indicates weak support for hypothesis 5, in that only one of the five factors 
has means scores that are significantly different, i.e. understanding national and 
corporate cultural issues. Both individual problems constituting understanding national 
and corporate cultural issues i.e. understanding different cultures and understanding 
different management styles shows means significantly higher for inexperienced 
acquiring firms compared with those of experienced firms. This means that 
inexperienced acquirer encounters more problems in understanding national and 
corporate cultural issues of the target firm. Conversely, experienced acquirers encounter 
fewer problems in understanding national and corporate cultural issues of the target 
frrm. This finding is in line with Very and Schweiger (2001) who reported that lack of 
experience to be associated with understanding different mentalities, cultures and 
management style. The authors suggested that lack of knowledge and experience affects 
not only the post-acquisition management but also the pre-acquisition management 
process. 
The mean scores for understanding negotiation issues, communication issues, 
deal structuring issues, and tax, accounting, legal and regulatory issues are not 
statistically different for experienced acquiring firm and inexperienced acquiring frrms. 
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Table 6.5: Pre-acquisition problems experienced and acquisition experience 
Factors Groups Mean SD T-value 
Factor 1: Understanding tax, accounting, legal Experienced 2.35 0.984 0.72 
and regulatory issues Not-experienced 2.04 0.819 
Understanding acquired finn's tax systems Experienced 2.75 1.500 0.82 
Not-experienced 2.28 1.075 
Understanding local environmental regulations Experienced 2.50 1.732 0.63 
Not-experienced 2.15 1.102 
Understanding acquired finn's legal systems Experienced 3.00 1.414 0.75 
Not-experienced 2.03 0.974 
Dealing with a different accounting systems Experienced 2.00 0.816 0.56 
Not-experienced 2.17 0.994 
Understanding currency control regulations Experienced 1.50 0.577 0.59 
Not-experienced 1.57 0.851 
Factor 2: Understanding national and corporate Experienced 1.75 0.500 -2.44·· 
cultural issues Not-experienced 2.40 0.767 
Understanding different cultures Experienced 1.75 0.500 -2.32·· 
Not-experienced 2.38 0.846 
Understanding different management styles Experienced 1.75 0.500 -2.48·· 
Not-experienced 2.43 0.890 
Factor 3: Understanding negotiation issues Experienced 1.91 0.833 -0.40 
Not-experienced 2.07 0.734 
Negotiating with the acquired finn Experienced 2.00 1.414 0.03 
Not-experienced 2.23 0.890 
MUltiple motives for acquisition leading to difficulty Experienced 1.50 0.577 -0.53 
in negotiation Not-experienced 1.75 0.914 
Negotiating employment contracts of acquired finn'sExperienced 2.25 0.957 0.Q3 
employees Not-experienced 2.23 1.031 
Factor 4: Understanding communication issues Experienced 1.91 0.630 -0.40 
Not-experienced 1.88 0.824 
Communicating with the acquired finn Experienced 1.50 0.577 -0.83 
Not-experienced 1.92 0.979 
Identifying acceptable finn Experienced 2.75 1.258 1.35 
Not-experienced 1.95 1.141 
Overcoming language barriers Experienced 1.50 0.577 -0.52 
Not-experienced 1.80 1.132 
Factor 5: Understanding deal structuring Issues Experienced 2.08 0.739 -0.43 
Not-experienced 2.23 0.691 
Effectively structuring a deal Experienced 2.00 0.816 -0.52 
Not-experienced 2.27 0.989 
Ensuring reliability of the information collected Experienced 2.50 1.000 -0.31 
Not-experienced 2.65 0.917 
Assembling teams to conduct the acquisition process Experienced 1.75 0.500 -0.13 
Not-experienced 1.80 0.732 
Notes: N '" 65; The mean for the factors is the mean of the factor scores; the mean for the individual problem 
experienced is the average on a scale of 1 (= 'no problem') to 5 (= 'major problem') .• p < 0.1; "p < 0.05, 
p ••• < 0.01 
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This means that experienced acquiring fIrm and inexperienced acquiring frrms face 
similar level of pre-acquisition problems. This may be explained by the fact that the 
acquisition process consists of many interdependent sub-activities, such as due diligence 
negotiation, fInancing, and integration, each of which is complex itself (Hitt et al., 
2001). Execution of each of these sub-activities typically needs to be customized to the 
specific deal under consideration (e.g., Galpin and Herndon, 2007; Haspeslagh and 
Jemison, 1991), no two deals are quite the same. As a result of these high levels of 
heterogeneity along multiple dimensions (Zollo and Singh, 2004), the acquiring fIrm is 
presented with a high level of causal ambiguity preventing effective learning. 
Moreover, the pre-acquisition assessment i.e. due diligence process takes place 
inside a team and also in relation with the headquarters whom, most of the time, decides 
whether to make an acquisition or not. However, the due diligence process needs to be 
managed under time and competitive pressures that are specifIc to each acquisition deal 
(Jemison and Sitkin, 1986a). These pressures prevent the acquirer from learning 
everything about a specific target firm before closing the deal (Very and Schweiger, 
2001). Consequently, unexpected events emerge leading to potential difficulties in the 
due diligence process and the integration process. Therefore, acquisition experience 
may not always lead to better understanding of pre-acquisition issues. 
6.5 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The purpose of this chapter was to investigate the pre-acquisition management issues in 
cross border acquisitions. The study contributes to the existing literature by examining 
the impact of evaluation of the target firm on acquisition performance which has rarely 
been attempted before. Moreover, the study investigated an under-research area of the 
pre-acquisition phase - whether greater acquisition experience leads to fewer pre-
acquisition problems. 
Initially, the study identified the factors leading to a successful acquisition deal. 
The leading set of factors is related to the due diligence and negotiation process. The 
highest ranked factors tend to suggest that UK managers perceived the success of the 
acquisition deal to be strongly influenced by effective due diligence i.e. target 
evaluation and the negotiation process. 
The study also identifIes the factors evaluated in selecting foreign firms. The 
factors evaluated thoroughly by UK frrms are the target firm's strategic and cultural 
relatedness, market position, technological and business competence, management 
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capability and cash flow generating capability. The ranking of the factors appears to 
suggest that UK fIrms do not perceive target evaluation as simply a fmancial assessment 
but a detailed investigation that tests the feasibility of the proposed acquisition. 
The extent of problems experienced by UK firms in managing the pre-
acquisition phase is also examined. Interestingly, the fIndings suggest that the severity 
of the problems experienced by the acquiring fIrm ranges from moderate to low. UK 
firms faced moderate levels of problems in collecting information about the acquired 
firm, ensuring the reliability of the information collected, understanding different 
management styles and understanding different cultures. 
The study attempted to investigate the impact on acquisition performance of 
evaluation of the target finn. The findings provided reasonable support for Hypothesis 
4, suggesting that thorough evaluation of the target firm enhances acquisition 
performance. As expected, thorough evaluation of the strategic and cultural fIt is found 
to positively influence acquisition success. Moreover, the analysis reveals that thorough 
evaluation of the target firm's employee and business capability improves the 
acquisition performance. 
The study attempted to investigate whether greater acquisition experience leads 
to fewer pre-acquisition problems experienced. The fmdings provided little support for 
Hypothesis 5. Experienced acquirers encounter fewer problems only in understanding 
national and corporate cultural issues. However, in most of the cases, experienced 
acquirers encountered similar level of pre-acquisition problems compared with those of 
inexperienced acquirers. This may be explained in two ways. Firstly, as the execution of 
acquisition activity typically needs to be customized to the specific deal under 
consideration, no two deals are quite the same. Secondly, time and competitive 
pressures often prevent the acquirer from learning everything about a specific target 
firm before closing the deal. Consequently, unexpected events emerge leading to 
potential difficulties in the due diligence process and the integration process. This can 
lead an experienced acquirer to face similar pre-acquisition problems to those of an 
inexperienced acquirer. 
This chapter has investigated the pre-acquisition management issues. The next 
chapter will investigate the determinants of top management retention in cross border 
acquisitions. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
DETERMINANTS OF EMPLOYEE RETENTION IN CBAs 
7.1 BACKGROUND 
Cross border mergers and acquisitions (M&As) are playing a progressively more 
important role in worldwide M&A activity both in terms of deal numbers and values 
(Bertrand and Zuniga, 2006). In parallel to this rise in activity, there has been increasing 
recognition of the poor performance of many cross border M&As. Problems with post-
acquisition implementation are among the primary reasons given for this disappointing 
record (Otie, 1990; Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991; Datta, 1991; Cartwright and Cooper, 
1993; Morosini, 1998; Schweiger and Goulet, 2000, Child et al., 2001; Ranft and Lord, 
2002). 
Acquisition implementation problems often anse because of clashes of 
organizational cultures, systems, or strategies and because of the loss of key executives 
in the acquired fIrm. In the academic literature, researchers have focused on the causes 
and consequences of top management team turnover in an acquired fIrm (Hambrick and 
Cannella, 1993; Krug and Hegarty, 1997). The departure of an acquired fIrm's top 
managers, and the consequent loss of their knowledge and skills, is thought to be an 
important determinant of poor post-acquisition performance (Cannella and Hambrick, 
1993). 
Much of the new research has used the theory of relative standing (Frank, 1986) 
to examine why top management turnover in acquired fIrms occurs (Ranft and Lord, 
2000). The theory of relative standings predicts that acquired managers are more likely 
to be retained after an acquisition when they are given a greater degree of autonomy and 
a greater sense of status and importance in the newly merged fIrm. Actions or symbols 
that indicate the importance of the acquisition to the acquiring fIrm, and that signal the 
commitment of the acquirer to the success of the acquisition, are likely to minimize 
departure of key managers (Hambrick & Cannella, 1993). 
The theory of relative standing primarily emphasizes the importance of non-
fmancial incentives, related to perceptions of the acquired fIrm's autonomy, status, and 
worth, for determining post-acquisition retention. However, fmancial incentives may 
substitute at least partially for many of these more intangible factors (CoiT, 1997; 
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Hambrick and Cannella, 1993). Financial incentives provide another form of indication 
of an employee's worth to an organization. The use of fmancial incentives to help 
achieve strategic and operational objectives, including specifically enhancing retention 
of valuable managers and knowledge workers, has received some attention in the 
literature (Saura-Diaz and Gomez-Mejia, 1997). In the specific context of acquisitions, 
however, there is relatively little research on the use and efficacy of financial incentives 
as a mechanism to enhance retention (Ranft and Lord, 2000). 
In order to explain the departure of top management teams, existing literature 
has used the relative standing theory (e.g. Cannella and Hambrick, 1993) or market for 
corporate control theories (Walsh and Ellwood, 1991). Relatively few studies have 
investigated the determinants of top management retention by applying both the theo~ 
of relative standing and the fmancial incentives mechanism of retention. The purpose of 
this chapter is to explore the determinants of top management retention by applying 
relative standing theory and the fmancial incentive mechanism of retention in the 
context of cross border acquisitions. Specifically the objectives are: 
1. To identify the importance of retaining employees of the acquired frrm. 
2. To assess the impact on the retention of top management team of post-
acquisition autonomy of the acquired firm, the acquirer's commitment to the 
acquired organisation, and financial incentives. 
The chapter is structured as follows:' the next section discusses the literature on 
employee retention in mergers and acquisitions. The following section develops the 
study's hypotheses. The findings and discussions are provided in section four. The last 
section includes the conclusion along with the implications of the fmdings. 
7 .2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
Cross border M&As represent a major organizational change, which generates 
employee uncertainty (Buono and Bowditch, 1989; Napier et al., 1989; Schweiger and 
DeNisi, 1991; Cartwright and Cooper, 1992a) and this uncertainty results in negative 
attitudes and behaviour amongst employees (see e.g. Buono and Bowditch, 1989; 
Bastien, 1987; Cartwright and Cooper, 1990) that will go on to affect acquisition 
performance and employee turnover (Schweiger and Goulet, 2000). 
Significant high rates of departure of acquired firms' top executives after 
acquisitions has generated considerable attention in the strategy literature (Cannella and 
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Hambrick, 1993; Hambrick and Cannella, 1993; Krug and Hegarty, 1997; Very et al., 
1997; Walsh, 1988, 1989; Walsh and Ellwood, 1991). The prior research has mostly 
used the theory of relative standing (Frank, 1986) to help understand why turnover in 
acquired top management teams occurs. The theory of relative standing highlights the 
significance of the individual's feelings of status and worth relative to that of others in a 
proximate social setting. Researchers have argued that "some acquisitions result in 
extremely low relative standing for acquired executives - they feel inferior, the acquirers 
see them as inferior and themselves as superior, autonomy is removed, status is 
removed, and a climate of acrimony prevails" (Hambrick and Cannella, 1993: 733). The 
theory of relative standing predicts that executives of the acquired firm expect to be 
retained after an acquisition when they are given a greater degree of autonomy and a 
greater sense of status and importance in the newly merged firm. Appointing acquired 
executives to the newly merged firm's management team may help provide them with a 
positive sense of their status and worth in the new organization (Ranft and Lord, 2000). 
Likewise, other actions or symbols that indicate the significance of the acquisition to the 
acquiring firm, and that signal the commitment of the acquirer to the success of the 
acquisition, are likely to minimize the departure of key managers (Hambrick and 
Cannella, 1993). 
In addition to the work by Hambrick and Cannella (1993), Walsh (1988, 1989) 
and Walsh and Ellwood (1991) also investigated top management turnover following 
acquisitions. These studies attempted to determine the underlying reasons for turnover 
but found that neither the relatedness of the acquisitions (Walsh, 1988), the degree of 
hostility of negotiating the acquisition deal (Walsh, 1989), nor market for corporate 
control theories (Walsh and Ellwood, 1991) were able to explain high turnover rates. 
Consequently, the theory of relative standing appears to offer the best explanation for 
top management turnover in acquired firms (Ranft and Lord, 2000). 
The degree of autonomy given to the acquired firm increases the relative 
decision-making latitude of acquired managers and employees. Rather than being 
dominated or subjugated by the acquirer, greater autonomy provides incentives for 
employees to stay with the firm because they are able to maintain greater control over 
their environment (Hambrick and Cannella, 1993; Huselid, 1995; Very et al., 1997). 
Cannella and Hambrick (1993) found that removal of autonomy from individuals during 
the first two years after the acquisition was associated with executive departure. 
Moreover, those acquired executives who were given status were less likely to leave. 
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The negative impact of autonomy removal was also confirmed in a European study by 
Very et a1. (1997) who found that removal of autonomy from individuals accustomed to 
high levels of autonomy caused performance to deteriorate. 
Relatively greater post-acquisition status of the acquired firm's human assets 
may also increase their tendency to stay with the newly merged firm (Coif, 1997). 
Status may be indicated by the acquired firm's role in the management of the newly 
merged fIrm after the acquisition is completed (Hambrick and Cannella, 1993). 
Managers and other employees from the acquired firm may be allowed to manage not 
only their own operations, but they also may be promoted to assume greater 
responsibilities through being appointed to higher level general management or 
functional responsibilities within the new, overall combined organization. Many 
acquirers strip the acquired fIrm's managers and employees of their key responsibilities, 
effectively demoting them and reducing their status, and instead appoint their own 
executives to manage the acquired fIrm's operations (Hambrick and Cannella, 1993; 
Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991). 
Evidence of the acquirer's commitment to the success of the acquisition is likely 
to increase feelings of relative standing among the acquired firm's managers and 
employees. This commitment may be expressed through positive internal and external 
media emphasizing the importance of the skills and capabilities of the acquired firm to 
the newly combined organization. Such positive publicity may increase acquired 
employees' feelings of worth within the new organization. Other types of evidence of 
the acquirer's commitment might include mechanisms such as increased resources for 
training and professional development for acquired managers and employees. Highly 
skilled employees are likely to value opportunities for continued learning, training, and 
other forms ofpersonal development in order to increase their expertise and skills (Coff, 
1997; Huselid, 1995; Pfeffer, 1994; Raelin, 1991). Investment in such opportunities by 
the acquiring firm demonstrates their commitment to the success of the acquisition. 
Consistent with the predictions of the theory of relative standing, these positive 
expressions of commitment are likely to increase the propensity of the acquired fIrm's 
employees to remain after the acquisition deal is completed. 
The primary focus of theory of relative standing is on importance of non-
fmancial incentives for determining post-acquisition employee retention. Non-fmancial 
incentives include perceptions of the acquired firm's autonomy, status, and worth. 
However, financial incentives may substitute at least partially for many of these more 
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intangible factors (Coff, 1997; Hambrick and Cannella, 1993). Financial incentives 
offer another form of signal of an employee's worth to an organization. The utilization 
of fmancial incentives to assist in achieving strategic and operational objective has 
received some consideration in the literature (Saura-Diaz and Gomez-Mejia, 1997). For 
instance, in high-technology industries, the use of financial incentives to retain highly 
skilled workers is sometimes considered as a key component of employee retention 
strategies (Balkin and Gomez-Mejia, 1990). 
In the specific context of acquisitions, however, there is relatively little research 
on the use and efficacy of fmancial incentives as a mechanism to enhance retention. 
One such study by Ghosh and Ruland (1998) found that ownership sharing was a 
legitimate incentive to retain acquired top managers. They found that managers of an 
acquired firm are more likely to remain in the combined fum when they receive shares 
in the new firm as payment for their ownership interest in the acquired firm. In fact, the 
fmdings indicate that jobs were not retained, following payment with stock, in only 10 
percent of the acquisitions. However, their study also indicates that acquiring managers, 
who value continued control of the acquiring company, prefer to pay cash to avoid 
diluting their existing holding. With regards to providing incentives, Schweiger and 
Goulet (2000) suggested that a conscious effort to integrate acquired management into 
the combined firm must be made by the acquirer and that the sharing of ownership 
control appears to be an incentive structure that aids in this process, by reducing 
acquired management turnover. 
Some practitioner-oriented literature supports the use of short- and long-term 
incentives to "help keep valuable executives on board during the transition period and 
signal key executives that they have important roles to play in the organization going 
forward" (Ferracone, 1987: 61). Financial incentives used to retain employees in 
acquisitions can take several forms: (1) "stay put" bonuses, generally a large bonus 
payable after the expiration of a certain period of time; (2) long-term contracts with 
bonuses payable over a given period of time; (3) stock options that can be exercised 
over some period of time or after a future date; and (4) increased base salary andlor 
benefits (Ranft and Lord, 2000). 
To retain valuable human capital, firms may need to share the wealth they help 
generate through some form of rent sharing, such as through various types of financial 
incentives. Sharing the profits generated by knowledge workers' valuable expertise and 
skills promotes retention by raising their compensation to a higher level relative to the 
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general labour market, as well as by increasing their perceived status in the fIrm (Coff, 
1997; Hambrick and Cannella, 1993). Economic rewards linked to key employees' 
continued employment within the newly merged firm therefore are likely to enhance the 
prospects that these employees will remain after the acquisition is completed. 
7.3 HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
Employee retention - post acquisition autonomy and commitment 
Prior research has identifted autonomy removal as a characteristic of relative standing 
(Frank, 1986). This is a condition which contributes to the executives of the acquired 
firm feeling inferior relative to the acquiring firm executives, or the executives of the 
acquiring fIrm viewing them as superior. The implication of this research is that 
maintaining the relative standing ofthe executives of the acquired fIrm will enhance the 
retention of the acquired fIrm's executives (Schweiger and Goulet, 2000). Appointing 
executives from the acquired fIrm to the newly merged fIrm's management team may 
help provide them with a positive sense of worth in the new organization (Ranft and 
Lord, 2000). Likewise, other steps that indicate the importance of the acquisition to the 
acquiring firm, and that signal the commitment of the acquirer to the success of the 
acquisition, are likely to minimize the departure of managers (Hambrick and Cannella, 
1993). 
The degree of autonomy given to the acquired fIrm increases the relative 
decision-making latitude of acquired managers and employees. Rather than being 
subjugated by the acquirer, greater autonomy provides incentives for employees of the 
acquired firm to stay with the firm because they are able to maintain greater control 
over their surroundings (Hambrick and Cannella, 1993; Huselid, 1995; Very et al., 
1997). This is especially likely to be the case in acquisitions aimed at acquiring new 
skills and capabilities, because highly skilled professionals tend to desire or require 
relatively high levels of autonomy (Jelinek and Schoonhoven, 1995; Raelin, 1991). 
Evidence of the acquiring fIrm's commitment to the success of the acquisition is 
likely to increase feelings of importance among the acquired firm's managers and 
employees. Such commitment may be articulated through positive internal and external 
media emphasizing the importance of the skills and capabilities of the acquired fIrm to 
the newly combined fIrm (Ranft and Lord, 2000). This positive publicity may increase 
acquired employees' feelings of worth within the new fIrm. Other kinds of indication of 
the acquiring firm's commitment might include mechanisms such as greater resoUrces 
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for training and professional development for the acquired firm's managers and 
employees. Highly skilled employees are likely to value opportunities for continued 
learning, training, and other forms of personal development in order to further increase 
their expertise and skills (Corr, 1997; Huselid, 1995; Pfeffer, 1994). Investment in such 
opportunities by the acquiring frrm demonstrates its commitment to the success of the 
acquisition. In line with the predictions of the theory of relative standing, these positive 
indications of commitment are likely to increase the likelihood of the acquired frrms' 
employees remaining after the acquisition. 
The preceding discussion suggests positive relationships between post 
acquisition autonomy and top management retention, and commitment and top 
management retention. This leads to the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 6: Post-acquisition autonomy is positively associated with top management 
retention of the acquired firm. 
Hypothesis 7: The acquiring firm's post-acquisition commitment to the acquired firm is 
positively associated with top management retention of the acquired 
firm. 
Employee Retention - Financial Incentives 
Financial incentives may provide another form of indication of an employee's worth to 
a firm The use of fmancial incentives to help achieve strategic and operational 
objectives, including enhancing retention of valuable managers, has been noted in the 
literature (Saura-Diaz and Gomez-Mejia, 1997). In the specific context of acquisitions, 
however, there is relatively little research on the use and efficacy of fInancial incentives 
as a mechanism to enhance retention (Ranft and Lord, 2000). Some practitioner-
oriented research supports the use of short-term and long-term incentives to assist in 
keeping valuable managers during the integration stage and to indicate to the executives 
that they have important roles to play in the merged firm (Ferracone, 1987). 
To retain valuable human capital, firms may need to share the wealth they help 
generate through some form of rent sharing, such as through various types of fmancial 
incentives. Economic rewards attached to employees' continued employment within the 
newly merged frrm are therefore likely to enhance the probability of employees 
remaining after the acquisition is realized. Such logic suggests the following hypothesis: 
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Hypothesis 8: The use of financial incentives is positively associated with top 
management retention of the acquiredfirm. 
7.4 FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 
7.4.1 RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF KEY EMPLOYEES 
The relative importance of key employees of the acquired firms, based on the mean 
measure of importance, is presented in Table 7.1. The median measure is exceeded by 
four key employees of which middle management, top management, marketing, sales 
and distribution, research and development, constitute the fIrst four with the highest 
degree of importance. It appears that UK managers perceived the success of acquisition 
integration to be signifIcantly influenced not only by the retention of top management 
but also by the retention of middle management, marketing, sales and R&D employees. 
Table 7.1: Relative importance of key employees to be retained 
Rank Key employees Mean SD 
Middle management 4.05 1.174 
2 Top management 3.80 1.535 
3 
Marketing, sales and 
3.55 1.234 
distribution 
4 Research and development 3.17 1.420 
5 Manufacturing and operations 2.97 1.272 
6 Finance, legal and other staff 2.38 1.091 
Note: N = 65; The mean is the average on a scale of 1 (= not important) 
to 5 (= very important) 
While most prior research has focused on retention of the top management team 
following an acquisition (Hambrick and Cannella, 1993; Walsh, 1989; Walsh and 
Ellwood, 1991), this study provides evidence suggesting the importance of retaining 
human capital other than top management. The findings in Table 7.1 indicate that the 
acquired fIrm's top managers are not always the most critical portion of the acquired 
fIrm's human capital. Given the focus of prior acquisitions research on top management 
teams, the fmdings also give a different perspective in that respondents cited middle 
186 
managers in the acquired flrm as being more important than top managers. Moreover, 
the importance of retaining acquired marketing, sales and distribution employees were 
not significantly different from the importance ofretaining acquired top managers (p >0 
.233). 
Retention of the top management team may nonetheless be important in some 
cases because their retention may provide some stability and continuity for the acquired 
organization through a transition period, even though other employees possess the 
actual expertise and skills that are of interest to the acquirer. The reasons for keeping 
top managers therefore are likely to involve symbolism to some degree and not just to 
retain their executive experience and skills. Retaining top managers may be necessary 
or helpful for a period of time, perhaps long enough to provide a smooth transition and 
to gain the loyalty of middle managers, marketing and R&D employees. 
7.4.2 THE DETERMINANTS OF TOP MANAGEMENT RETENTION 
The survey data were screened to check for outliers, out-of-range values, missing data, 
and assumptions of normality and homoscedasticity by examining univariate statistics 
and scatterplots of the residuals (Tabachnick and FideU, 1996). Descriptive statistics 
and correlations for each of the variables used in the analyses are presented in Table 7.2. 
Table 7.2: Descriptive Statistics and Pearson's correlations 
Variables Mean S.D. 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Autonomy 1.89 0.71 
Acquirer 
3.87 0.91 0.16 
commitment 
Financial Incentive 
2.23 1.04 0.18 0.41" (time) 
Financial Incentive 
3.08 1.24 0.20 0.13 0.21 (performance) 
Acquisition 011 
-0.12 -0.26* -0.22* 0.08 
relatedness variable 
Relative size 0.60 0.44 0.31** 0.10 0.12 0.12 0.07 
Attitude of acquired 
1.33 0.74 -0.17 0.01 -0.03 -0.10 -0.13 -0.09 
firm 
Top management 
3.55 1.37 0.41" 0.04 0.06 0.16 0.03 -0.05 -0.08 
retention 
Note: N = 46; S.D. = Standard deviation; .*p < 0.01, .p < 0.05, ••• p < 0.10; Two tailed test 
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As mentioned in the methodology section, the dependent variable, top management 
retention, consists of 46 observations. As the number of observations exceeds 30, the 
use of multiple regressions was considered appropriate. Thus, the analysis was run 
using a sub-sample of 46 acquisitions in order to investigate Hypotheses 6, 7 and 8. 
Condition indices and variance inflation factors were analyzed for the model to 
assess any potential problems with multicollinearity (Tabachnik and Fidell, 1996). 
Multicollinearity is not a problem as the variance inflation factor scores (VIFs: 1.23-
1.71) are well within the cutoff of 10 recommended by Neter, Wasserman, and Kutner 
(1985). Moreover, the Durbin-Watson test statistic for autocorrelation of the residuals 
indicates no existence of autocorrelation (Durbin-Watson statistic = 2.033). The 
regression models are presented in Table 7.3. 
Table 7.3: Regression results: Determinants of top management retention 
Variables Modell Model 2 
Control variables 
Relative size 
-0.027 -0.259" 
Acquisition relatedness 0.111 0.103 
Attitude of acquired firm 
-0.093 -0.134 
Explanatory variables 
Autonomy 0.586··· 
Acquirer commitment 0.202· 
Financial incentive (time) -0.085 
Financial incentive (performance) -0.022 
Model 
0.040 0.359 
Adjusted R2 0.034 0.268 
F-statistics 0.370 3.926··· 
Note: N = 46; Standardized beta coefficients: significant at ••• p < 0.01, 
"p < 0.05, .p < 0.10; the t-test on each regression coefficient is two-
tailed. Model 1 represents regression with control variables and model 2 
represents regression with explanatory and control variables. 
Table 7.3 shows the results for two regression models: Model 1 contains only the 
control variables; Model 2 contains the control variables and the explanatory variables. 
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For Model 2, the regression equation has a significant F value (p < .01). In terms of 
explanatory power, about 36% of the variation in top management retention is explained 
by the independent variables. The explanatory variables autonomy (~= 0.586,p < 0.01) 
and acquirer commitment (~ = 0.202, p < 0.10) are positive and significant predictors of 
top management retention during post acquisition integration, providing support for 
Hypotheses 6 and 7. The coefficients of the fmancial incentive variables are not 
significant, Hypothesis 8, therefore, is not supported. In addition, the control variable 
for relative size is negative and significantly related to top management retention (~ = -
0.259, p < 0.05). The ~ther control variables, acquisition relatedness and profitability of 
the acquired firm, are not significant predictors of top management retention. 
The results provide support for the positive influence of continued autonomy of 
the acquired organization on retention of the top management team. Past research 
indicates that granting autonomy to an acquired firm's managers increases their feelings 
of relative standing in the firm and, therefore, minimizes their tendency to leave. 
Consistent with the theory of relative standing and Hambrick and Cannella's (1993) 
fmdings for top executives, the data suggest that the 'preservation' (Haspeslagh and 
Jemison, 1991: 147) mode of acquisition implementation (i.e. acquisitions requiring a 
high level of organizational autonomy and a low need for strategic interdependence) 
may be sometimes appropriate for acquisitions aiming to acquire knowledge-based 
resources in order to prevent the loss of key resources through personnel turnover. 
Some researchers (e.g. Ashkenas, DeMonaco and Francis, 1998) have 
recommended relatively rapid and complete integration of acquisitions in order to 
increase the chances of acquisition success. For some types of acquisitions, 
implementation strategies based on quick integration may be appropriate. However, the 
positive significant finding for autonomy in this sample of cross border acquisitions 
suggests that a more cautious consideration of such recommendations. Critical aspects 
of acquisition implementation strategies, such as levels of autonomy, should be 
informed more by the specific motivations and resources of the particular acquisition 
situation rather than by some general prescription for all acquisitions. 
The acquirer's corporate commitment to the acquisition was also found to have a 
positive influence on the retention of top management team. Indications of commitment 
to the success of the acquisition integration (e.g. support for training and travel, and 
positive public relations on the part of the acquirer) appear to enhance acquired 
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employees' comfort within, and commitment to, the newly combined organization. The 
fmding is consistent with Ranft and Lord (2000) who found a significant positive 
association between acquirer's commitment towards the acquisition and employee 
retention. 
Surprisingly, this study fmds that financial incentives do not significantly 
influence top management retention. Neither fmancial incentive based on time spent 
with the firm following acquisition, nor financial incentives based on post-acquisition 
performance criteria, are effective determinants of top management retention in this 
sample of cross border acquisitions. The less economically related and more socially 
oriented issues associated with autonomy and commitments are found to be more 
important determinants of top management team retention than are fmancial incentives. 
This finding appears to support the contention of Ranft and Lord (2000: 315) who 
argued that 'the broader social logic behind the theory of relative standing therefore 
appears to be a better predictor of employee retention than a theory simply based on 
direct, personal economic interests. ' 
Relative size (measured as the ratio of the sales turnover of the acquired firm to 
that of the acquiring firm) has a negative and significant relationship with the retention 
of top management team. This tends to suggest that acquiring a relatively smaller firm 
can lead to a higher level oftop management retention, and acquiring a relatively larger 
firm can lead to a lower level of top management retention. A large acquiring firm is 
likely to have a supply of skilled managers on hand to replace the management of a 
smaller acquired firm. Also, the management in the smaller acquired firm may be less 
skilful and inexperienced in managing larger firms. As a result, the possibility of 
retaining the top management team of the smaller acquired firm is low. As the size 
difference between the acquired and acquiring frrm reduces the possibility of replacing 
top management in the acquired frrm also diminishes. 
7.5 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This study contributes to the existing literature by assessing the determinants of top 
management team retention in cross border acquisitions in terms of the impact of 
autonomy given to the acquired firm, the acquirer's commitment to the acquired firm 
and fmancial incentives provided to employees. This has been attempted by very few 
prior studies. A particular distinguishing feature of this study is that it investigates the 
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determinants of top management retention in cross border acquisitions by applying both 
the theory of relative standing and the financial incentive mechanism of retention. 
The study identified the employees that acquirers wished to retain during the 
acquisition integration phase. The acquirers considered that the most important 
employees to retain were middle management followed by top management, marketing 
employees and R&D employees. This fmding indicates that the acquired firm's top 
managers are not always the most critical portion of the acquired firm's human capital. 
Given the focus on top management teams in prior research on acquisitions, the fmdings 
of this study provide a new perspective. Middle managers and others with key skills in 
the acquired firms may be as important to retain as the top managers. 
Three potential determinants of top management retention were examined: the 
autonomy granted to the acquired firm; corporate commitment to the acquisition; and 
fmancial incentives for employees. 
The regression results provide support for the positive influence of continued 
autonomy of the acquired fum on the retention of top management. Consistent with 
prior research, the fmding indicates that granting autonomy to an acquired firm's 
managers is likely to increase their feelings of relative standing in the firm and, 
therefore, reduces the probability of them leaving. 
The acquirer's corporate commitment to the acquisition was also found to have a 
positive influence on the retention of the top management. Evidence of commitment on 
the part of the acquirer appears to enhance the acquired employees' comfort with, and 
commitment to, the newly combined firms. The significant finding for commitment is 
consistent with the theory of relative standing. 
Surprisingly, this study found no significant influence of fmancial incentives on 
top management retention. Neither fmancial incentives based on time nor fmancial 
incentives based on post-acquisition performance criteria, were effective determinants 
of top management retention. The more socially oriented factors related to autonomy 
and commitment were found to be more important determinants of top management 
retention than the more economically related fmancial incentives. 
This chapter has investigated the determinants of top management retention. The 
next chapter will examine the impact of post-acquisition management issues on cross 
border acquisition performance. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
POST-ACQUISITION MANAGEMENT AND THE PERFORMANCE 
OF CROSS BORDER ACQUISITIONS 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
Over the past two decades, cross border mergers and acquisitions (M&As) have become 
an increasingly common mode of international expansion for companies seeking global 
reach (Teerikangas and Very, 2006). M&As provide access to competencies and a local 
intelligence base without carrying the burden of starting up a subsidiary from scratch. 
Despite their apparent popularity, over half of these ventures end up reporting failure 
(Cartwright and Cooper, 1993; Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991). This failure has been 
t'raced back to an inadequate strategic rationale for the deal, a lack of pre-acquisition 
evaluation and poor post-acquisition implementation management (e.g. Cartwright and 
Cooper, 1992b). 
This study attempts to enrich the existing literature on the post-acquisition 
management process and acquisition performance by applying a multiple theoretical 
approach - using the resource-based view, process-based view, and human capital 
theory. The study investigates the impact of the post-acquisition management process 
on cross border acquisition performance. Specifically, the objective of this study is to 
investigate the impact of degree of integration, organizational cultural difference, 
transfer of knowledge and top management retention on cross border acquisition 
performance. 
The extent to which an acquired company should be integrated into an acquiring 
fIrm has significant implications for acquisition performance. Child et al. (2001) argued 
that the degree of integration achieved following a cross border acquisition is crucial 
because an inappropriate level of integration might be detrimental to acquisition 
performance. However, prior empirical work on this issue is scant and has not yielded 
defmitive results. Datta and Grant (1990), for example, did not find statistically 
significant results for their sample of related acquisitions. In contrast, Shanley (1994) 
found some support for the positive relationship between acquisition performance and 
the level of integration. The ambiguous research fmdings relating to the impact of 
integration on acquisition performance call for further research. 
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Cultural differences have been blamed for the high failure rate in both domestic 
and cross border deals (Buono and Bowditch, 1989; Cartwright and Cooper, 1992a, 
1993; Chatterjee et al., 1992; Datta, 1991; Morosini, 1998; Weber, et al., 1996). Prior 
research has generally focused on national cultural differences as determinants of 
acquisition performance. However, instead of proving the commonly expected and 
suggested negative impact of cultural differences on the performance of M&A, pior 
research has produced contradictory fmdings (Teerikangas and Very, 2006). The issue 
of organizational culture difference has received considerably less attention in cross 
border acquisition research - the existing research is limited, fragmented and conflicting 
(Buono and Bowditch, 1989; Sales and Mirvis, 1984; Datta, 1991), consequently, 
pointing to the need for more research in this area. 
The resource based view suggests that knowledge transfer is particularly critical 
for multinational companies and cross-border inter-firm alliances (Gupta and 
Govindarajan, 2000; Kogut and Zander, 1993; Ranft and Lord, 2000; Subramanian and 
Venkatraman, 2001). This research stream assumes that value creation by multinational 
companies is determined by their ability to transfer tacit knowledge about best practices 
and foreign markets across borders (e.g., Buckley and Carter, 1999). However, only 
limited empirical evidence exists about the link between international knowledge 
transfer and performance. In most knowledge based research, attention is directed 
towards factors that enhance or impede knowledge transfer, without subsequently 
examining the link to fum performance (see, for example, Ranft and Lord, 2000). As a 
result, further research is required on the relationship between knowledge transfer and 
acquisition performance. 
The rest of the chapter is set out as follows. The next section reviews the 
literature on post-acquisition management issues and performance and develops the 
hypotheses of the study. Section three presents the research methods employed in the 
study. In section four, the research findings and discussion are presented. Conclusions 
are provided in the fmal section. 
8.2 LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
The literature has emphasized four aspects of the post-acquisition management process 
that have an impact on cross border acquisition performance: degree of integration, 
organizational cultural differences, transfer of knowledge and employee retention. Each 
of these issues is considered in the following subsections. 
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8.2.1 DEGREE OF INTEGRATION 
The need for post-acquisition integration is primarily bounded by the strategic 
objectives of the acquisition (Datta, 1991). An acquisition might fonn part ofa strategy 
of related diversification and therefore be expected to provide synergistic benefits. Such 
benefits could be in the form of economies of scale and operating efficiencies requiring 
high levels of integration, as might be feasible in related acquisitions (Porter, 1985; 
Salter and Weinhold, 1979). Conversely, an acquisition could be of an unrelated 
business, primarily motivated to improve the price-earning-ratio, or sales growth, and 
involving little or no integration or sharing of resources (Shrivastava, 1986). 
The overall degree of integration achieved following an acquisition is an issue of 
great interest. This is because an inappropriate level of integration may be detrimental to 
perfonnance (Child et at, 2001). Thus a tendency to over or under integrate, for 
example, as a result of cultural factors hindering integration or pressuring moves 
towards it, may result in sub-optimal solutions. Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991: 146) 
have proposed a set of "metaphors" to classify acquisitions into four types depending on 
whether the need for .organisational autonomy and the need for strategic 
interdependence are high or low: (i) absorption - acquisitions that have a high need for 
strategic interdependence, and a low need for organizational autonomy; (ii) preservation 
- acquisitions that present a low need for strategic interdependence, but a high need for 
organizational autonomy; (iii) symbiosis - acquisitions characterized by high need for 
interdependence and high need for organizational autonomy; (iv) holding - acquisitions 
where the firm has no intention of integrating and creating value though anything except 
fmancial transfers, risk sharing, or general management capability, the only integration 
would be a holding activity. 
Marks and Mirvis (1998) also take a multi-dimensional view of integration 
ranging from full consolidation to near separation of the companies. They see this range 
as including such forms as separate holding company, strategic contro~ managed 
subsidiary, operational control, merged and consolidated. The order is presented in 
increasing levels ofconsolidation of the acquiring and acquired firms. Marks and Mirvis 
also view integration from the perspective of the degree of change made in either the 
buyer, the target or in both firms. Similar to Haspeslagh and Jemison, they identify five 
approaches i.e. absorption, preservation, best of both, transformation and reverse 
merger. 
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There appears to be a continuum in the potential degree of acquisition 
integration. Child, Faulkner and Pitkethly (2001) examined cross border acquisitions 
with varying degrees of integration. They suggested that the degree of integration 
ranges from acquisitions with little integration (1-2 on their scale, corresponding to 
Haspeslagh and Jemison's Preservation and Holding) to those where the integration is 
almost total (6-7 on their scale, corresponding to Haspeslagh and Jemison's 
Absorption). Symbiotic acquisitions can be arranged at intermediate points on the scale 
corresponding to partial integration where some but not all functions and departments of 
the acquired firm are integrated with the acquiring firm. 
Prior empirical work on the impact of the level of integration on performance 
has not yielded definitive results. Datta and Grant (1990) did not fmd statistically 
significant results for either their overall sample or their sub sample of related 
acquisitions, although their sample of unrelated acquisitions did seem to benefit from 
lower levels of integration. In contrast, Shanley (1994) found some evidence that 
positive performance was related to the level of integration. In a recent study in the 
banking industry, Zollo and Shing (2004) found that the level of integration extensively 
influences the acquisition performance. They argued that the benefits from cost 
efficiencies gained through higher levels of integration might be greater than the costs 
inherent to the integration process (e.g., routine and competence disruptions, increased 
process complexity, and hidden implementation costs). Following Shanley (1994) and 
Zollo and Singh (2004) the following hypothesis is proposed: 
H9: The greater the degree of integration of the acquiredfirm within the acquiringfirm. 
the better the acquisition performance i.e. there will be a positive association 
between the degree of integration and cross border acquisition performance. 
8.2.2 ORGANISATIONAL CULTURAL DIFFERENCES 
In the early 1980s, the concept of culture was introduced into the M&A literature. 
Whilst some studies have highlighted the human and cultural consequences of 
differences in organizational cultures (Marks, 1982; Sales and Mirvis, 1984), others 
have focused on the importance of cultural fit (Cartwright and Cooper, 1992a, 1993; 
Chatterjee et at, 1992; Larsson and Finkelstein, 1999). A' considerable number of 
studies have sought to understand how the organizational aspects of an acquisition 
influence the performance (e.g. Chatterjee et at, 1992; Cartwright and Cooper, 1996). 
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Collectively, these streams of literature emphasize the importance of cultural 
compatibility as a central component of organizational fit and acquisition performance. 
Empirical studies of organizational cultural compatibility reveal that differences 
in the philosophies, values and behaviours of the top management teams can lead to 
uncertainty and insecurity amongst acquired firm managers (Buono and Bowditch, 
1989) which may develop into feelings of anxiety, frustration and resentment 
(Cartwright and Cooper, 1996). These negative feelings in tum can result in 
miscommunication and conflict (Sales and Mirvis, 1984), reduced commitment towards 
cooperation (Weber et al., 1996) and lower job performance (Buono and Bowditch, 
. 1989). This line ofresearch is best summarised by Chatterjee et aI's (1992) finding ofa 
strong negative relationship between the extent of organisational cultural differences 
and acquirer shareholder gains. 
In parallel to the academic research, there has been growing recognition amongst 
practitioners of the importance of organisational issues as a key performance 
determinant of acquisitions (Hopkins, 1999). The practitioners argue that acquiring 
across borders can bring clashes of different management styles and operating 
approaches. The survey data of Angwin and Savill (1997) confirms the practitioner 
concern with management style compatibility. Management style has been posited as a 
central element of a firm's overall culture, simultaneously reflecting the influence of 
both organisational culture (Sales and Mirvis, 1984; Sathe, 1985) and national culture 
(Hofstede, 1983). Against this background, Schoenberg (2004) empirically investigated 
the impact of management style differences on the performance of cross border 
acquisitions. Schoenberg found that the differences between the acquiring organisation 
and the acquired organisation in their attitudes towards risk are negatively correlated to 
the performance of the cross border acquisition. 
Overall, the empirical studies suggest that differences in organizational culture 
between the acquiring and acquired firm can lead to inferior acquisition performance 
(Schoenberg, 2000). This line of reasoning leads to the second hypothesis. 
HI 0: The greater the organizational cultural difference between the acquired and 
acquiringfirm the lower the acquisition performance i.e. there will be a negative 
association between organizational cultural difference and cross border 
acquisition performance. 
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8.2.3 TRANSFER OF KNOWLEDGE 
Much research on knowledge transfer within and between organizations has been 
conducted in an international context (Gupta and Govindarajan, 2000; Kogut and 
Zander, 1993; Ranft and Lord, 2000; Subramanian and Venkatraman, 2001). This. 
research suggests that knowledge transfer is particularly critical for multinational 
companies and cross-border inter-ftrm alliances. For example, Kogut and Zander (1993) 
argue that, compared to markets, organizations are better able to transfer tacit 
knowledge across borders. 
Taking a knowledge-based view of the multinational company, this research 
stream assumes that value creation by multinational companies is determined by their 
ability to transfer tacit knowledge about best practices and foreign markets across 
borders (e.g., Buckley and Carter, 1999). However, only limited empirical evidence 
exists about the role of international knowledge transfer and performance. Like most 
knowledge based research, attention is directed towards factors that enhance or impede 
knowledge transfer, without subsequently examining the link to ftrm performance. For 
example, Ranft and Lord (2000) ftnd that differences in organizational structures 
influence the extent of internal transfer about new international markets among 
divisions. 
The transfer of tacit knowledge, such as know-how and practical knowledge is 
strategically important because it is closely linked with the production tasks and is more 
difficult to transfer and replicate by competitors (Grant, 1996a; Kogut and Zander, 
1992). Accordingly, the knowledge-based view of the ftrm predicts that transfer of tacit 
knowledge is positively associated with ftrm performance. Likewise, multinational 
companies develop sustainable competitive advantages through coordination and 
cooperation efforts that facilitate transfer and integration of tacit knowledge, such as 
expertise and capabilities, across borders (Barlett and Ghoshal, 1991; Buckley and 
Casson, 1976; Hymer, 1976; Kogut and Zander, 1993). 
Hymer (1976) explains that it is the ownership of superior knowledge that 
represents the primary advantage that multinational companies bring to foreign markets. 
Moreover, a key reason for acquisition strategies is the access of new knowledge. When 
expanding into foreign markets, ftrms are more likely to choose acquisition, rather than 
Greenfteld operations, as the mode of entry if there is little overlap between existing 
corporate know-how (Hennart and Park, 1993). At least a part of this newly acquired 
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knowledge is likely to be relevant to the global network of the multinational company 
(Gupta and Govindarajan, 2000). This makes it essential that firms are able to transfer 
knowledge - for example, expertise in local market knowledge and technical or 
production know-how - that resides in acquired firms to other parts of the firm (e.g., 
Ranft and Lord, 2000). Thus, within this network, apart from knowledge transfer to the 
acquired firm, knowledge transfer from the newly acquired firm to the head office and 
other subsidiaries is critical to acquisition success. This study, therefore, proposes the 
following hypothesis: 
Hll: The greater the level of knowledge transfer between the acquired and the 
acquiring firms the greater the acquisition performance i.e. there is a positive 
relationship between knowledge transfer and cross border acquisition 
performance. 
8.2.4 TOP MANAGEMENT RETENTION 
A growing number of studies (Cannella and Hambrick, 1993; Hambrick and Cannella, 
1993; Krug and Hegarty, 1997; Walsh, 1988) have shown that M&As result in 
increased levels of executive turnover among acquired companies, compared with 
matched non-acquired organizations, over common time periods. Walsh (1988) found 
that a quarter of senior executives left in the first year post acquisition. Furthermore, 
after 5 years only 40% of senior executives still remained in the acquired organizations. 
UK research examining turnover among 100 large acquisitions found that only 
43% of CEOs remained in post two years after the acquisition (Angwin, 1996). 
Buchholtz et al. (2003) tracked the rate of senior executive turnover among 161 
uncontested acquisitions over a four-year period. Their fmdings were consistent with 
previous studies in that 75% of executives had left by the end of three years. However, 
executive turnover continued into the fourth year, when a further 25% left the acquired 
organization. Krug (2002) conducted a longitudinal analysis of post-acquisition 
turnover by comparing senior management turnover rates. The study showed that the 
acquired and non-acquired organizations were well matched in that executive turnover 
rates were not significantly different in the five years prior to acquisition. Consistent 
with previous research, average turnover rates among incumbent executives was 
significantly higher in acquired than non-acquired organizations and was highest in the 
first and second years post acquisition. 
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Several theories have been advanced to explain the post-acquisition departure of 
semor executives. The market discipline perspective (Walsh and Ellwood, 1991) 
suggests that poor performers are the most likely to leave, and acquirers make their 
initial retention decisions on the basis of the pre acquisition performance of the target 
company. Ifacquirers consider that they already have an abundance of managerial talent 
within their own organization who understand 'the logic' (Napier, 1989) of the 
acquisition, then target company executives are likely to be perceived as being surplus 
to requirements, a response that has been described as 'acquirer arrogance' (Jemison 
and Sitkin, 1986), which can lead to the loss of the most talented. 
Bergh (2001) studied the association between target company executive 
retention and the probability of target fIrm divesture. Performance was measured as 
return on assets for the acquiring fIrm during the years the target fIrm was retained. He 
found that target fIrms with the highest probability of eventual divesture were the ones 
where the fewest senior executives were retained. Moreover, targets that retained 
executives with the longest organizational tenures were the least likely to be divested. 
These fIndings indicate that retaining executives with the longest organizational tenure 
decreases a target fIrm'S probability of divesture. 
Cannella and Hambrick (1993) suggested that executives from acquired fIrms 
are an intrinsic component ofthe acquired fIrmS' resource base, and that their retention 
therefore is an important determinant of post-acquisition performance. In other words, if 
executives of acquired fIrmS are part of the valuable resources obtained in the 
acquisition (Pitts, 1976; Walsh and Ellwood, 1991), then the success of the acquisition 
may hinge on the retention oftheir knowledge and skills. In genera~ employee retention 
of the target fIrm positively influences acquisition performance. This contention leads to 
the following hypothesis. 
H12: The greater the extent of top management retention of the acquired firm the 
greater the acquisition performance i.e. there will be a positive association 
between top management retention and acquisition performance. 
The conceptual framework is illustrated in Figure 8.1. The study conjectures that 
acquisition performance is determined by the degree of integration, organizational 
cultural differences, transfers of skills to and from the target frrm, and top management 
retention of the target fIrm. 
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I The Post-Acquisition Management Process 
1 1 1 1 
Integration Organizational Knowledge Top Management 
Level Culture Transfer Retention 
~ HlO- Hll+ 7 Acquisition performance 
> Market share & sales growth 
> EPS and Share price 
> Profitability 
Figure 8.1: The impact of the post-acquisition management process on the performance of 
cross border acquisitions - A conceptual framework 
8.3 FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 
8.3.1FINDINGS 
The survey data were screened to check for outliers, out-of-range values, missing data, 
and assumptions of normality and homoscedasticity by examining univariate statistics 
and scatterplots of the residuals (Tabachnick and Fidell, 1996). Table 8.1 shows the 
descriptive statistics and correlations for each ofthe variables used in the analyses. 
Table 8.2 presents the multiple regressions on the three measures of acquisition 
performance. For each dependent variable, Modell includes only the control variables, 
while Model 2 includes the control variables and the explanatory variables. The 
presentation ofthe findings focuses on Model 2 for each of the dependent variables. 
In terms of explanatory power, the regression equation with EPS & Share price 
as the dependent variable prevails with the largest adjusted R2. In this regression 
equation, 29.8 percent of the variation in the acquisition performance (i.e., EPS & Share 
price) is explained by the explanatory variables. This compares with 29.1 percent of the 
variation of Market share & Sales growth explained by the independent variables, and 
about 23.4 percent of the variation in Profitability. 
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Table 8.1: Descriptive Statistics and Pearson's Correlations 
Variables Mean S.D. 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Profitability of the 3.25 1.16 
acquired firm 
Acquisition Oil 0.00 -0.12 
relatedness variable 
Acquiring firm's 4.03 0.95 0.33" 0.09 
experience 
Level of integration 2.91 0.69 0.39* -0.13 -0.11 
Organizational 2.67 0.81 -0.31* 0.02 -0.09 -0.05 
cultural difference 
Knowledge transfer - 3.41 1.32 0.17 0.20 0.06 0.08 0.17 Functional area 
Knowledge transfer - 3.21 1.11 0.21 0.34· 0.11 0.43* 0.13 0.18 General management 
Top management 3.55 1.37 0.21 0.39· 0.31 0.34* -0.17 0.11 0.19 
retention 
Market share & Sales 3.46 1.17 0.32* 0.13 0.21 0.15 -0.17 0.38* 0.29* 0.22 growth 
EPS & Share Price 2.52 1.66 0.36* 0.04 0.16 0.11 -0.05 0.42* 0.37* 0.21 0.39* 
Profitability 3.97 1.14 0.16 0.13 0.17 0.05 -0.33* 0.18 0.02 0.12 0.32* 0.12 1 
N - 46; S.D. - Standard Deviation; *.p < 0.05, *p < 0.10; Two tailed test 
The regression on Market share and Sales growth shows a significant and positive 
coefficient on the level of integration (p < 0.05), knowledge transfer - functional area (p 
< 0.01), knowledge transfer - general management (p < 0.05), and top management 
retention (p < 0.10). The regression on EPS and Share price shows a significant and 
positive coefficient on knowledge transfer - functional area (p < 0.01) and knowledge 
transfer - general management (p < 0.05). The regression on Profitability reveals a 
significant and negative coefficient on organizational cultural difference (p < 0.05) and a 
significant and positive coefficient on level of integration (p < 0.05). 
In the case of the control variables, the regressions on Market share and Sales 
growth, and EPS & Share price, show positive and significant coefficients on acquisition 
relatedness (p < 0.05). The other variables entered as controls in the model - relative 
profitability of the acquired firm and acquiring firm's acquisition experience - do not 
significantly influence performance. This further suggests that the variables considered 
in the theoretical discussion are meaningful and relevant to the explanation of acquisition 
performance. 
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Table 8.2: Regression on post-acquisition management issues & acquisition performance 
Market share & 
Sales growth 
EPS & Share price Profitability 
Modell Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Modell Model 2 
Control variables 
Profitability of the acquired firm 0.372" 0.140 0.109 0.043 0.126 0.137 
Acquisition relatedness 0.140 0.261" 0.648" 0.281·· -0.178 0.129 
Acquisition experience 0.050 0.007 -0.134 0.161 -0.005 0.138 
Explanatory variables 
Level of integration 0.263·· 0.147 0.261·· 
Organizational cultural difference 
-0.110 -0.117 -0.316·· 
Knowledge transfer - Functional area 0.331·" 0.423··· 0.071 
Knowledge transfer - General management 0.266·· 0.246·· 0.145 
Top management retention 0.243· 0.094 -0.105 
The model 
R2 0.152 0.398 0.164 0.383 0.245 0.326 
Adjusted R2 0.110 0.291 0.122 0.298 0.207 0.234 
F value 3.198·· 4.145··· 3.018" 4.251··· 3.074··· 3.132··· 
Notes: N = 46; Standardized beta coefficients: significant at ••• p < 0.01, •• p < 0.05, .p < 0.10; the t-test on each 
regression coefficient is two-tailed Model 1 represents regression with control variables and model 2 represents 
regression with explanatory and control variables. 
8.3.2 DISCUSSION 
Two out of the three regression models (i.e., Market share and Sales growth, and 
Profitability) reveal a significant and positive coefficient on the level of integration. 
This gives reasonable support for hypothesis 9, suggesting that the higher the level of 
integration of the target firm into the acquiring firm the better will be the performance 
with respect to market share and sales growth, and profitability. This fmding is 
consistent with Shanley (1994) who found some evidence of the positive relationship 
between the acquisition performance and the level of integration. The fmding also 
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supports the view of Zollo and Shing (2004) who argued that the benefits from cost 
efficiencies gained through higher levels of integration might be greater than the costs 
inherent to the integration process (e.g., routine and competence disruptions, increased 
process complexity, and hidden implementation costs). The results of prior attempts to 
relate the level of integration to performance are somewhat equivocal, however, the 
fmdings of this study suggest that for the performance measures of Market share and 
Sales growth and Profitability, the degree of integration positively influences the 
acquisition performance. 
Only one out of three regression models (i.e., Profitability) shows a significant 
and negative coefficient on the organizational cultural difference. This provides limited 
support for Hypothesis 10, but suggests that the greater the organizational cultural 
difference between the acquired firm and acquiring firm the lower will be the 
acquisition performance. This line of reasoning is in line with the study of Chatterjee et 
al. (1992) and Datta (1991) who found a negative relationship between the 
organizational cultural difference and acquisition performance. 
Weber and Schweiger (1992) identified the consequences of management 
cultural clash in acquisitions as: (1) stress, distrust, and annoyance on the part of the 
target team in working with the acquirer team; (2) negative attitudes on the part of the 
target team toward the acquirer; and (3) negative attitudes toward cooperating with the 
top executives. This crucial cultural difference between merging firms causes negative 
fmancial performance by the acquiring firms after the deals (Chatterjee et al., 1992), and 
may indicate the source of the high rate of acquisition failures (Cartwirght and Cooper, 
1993). Thus, the differences in organizational culture may exert an enduring influence 
on subsequent acquisition performance, as is observed in this study. 
Two out of the three regressions on the measures of performance (i.e., Market 
share and Sales growth, and EPS & Share price), show a significant and positive 
coefficient on both types of knowledge transfers (i.e., functional area and general 
management area). This provides relatively strong support for Hypothesis 11, 
suggesting that the greater the transfer of knowledge to and from the acquired firm the 
higher will be the acquisition performance. This fmding supports the study of Capron 
(1999) who found that resource redeployment (e.g. knowledge transfer) has a positive 
impact on acquisition performance. 
In the context of international acquisitions, knowledge transfer is particularly 
important because the newly combined firm is likely to have a distinct knowledge pool 
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that can provide it with the opportunity to explore new knowledge. Zollo and Winter 
(2002) argue that a firm's dynamic capabilities develop from a co-evolution of the 
accumulation of tacit experience processes with explicit knowledge articulation and 
codification activities. The existing literature revealed little if any research explicitly 
directed at the relationship between knowledge transfer and cross border acquisition 
performance. Most relevant is the process school which is concerned with the creation 
of value through post acquisition integration (Shrivastava, 1986; Haspeslagh and 
Jemison, 1991), for example, Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) discussed the issue of 
knowledge transfer focusing on how it may lead to overall value creation. This study 
provides additional support for the resource-based-view that transfer of knowledge has 
significant positive influences on cross border acquisition performance. 
Only one out of three regression models (i.e., Market share and Sales growth) 
shows a significant and positive coefficient on top management retention. This provides 
limited support for Hypothesis 12, but suggests that the greater level of top management 
retention leads to superior acquisition performance. This fmding is consistent with 
Cannella and Hambrick (1993) who suggested that executives from acquired firms are 
an intrinsic component of the acquired firms' resource base, and that their retention 
therefore is an important determinant of post-acquisition performance. 
Overall, there is a reasonable support for hypotheses 9 and 11, and limited 
support for hypotheses 10 and 12. One of the strongest fmdings of this study is the 
significant positive impact of knowledge transfer on cross border acquisition 
performance. This fmding confirms assumptions made by several acquisition 
researchers, and provides significant support for the knowledge-based view. Another 
noteworthy fmding is the significant positive impact of level of integration on cross 
border acquisition performance. The data analysis suggests that the process-view of 
acquisitions (Jemison and Sitkin, 1986b; Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991; Pablo, 1994; 
Pablo et aI., 1996), which emphasizes the role of the integration phase, is relevant in 
understanding the performance ofthe entire cross border acquisition process. 
8.4 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has investigated the impact of post-acquisition management processes on 
the performance of cross border acquisitions. One of the key contributions of this study 
is the use of multiple theoretical approaches (e.g., process-based view, knowledge-based 
view, and human capital theory) in understanding the relationship between post-
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acquisition management process and acquisition performance. This study attempts to 
bridge and integrate different theoretical approaches to the highly visible phenomenon 
of corporate acquisitions. This study helps to signal the advantages of leveraging 
different theoretical perspectives in offering managers a more clearly defined and useful 
account of the conditions under which acquisition activities can create value. From the 
view point of academic researchers, the findings highlight the importance of taking a 
broad perspective in studying cross border acquisition performance. 
A crucial insight, supported by the data, is that a considerable portion of cross 
border acquisition success can be explained by the ability to transfer knowledge 
between the acquired and acquiring firms. The knowledge-based view has received 
much conceptual and empirical attention, with important emphasis on core 
competencies (Prahalad and Hame~ 1990), tacit knowledge (Nonaka, 1994), and 
numerous types of knowhow and specific forms of expertise (e.g., Gupta and 
Govindarajan, 2000) to attain sustained competitive advantages, and long-term 
profitability. However, the current understanding of whether knowledge transfer or 
knowledge integration leads to success is limited (Eisenhardt and Santos, 2002). Thus, a 
primary contribution of this study is the examination of the impact of knowledge 
transfer on cross border acquisition performance. The fmdings of this study provide 
support for the knowledge-based view of cross border acquisitions. 
Moreover, the data analysis suggests that the process-view of acquisitions 
(Jemison and Sitkin, 1986; Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991; Pablo, 1994; Pablo et aI., 
1996) is relevant in understanding the performance of the cross border acquisition 
process. Although prior research fmdings regarding the impact of the level of 
integration on performance are equivoca~ the fmding suggests that the benefits from 
cost efficiencies gained through higher levels of integration might be greater than the 
costs inherent to the integration process (e.g., routine and competence disruptions, 
increased process complexity, and hidden implementation costs). Thus, in this setting, 
the negative consequences typically attributed to post-acquisition integration processes 
within the human resources management and organizational behaviour literature do not 
systematically occur (Marks and Mirvis, 1985; Mirvis, 1985; Schweiger et aI., 1987; 
Buono and Bowditch, 1989; Astrachan, 1990). 
This chapter has provided the fmdings related to the impact of post-acquisition 
management and performance. The next chapter will provide the conclusion of the 
study. 
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9.1 INTRODUCTION 
CHAPTER NINE 
CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter presents the conclusions of the research. The chapter starts with a summary 
of the research findings. The following section presents the academic and practical 
contributions arising from the research in light of the acquisition research, knowledge 
based research and international business strategy literatures. The limitations of this 
research as well as recommendations for future research are presented in the fmal 
section. 
9.2 SUMMARY OF RESEARCH FINDINGS 
The aim of this study was to investigate the management of cross border acquisitions 
and performance. Table 9.1 shows the hypotheses tested in this study along with the 
corresponding level of support for each hypothesis. The data analysis revealed a number 
of fmdings which are summarized below. 
9.2.1 MOTIVES FOR CROSS BORDER ACQUISITIONS 
Cross border acquisitions are seen primarily as a means to enable presence in new 
markets, to enable faster entry to the market, to facilitate international expansion, and to 
gain new capabilities. In terms ofunderlying theoretical explanations, the main strategic 
motives are underpinned by the theories of strategic positioning and the resource based 
view (RBV) of the firm. The first three ranked motives are concerned with improving 
the fIrm's competitive position through the use of acquisition that may be characterized 
as most importantly allowing the UK fIrms to enter new foreign markets at speed and/or 
consolidating existing market positions. 
The leading set of motives also lends support to the RBV of acquisition as the 
respondents recognized that the acquisition occurs because the acquirer lacks the 
necessary capabilities or assets required to remain competitive in the foreign market. 
Where one fIrm wishes to acquire a capability that it does not have but is possessed by a 
target fIrm then an acquisition may facilitate obtaining this capability. 
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Table 9.1: A summary of research hypotheses and support for each hypothesis 
Research area Hypothesis 
Motives for HI: The relative importance of strategic motives for cross border acquisitions will vary with the regional origin of the 
cross border target firm 
acquisitions 
H2: The relative importance of strategic motives for cross border acquisitions will vary with the industry of the target 
firm. 
H3: The relative importance of the strategic motivates for cross border acquisitions will vary according to the pre-
acquisition performance of the target firm. 
Pre-acquisition H4: The more thorough the evaluation of the target firm the better the acquisition performance i.e. there will be a positive 
management on association between target evaluation and acquisition performance. 
acquisition H5: An experienced acquirer will encounter fewer pre-acquisition problems than an inexperienced acquirer 
performance 
Statistical Hypothesis 
analysis support 
t-test No support 
t-test Some 
sUEE°rt 
t-test Limited 
support 
Regression Reasonable 
support 
l-test Weak 
support 
Determinants 
oftop 
management 
retention 
H6: Post-acquisition autonomy is positively associated with top management retention of the acquired firm. Regression Strong 
Post-
acquisition 
management on 
acquisition 
performance 
support 
H7: The acquiring firm's post-acquisition commitment to the acquired firm is positively associated with top management Regression Strong 
retention of the acquired firm. support 
H8: The use of financial incentives is positively associated with top management retention of the acquired firm. Regression No support 
H9: The greater the degree of integration of the acquired firm within the acquiring firm, the better the acquisition 
performance i.e. there will be a positive association between the degree of integration and cross border acquisition 
performance. 
HIO: The greater the organizational cultural difference between the acquired and acquiring firm the lower the acquisition 
performance i.e. there will be a negative association between organizational cultural difference and cross border 
acquisition performance. 
Regression 
Regression 
HIl: The greater the level of knowledge transfer between the acquired and the acquiring firms the greater the acquisition Regression 
performance i.e. there is a positive relationship between knowledge transfer and cross border acquisition 
performance. 
H12: The greater the extent of top management retention of the acquired firm the greater the acquisition performance i.e. Regression 
there will be a positive association between top management retention and acquisition performance. 
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Reasonable 
support 
Limited 
support 
Relatively 
strong 
support 
Limited 
support 
The study did not find support for hypothesis 1, indicating that the relative 
importance of the strategic motives do not vary significantly between the regional origin 
of the target f]fm. The fmdings indicate that the relative importance of the strategic 
motives vary to a moderate extent with the sector of acquisition activity, providing 
some support for hypothesis 2. There is limited support for hypothesis 3, in that there is 
little variation in the relative importance of the strategic motives with pre-acquisition 
performance of the target f]fm. However, in the key motive oftarget improvement there 
is a significant difference in means with a significantly higher mean for not profitable 
acquisitions. In general, there is little variation in the relative importance of the 
motivating factors across the characteristics of the sample. Where there is variation, 
while this is sometimes readily explicable, it is not always obvious. 
9.2.2 PRE-ACQUISITION MANAGEMENT ISSUES AND PERFORMANCE 
Prior research on the pre-acquisition phase has noted that strategic, financial, and 
technical aspects override human and organisational aspects in the due diligence phase 
(Greenwood et al., 1994; Marks, 1999). Indeed, the focus in the due diligence phase 
generally centres around carrying out the lega~ fmancial, and technical due diligence 
analysis (Hayes, 1979; Napier, 1989; Madura et al., 1991; Kissin and Herrera, 1990) in 
addition to the negotiation process itself (O'Connor, 1985). Extant M&A research has 
argued for the importance of studying organisational fit in parallel with the traditional 
fmancial evaluation (Datta, 1991, Forstmann, 1998). The findings of the present study 
lend support to the importance of evaluating the target frrm's strategic and cultural 
relatedness along with its fmancial health. 
The study identifies the factors evaluated in selecting foreign frrms. The factors 
evaluated thoroughly by UK f]fms are the target f]fm's strategic and cultural 
relatedness, market position, technological and business competence, management 
capability and cash flow generating capability. The ranking of the factors appears to 
suggest that UK f]fms do not perceive target evaluation as simply a fmancial assessment 
but a detailed investigation that tests the feasibility of the proposed acquisition. 
The extent of problems experienced by UK frrms in managing the pre-
acquisition phase is also identified. Interestingly, the fmdings suggest that the severity 
of the problems experienced by the acquiring f]fm ranges from moderate to low. UK 
f]fms faced moderate levels of problems in collecting information about the acquired 
f]fm, ensuring the reliability of the information collected, understanding different 
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management styles and understanding different cultures. 
This study investigated the impact of target fIrm evaluation on acquisition 
performance. The fmdings provided reasonable support for Hypothesis 4, suggesting 
that thorough evaluation of the target fIrm enhances acquisition performance. Thorough 
evaluati?n of the strategic and cultural fit is found to have a positive influence on 
acquisition success. Moreover, the analysis reveals that thorough evaluation of the 
target fIrm's employee and business capability improves the acquisition performance. 
The fmdings provide weak support for hypothesis 5, suggesting that both 
experienced acquiring fIrms and inexperienced acquiring fIrms face similar levels of 
pre-acquisition problems. With the exception of understanding national and corporate 
cultural issues, both experienced acquiring fIrms and inexperienced acquiring fIrms face 
similar problems in understanding negotiation issues, communication issues, deal 
structuring issues, and tax, accounting, legal and regulatory issues. This may be 
explained in two ways. First, high levels of heterogeneity along multiple dimensions 
(e.g. due diligence, negotiation, financing, etc.) prevents effective learning. Secondly, 
time and competitive pressure prevent the acquirer from learning everything about a 
specific target fIrm before closing the deal. Therefore, acquisition experience may not 
always lead to better understanding of pre-acquisition issues. 
9.2.3 DETERMINANTS OF TOP MANAGEMENT RETENTION 
The study identifIed the key employees that acquirers wished to retain during the 
acquisition integration phase. The acquirers considered that the most important 
employees to retain were middle management followed by top management, marketing 
employees and R&D employees. This fmding indicates that the acquired fIrm's top 
managers are not always the most critical portion of the acquired fIrm'S human capital. 
Given the focus on top management teams in prior research on acquisitions, the findings 
of this study provide a new perspective. Middle managers and others with key skills in 
the acquired firms may be as important to retain as the top managers. 
The fIndings provide strong support for hypothesis 6, suggesting a positive 
influence of continued autonomy of the acquired fIrm on top management retention. 
Consistent with prior research, the findings indicate that granting autonomy to an 
acquired firm's top managers increases their feelings of relative standing in the firm 
and, therefore, reduces the probability of them leaving. 
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The acquirer's corporate commitment to the acquisition was also found to have a 
positive influence on top management retention providing support for hypothesis 7. 
Evidence of commitment on the part of the acquirer appears to enhance the acquired 
employees' comfort with, and commitment to, the newly combined firms. 
Surprisingly, this study found no support for hypothesis 8, indicating no 
significant influence of fmancial incentives on top management retention. Neither 
fmancial incentives based on time nor financial incentives based on post-acquisition 
performance criteria, were effective determinants of top management retention. The 
more socially oriented factors related to autonomy and commitment were found to be 
more important determinants of top management retention than the more economically 
related fmancial incentives. 
9.2.4 POST ACQUISITION MANAGEMENT ISSUES AND PERFORMANCE 
The study investigated the impact of the post-acquisition management processes on the 
performance of cross border acquisitions. The fmdings suggest that the process view of 
acquisitions is relevant in understanding the post-acquisition management process, thus, 
providing reasonable support for hypothesis 9. Although prior research has been 
inconclusive, the findings of this study suggest that the benefit gained through higher 
levels of integration might be greater than the costs inherent to the integration process. 
Another fmding is that organizational culture differences negatively influence 
cross border acquisition performance. The prior research suggests that a performance 
impact between differences in organizational cultures varies from negative to positive. 
The results of this study provide (although limited) support for hypothesis 10, indicating 
a negative relationship between organizational cultural differences and cross border 
acquisition performance. 
The fmdings also indicate that the success of cross border acquisitions largely 
depends on the ability to transfer knowledge. For the two alternative measures of 
acquisition performance identified in the study (i.e. market share and sales growth, and 
EPS and share price), transfer of knowledge (both in functional areas and the general 
management area) is a strong determinant of cross border acquisition performance. This 
provides relatively strong support for hypothesis 11, suggesting that the greater the 
transfer of knowledge to and from the acquired firm the higher will be the acquisition 
performance. 
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The study also finds (although limited) support for H12, suggesting that a higher 
level of top management retention can lead to better acquisition perfonnance. This is 
not surprising given the popularity of employee retention in many acquisition 
implementation plans. 
9.3 ACADEMIC AND PRACTICAL CONTRIBUTIONS 
In this section, the contributions arising from this study are presented in light of the 
acquisition research and international business strategy literature. The analysis of this 
study has given rise to a number of specific contributions to the cross border 
acquisitions and international business strategy literatures. These pertain to individual 
topics within the developed integrative framework. 
9.3.1 ACADEMIC CONTRIBUTION 
Prior research has largely focused on post-acquisition issues (e.g. Jemison and Sitkin 
1986b; Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991). The role of pre-acquisition issues in the success 
of the implementation phase has not been the subject of extensive research (see e.g. 
Schweiger and Goulet, 2000) and calls have been made for more research into its effect 
on the acquisition process (Greenwood et aI., 1994; Schweiger and Goulet, 2000). The 
process perspective on acquisitions (Jemison and Sitkin, 1986b; Haspeslagh and 
Jemison, 1991) introduced the need to consider the importance of pre-acquisition issues 
in acquisition process and success. Recently, Quah and Young (2005) studied the pre-
acquisition phase from the perspectives of the likely employee reactions, the planning of 
post-deal changes, actions to be taken, and cultural factors to watch out for. 
In this context, the study's fmdings contribute to research on cross border 
acquisition management by extending the work of Jemison and Sitkin (1986b), 
Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991), and Quah and Young (2005), especially as regards to 
the pre-acquisition issues such as the evaluation of the target firm. In doing so, the 
study'S fmdings refocus the debate from post-acquisition integration issues towards pre-
acquisition issues. The study has examined the impact of evaluation of the target firm 
on acquisition perfonnance which has rarely been attempted in previous research. 
Another major contribution of this thesis is that it provides an empirical 
examination of the effect of knowledge transfer on the success of cross border 
acquisitions. Only recently have strategy researchers viewed finns as integrative 
mechanisms to foster knowledge transfer and integration (Grant, 1996b; Kogut and 
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Zander, 1992). The knowledge-based view has received much conceptual and empirical 
attention, with important emphasis on core competencies (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990), 
tacit knowledge (Nonaka, 1994), and numerous types of knowhow and specific forms of 
expertise (e.g., Gupta and Govindarajan, 2000) to attain sustained competitive 
advantages, and long-term profitability. However, the current understanding of whether 
knowledge transfer or knowledge integration leads to success is limited (Eisenhardt and 
Santos, 2002). Thus, a primary contribution of this study is the examination of the 
impact of knowledge transfer on cross border acquisition performance. The findings of 
this study provide support for the knowledge-based view of cross border acquisitions. 
Another key contribution of this study is the use of multiple theoretical 
approaches in understanding the relationship between post-acquisition management 
process and acquisition performance. The performance of cross border acquisitions has 
been examined using the lenses of the resource-based view, process-based view, and 
human capital theory simultaneously. This study attempts to bridge and integrate 
different theoretical approaches to the highly visible phenomenon of corporate 
acquisitions. From the view point of academic researchers, the fmdings highlight the 
importance of taking a broad perspective in studying cross border acquisition 
performance. 
The study contributes to our understanding of the role of the foreign context of 
cross border acquisitions. Researchers have proposed and found support for a negative 
relationship between organizational cultural differences and acquisition performance. 
Commonly, these researchers emphasize that cultural differences increase the chance of 
culture clashes during acquisition integration, complicating the acquisition 
implementation process and success. This study provides support (although limited) in 
favour of this argument, suggesting an inverse relationship between organizational 
cultural differences and acquisition performance. 
This study contributes to the existing literature by assessing the determinants of 
top management team retention in cross border acquisitions in terms of the impact of 
autonomy given to the acquired firm, the acquirer's commitment to the acquired fum 
and fmancial incentives provided to employees. This has been attempted by very few 
prior studies. A particular distinguishing feature of this study is that it investigates the 
determinants of top management retention in cross border acquisitions by applying both 
the theory of relative standing and the financial incentive mechanism of retention. 
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The study contributes to the research on acquisition motives by providing 
support to the theories of strategic positioning and the resource based view (RBV) of 
the firm. The highest ranked motives identified in this study are concerned with 
improving the firm's competitive position through the use of acquisitions. The leading 
set of motives also lends support to the RBV of acquisition, particularly when it is 
recognized that the acquisition is formed because the acquirer lacks the necessary 
capabilities or assets required to remain competitive in the foreign market. 
The study also contributes to the research by providing a description ofthe types 
of cross border acquisitions undertaken by the UK firms during the current takeover 
boom, the process undertaken in their management and the outcomes achieved. A 
number of distinctive sample characteristics were revealed along with some distinctive 
acquisition management processes. 
9.3.2 PRACTICAL CONTRIBUTIONS 
In this section attention is given to the practical contributions of the research findings. 
The practical relevance needs to be set in the current economic context in which cross 
border acquisitions remain a recurring and central phenomenon in the corporate world. 
In this context, this study provides important avenues for improving managers' 
appreciation of the challenges and management of cross border acquisitions. To this 
end, the main managerial implications stemming from this thesis are the following: 
The research fmdings relating to the pre-acquisition management issues suggest 
a number of managerial implications. Firstly, thorough evaluation of the strategic and 
organizational fit between the target firm and acquiring firm enhances the prospects of 
acquisition success. Thorough evaluation of the target firm's employee and business 
capability also contributes to the desired acquisition outcome. Secondly, management 
should pay greater attention to the strategic and organizational compatibility in the pre-
acquisition phase. Finally, acquiring a profitable flfIll positively influences the 
acquisition performance. 
From the perspective of management practice, this study provides managers 
with an indication of where to focus their efforts and expend resources in order to retain 
valuable human capital during cross border acquisition integration. The relatively direct 
approach of using fmancial incentives to encourage retention does not appear to be 
particularly effective. In contrast, other less tangible and more social factors may prove 
to be more signifIcant determinants of top management retention. Rather than solely 
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focusing on compensation issues, managers of the acquiring fIrms should pay increased 
attention to issues related to autonomy and commitment during acquisition integration. 
The fmdings related to the post-acquisition management issues indicate a 
number of managerial implications. Perhaps the most critical insight of importance to 
managers is the fmding that knowledge transfer can facilitate the achievement of 
acquisition performance. This study has found the transfer of knowledge to be a strong 
determinant of cross border acquisition performance. Another implication is that a 
higher level of integration can have a positive influence on cross border acquisition 
performance. Therefore, choosing an appropriate level of integration is crucial for the 
acquisition success. 
9.4 LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH 
As with any research, this study has limitations. To begin with, an inherent weakness 
and limitation to the study is the fact that the sample fIrms are all UK acquiring fIrms. It 
may be argued that this limits the generalisation of the study's findings. The limitation 
of studying only UK acquiring firms can be countered by the fact that the acquiring 
fIrms came from different industries and that the acquired fIrms represented a variety of 
different country backgrounds. Thus, selecting acquiring fIrms from one country was a 
purPoseful way of dealing with the otherwise high variability in the studied firms' 
backgrounds. It should be further recognised that the sample selection was also guided 
by pragmatic reasoning based on the time and cost constraints facing the researcher. 
A second limitation concerns the fact that the study employed a self-
administered structured questionnaire completed by one respondent from each acquiring 
company. The standard caveats associated with research fmdings based on this method 
of collecting data, for instance the problem of common method bias, should be 
recognised. 
Another limitation of this study is the potential for retrospective bias, since the 
. questionnaire asked managers to recall events that occurred in the past. To address and 
minimize this concern only fairly recent acquisition were selected for examination, and 
efforts were made to identify the individual in the acquiring fIrm that was involved with 
the acquisition decision and implementation process. A comparison of acquisitions 
made in 2004 to acquisitions made in 2002 served as an indication that the influence of 
this bias was a very minor threat to the validity of the data. 
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A fourth limitation is the cross-sectional research design that was used to 
examine the longitudinal process of cross border acquisition implementation. A 
longitudinal design would increase the ability of future research to better examine post 
acquisition management and the implementation process. Also a longitudinal design 
would better address the causal relationships that were proposed in the research model. 
Unfortunately, a longitudinal design requires repeated measurement over a number of 
years, which was beyond the scope of this study. 
A further limitation of the study is related with the sample size. The fmal sample 
size (n = 65) limits the possibility of more integrative analysis across the different M&A 
stages. For instance, multi-variate analysis between the different acquisition stages 
could have investigated questions, such as, what types of pre- and post-acquisition 
processes are important/related to the successful achievement of different motives? 
Does the relationship between post-acquisition integration and performance vary 
according to the motive and therefore value creation logic of the acquisition? Is the 
relationship between employee retention and performance moderated by the degree of 
integration adopted? 
9.5 DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
Based on the findings and analysis of this study, the following areas are recommended 
as directions for future research. 
The fmdings of this study may provide a useful basis for future empirical 
investigation into the factors that contribute to acquisition performance. Further 
research is needed to generalize the research fmdings regarding the linkage between 
evaluation of the target firm and acquisition performance. Further research could extend 
this study by investigating the negative impact of evaluation of investment and 
fmancing issues on acquisition performance. Finally, future research could investigate 
whether factors evaluated relating to the target firm vary according to the motives of the 
international acquisitions. 
The fmdings of the present study offer a useful basis for future empirical 
investigation of top management retention in cross border acquisitions. The findings 
relating to autonomy highlight a persistent dilemma when high levels of autonomy are 
granted to an acquired firm. With a high level of autonomy and consequently a low 
level of integration of the acquired and acquiring firms, it may be difficult for the 
resources and capabilities of the two firms to be transferred successfully, shared, and 
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combined. Assuming that in many acquisition cases there are synergies to be realized 
through integration, the need to maintain a large degree of post-acquisition autonomy 
for the acquired fIrm (in order to retain employees) creates a serious challenge. How 
this tension can be managed successfully is a question for future research . 
. The impact of fInancial incentives on employee retention is worthy of further 
consideration in future research, especially given the apparent popularity of such 
incentives in many acquisition implementation plans. At least for some groups of 
employees, broader issues related to their relative standing ultimately may prove to be 
more important than fmancial incentives in determining whether they decide to remain 
with the acquired fIrm. A detailed comparison of the effects of economic incentives and 
social standing on post-acquisition employee retention would be a fruitful avenue for 
future research. 
The fIndings of the study provide limited support for the view that a high level 
of employee retention can lead to better acquisition performance. The fIndings also 
provide limited support for the view that organizational cultural differences can 
negatively influence cross border acquisition perforInance (Datta 1991; Chatterjee et aI., 
1992). In order to provide more conclusive fmdings, both of these areas of post-
acquisition management should be examined in future research. 
The study finds that knowledge transfer and the level of integration significantly 
affect the prospect of superior acquisition performance. These fmdings can act as a 
guide to future research directed toward increasing understanding of the antecedents of 
cross border acquisition performance. Further studies are necessary in order to test the 
hypotheses in different contexts and to achieve a more fme-grained appreciation of the 
conditions under which greater or lower levels of integration improves acquisition 
performance. It would be useful for future research to identify the impediments 
associated with different levels of integration and their impact on acquisition 
performance. Future research could also provide additional geographical settings in 
which to examine cross border acquisitions, in order to validate and to extend the 
knowledge based view and process based view of the firm. 
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Dear SirlMadam, 
APPENDIX A 
COVER LETTER 
We are investigating the management of international acquisitions, and would like to request 
your assistance with our research. We have identified your firm as one that made acquisitions 
abroad in the 2000 to 2004 period. The purpose of the survey is to gain a deeper understanding 
of the factors that relate to the management of international acquisitions. The study will explore 
pre-acquisition management issues, post-acquisition integration issues, and post-acquisition 
performance. Specifically, we are interested in your experiences as the "acquirer firm" of a 
foreign firm. 
We would greatly appreciate your participation in this research. Please fmd enclosed a 
questionnaire that we would like you to complete. If you are unable to complete this 
questionnaire we would be grateful if you would ask someone in your organization who is 
knowledgeable about the acquisition to do so. In appreciation of your participation, we will send 
you a summary of the research findings when the study is completed. We hope that our findings 
will be valuable to you and your firm. 
We assure complete confidentiality. Your name and your company's name will never be placed 
on the questionnaire, and your responses will only be accessible to the project director. 
Completing the questionnaire will take only a small amount of your time and you will make a 
valuable contribution to our research study. We would be pleased to answer any questions you 
might have regarding this study. Please call Mohammad Faisal Ahammad on 0114 2223444 or 
email at:M.F.Ahammad@shef.ac.uk 
We look forward to receiving your completed questionnaire. Thank you in advance for your 
assistance. 
Yours sincerely, 
Keith W. G1aister 
Dean - Management School 
Professor ofIntemational Strategic management 
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Mohammad Faisal Ahammad 
Doctoral Candidate 
Management School 
A. BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
APPENDIXB 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
A1. Position of the respondent (Job Title): ......................................................................... . 
A2. What was the nationality of the foreign acquired company? Nationality: .......................... . 
A3. When was the acquisition completed? Month: ....................... Year: ......................... . 
A4. Please give the number of acquisitions made by your company In the five years prior to this 
acquisition: 
a) In the same country as the acquisition In question 
b) In the UK 
c) In other European countries (excluding the UK) 
d) In North America (USA and Canada) 
e) In Asia Pacific (including Australia and New Zealand) 
f) Others 
AS. Please provide the following Information for both your company and the acquired firm at the 
time of the acquisition. If your company Is a division/subsidiary of a larger organisation you should 
provide the information for your particular division/subsidiary, not for the larger parent organisation. If 
giving an approximate estimate please indicate with an "E". 
Your company Acquired firm 
at the time of acquisition at the time of acquisition 
a) Annual sales (£ million) 
b) Total assets (£ million) 
c) Number of employees 
d) Major industry sector 
e) Number of years in operation 
B. THE ACQUISITION 
81. What was the ownership structure of the two companies prior to the acquisition? Please tick 
one box in each column. 
Publicly quoted company 
Division/Subsidiary of publicly quoted company 
Private, Owner-managed company 
Private company, not Owner-managed 
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Your 
company 
[ 
[ 
] 
Acquired 
company 
] 
B2. Please Indicate the attitude of the acquired finn's board towards the acquisition, at the time of 
the purchase negotiations. Please circle the appropriate number on the scale below. 
No Resistance 
To Being Acquired 
(Willing seller) 
1 2 
Some Resistance 
To Being Acquired 
3 4 
Major Resistance 
To Being Acquired 
(Unwilling Seller) 
5 
B3. Were any other companies actively Interested In purchasing the acquired finn at the time of 
your bid? Please tick. 
No 
Yes 
B4. Please Indicate the profitability (return on capital employed) of the acquired finn at the time of 
acquisition relative to Its malor competitors. Please circle. 
Very poor f22!: Average ~ Very good 
1 2 3 4 5 
C. MOTIVES FOR INTERNATIONAL ACQUISITION 
1. How Important were the following strategiC motives for the international acquisition? 
Please circle your answer. 
No Very 
Importance Important 
a. To enable faster entry to market 1 2 3 4 5 
b. To facilitate international expansion 1 2 3 4 5 
c. To enable presence in new markets 2 3 4 5 
d. Enable the overcoming of restrictions 1 2 3 4 5 
e. Increase market share 1 2 3 4 5 
f. Increase market power 1 2 3 4 5 
g. Gain efficiency through synergies 1 2 3 4 5 
h. Gain strategic assets 1 2 3 4 5 
I. Gain new capabilities 1 2 3 4 5 
j. Obtain economies of large scale production 1 2 3 4 5 
k. Obtain non-manufacturing scale economies 2 3 4 5 
I. Enable product diversification 1 2 3 4 5 
m. Acquire complementary resources 1 2 3 4 5 
n. Redeploy assets to the acquisition 1 2 3 4 5 
o. Tax reasons (savings) 1 2 3 4 5 
p. Replace inefficient management 2 3 4 5 
q. Elimination or reduction of competition 2 3 4 5 
r. Turn around failing acquired firm 2 3 4 5 
s. Cost reduction 2 3 4 5 
t. To reduce risk of the business 1 2 3 4 5 
u. Other (Please specify) .............................. 2 3 4 5 
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D. PRE - ACQUISITION PHASE 
1. Please Indicate the extent to which your company evaluated the following factors relating to 
the acquired firm. Please circle your answer. 
Very little Thorough 
evaluation evaluation 
a) The strategic relatedness between your company and the 1 2 3 4 5 
acquired firm 
b) The degree of cultural relatedness between your company and 2 3 4 5 
the acquired firm 
c) The acquired firm's market position 2 3 4 5 
d) The acquired firm's technological competence 2 3 4 5 
e) The acquired firm's business competence 2 3 4 5 
f) The acquired firm's management capability 2 3 4 5 
g) The capability of the acquired firm's workforce 2 3 4 5 
h) The effectiveness of the acquired firm's HRM policies 2 3 4 5 
i) The degree of the acquired firm's cash flow generating capability 2 3 4 5 
j) The acquired firm's fixed asset value 2 3 4 5 
k) The future financing needs of the acquired firm 2 3 4 5 
I) The future investment needs of the acquired firm 2 3 4 5 
m) The extent of the debt of the acquired firm 2 3 4 5 
n) The future interest payments of the acquired firm 2 3 4 5 
0) The degree of compatibility of the IT systems of both firms 2 3 4 5 
p) The differences in the legal system between the UK and the 2 3 4 5 
acquired firm's home nation 
q) The differences in the tax system between the UK and the 2 3 4 5 
acquired firm's home nation 
1. Please Indicate how different the acquired firm was to your firm, In the following areas, before 
the acquisition. Please circle your answer. 
Very similar Very different 
a) General management styles 1 2 3 4 5 
b) Values, beliefs and philosophies 1 2 3 4 5 
c) Reward and evaluation systems 1 2 3 4 5 
d) Types of distribution channels 1 2 3 4 5 
e) Culture of home countries 1 2 3 4 5 
f) Types of customers 1 2 3 4 5 
g) Major products/services offered 1 2 3 4 5 
h} Production and operations technologies 1 2 3 4 5 
I} Approach to risk taking 1 2 3 4 5 
j) Geographic markets served 2 3 4 5 
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2. In your view how Important are the following factors In leading to a successful acquisition 
deal. Please circle your answer. 
No Very 
Importance Important 
a) Determining the appropriate price to be paid for the acquired firm 2 3 4 5 
b) Accurately forecasting the acquired firm's cash flows 1 2 3 4 5 
c) Identifying anticipated synergies between two firms 1 2 3 4 5 
d) Avoiding hostile takeover 1 2 3 4 5 
e) Deciding appropriate method of payment (e.g., cash or stock) 1 2 3 4 5 
f) Conducting effective due diligence 1 2 3 4 5 
g) Negotiating effectively with the acquired firm 1 2 3 4 5 
h) Obtaining advice from external advisors (e.g., investment bank) 1 2 3 4 5 
i) Anticipating reaction of the major shareholders of the acquired firm1 2 3 4 5 
j) Broad involvement throughout of the acquired firm's personnel 1 2 3 4 5 
in the negotiation of the acquisition 
4. Please Indicate the extent to which you experienced the following problems In the pre-
acquisition phase? Please circle your answer. 
No Major 
problem Problem 
a) Identifying acceptable firm 1 2 3 4 5 
b) Collecting information about the acquired firm 2 3 4 5 
c) Ensuring reliability of the information collected 2 3 4 5 
d) Effectively structuring a deal 2 3 4 5 
e) Assembling teams to conduct the acquisition process 2 3 4 5 
f) Understanding different cultures 1 2 3 4 5 
g) Understanding different management styles 1 2 3 4 5 
h) Understanding acquired firm's legal systems 1 2 3 4 5 
i) Understanding acquired firm's tax systems 1 2 3 4 5 
j) Understanding local environmental regulations 2 3 4 5 
k) Understanding currency control regulations 1 2 3 4 5 
I) Dealing with a different accounting systems 1 2 3 4 5 
m) Negotiating employment contracts 1 2 3 4 5 
n) Overcoming language barriers 1 2 3 4 5 
0) Communicating with the acquired firm 1 2 3 4 5 
p) Negotiating with the acquired firm 1 2 3 4 5 
q) Multiple motives for acquisition leading to difficulty 1 2 3 4 5 
r) Increased personal pressure to conclude the deal 1 2 3 4 5 
s) Maintaining the confidentiality of the negotiation 2 3 4 5 
t) Others (please specify) ................................... 1 2 3 4 5 
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5. At the time of the acquisition, please Indicate how Important It was for your firm to retain employees 
of the acquired firm In the following categories? Please circle your answer. 
a) Top management 
b) Middle management 
c) Research and development 
d) Manufacturing and operations 
e) Marketing, sales and distribution 
f) Finance, legal and other staff 
E. THE POST - ACgUISITION PHASE 
Not 
Important 
1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
Extremely 
Important 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
1. What was the extent of your firm's acquisition experience at the time of this acquisition? 
No experience Great experience 
2 3 4 5 
2. To what extent had the prior top management team of the acquired firm (board level and one-
below board level) changed one year after the acquisition? Please circle the appropriate number. 
Little or no 
Change 
2 
Moderate 
Turnover 
3 4 
Complete 
Turnover 
5 
3. Please Indicate the extent to which the following Incentives were offered to encourage 
employees of the acquired firm to stay with the company. Please circle your answer. 
No extent Great extent 
a) Short-run incentives ( e.g. a large bonus payable 1 
after the expiration of a certain period of time) 
2 3 4 5 
b) Long-tenn contracts 1 2 3 4 5 
c) Stock options 2 3 4 5 
d) Perfonnance bonuses 2 3 4 5 
4. Please Indicate the extent to which you agree with the following statements? Please circle your 
answer. 
Strongly Strongly 
Disagree agree 
a) Your finn was visibly committed to making the 1 2 3 4 5 
acquisition a success 
b) Your finn provided support for continued training and 1 2 3 4 5 
development of the acquired finn's employees 
c) Your finn provided support for travel and liaison between 2 3 4 5 
the two finn 
d) Your finn provided positive internal and external messages 1 2 3 4 5 emphasizing the importance of the skills and capabilities of 
the acquired finn 
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5. Pleases Indicate how frequentlv the acquiring company used the following communication 
methods and style In dealing with the managers of the acquired company during the Integration 
process. Please circle your answer. 
Hardly ever Very frequently 
a) Use of first name 2 3 4 5 
b) Holding regular meeting at all levels 2 3 4 5 
c) Written memos 2 3 4 5 
d) Longer more detailed reports or studies 2 3 4 5 
e) E-mail messages 2 3 4 5 
f) Phone conversations 2 3 4 5 
g) Socialize outside work 2 3 4 5 
h) Establishing notice board to present mission and 1 2 3 4 5 
vision statement 
6. Please Indicate the degree of centralization or decentralization of strategic decision making In 
the acquired firm following acquisition. Please circle your answer. 
Centralized Decentralized 
1 2 3 4 5 
7. Please Indicate the degree of centralization or decentralization of operational decision making 
In the acquired firm following acquisition. Please circle your answer. 
Centralized Decentralized 
1 2 3 4 5 
S. Are any of the following positions (or their equivalent) held by people from your company In 
the acquired firm (Le. appointed by the acquiring company from among acquiring company staff .Q!: 
from new staff appointed by the acquiring company)? Please tick. 
Yes No 
1. CEO [ ) ) 
2. Finance director [ ) ] 
3. Operations director [ ] ] 
4. Sales and marketing director [ ] ) 
5. R&D director [ ] 
6. HRM [ ] 
7. Other reporting directly to the CEO 
(Please specify) ........................... [ 
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9. Transfer of skills: For each of the activities given below please Indicate the extent to which 
benefits based on transferring skills have been: 
a. Actively sought since the time of acquisition (by circling to the appropriate number on the left hand 
scale) 
b. Actually achieved as of now (by circling the appropriate number on the right hand scale) 
(The direction of skills transfer may be either from your company to the acquired firm or vice-versa) 
ACTIVELY SOUGHT ACTUAllY ACHIEVED 
No Some Significant No Some Significant 
Skills Skills Skills Skills Skills Skills 
Transfer Transfer Transfer Functional Areas Transfer Transfer Transfer 
2 3 4 5 Research and Development 1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 Product and Service design 1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
Purchasing I Supplier 
1 2 3 4 5 
relation 
2 3 4 5 
Service I Manufacturing 
operations 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 Marketing and Sales 1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 Distribution I Outlets 1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 Customer Service 1 2 3 4 5 
Administrative Areas 
2 3 4 5 Strategic Planning 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 Financial Reporting 1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 Investment Appraisal 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 Personnel I HRM 1 2 3 4 5 
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10. Decision making process: Please Indicate whether the following decisions relating to !ill! 
acquired firm are !!2.W made by the current top management of your company, by the acquired 
firm or jointly (I.e. by the two firms). Please circle your answer, if not applicable please circle N/A 
(Note: where the acquired firm is no longer recognisable as a separate entity, please Indicate 'your company' as 
now making the decision.) 
Type of Decisions Decisions made by top management of 
Product I Market decisions In the acquired firm Your Acquired Jointly 
company firm 
a) Introducing a new product line/service N/A 1 2 3 
b) Discontinuing an existing product line/service N/A 1 2 3 
c) Expanding into new geographic markets N/A 1 2 3 
d) Deciding brand names N/A 2 3 
e) Change in distribution channels I Outlet sites N/A 1 2 3 
f) Investing in major assets to expand capacity for existing N/A 1 2 3 
product/services 
g) Determining Research and Development content N/A 2 3 
h) Determining Research and Development budget N/A 2 3 
Operating Decisions In the acquired firm 
i) Purchasing important raw materials/services NlA 1 2 3 
j) Changing the selling price on a major product or service N/A 2 3 
k) Changing selling and marketing techniques N/A 1 2 3 
I) Changing level of expenditure for advertising and promotion N/A 1 2 3 
Personnel I Administrative decisions In the acquired firm 
m) Hiring, promoting, firing high level managers (Board/one-below N/A 1 2 3 
board) 
n) Hiring, promoting, firing lower level mangers N/A 2 3 
0) Changing salary and fringe benefit levels for salaried N/A 1 2 3 
personnel 
p) Determining and changing budget plans N/A 1 2 3 
q) Changes in high level reporting relationships I Organizational N/A 1 2 3 
structure (Board lone-below board level) 
r) Changes in lower level reporting relationships I N/A 1 2 3 
Organisational structure 
Overall On balance, taking everything Into account, Indicate your estimate of the decision-
making process for 
s) Operating decisions 1 2 3 
t) Strategic decisions 1 2 3 
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F. ACQUISITION PERFORMANCE 
1. Has the acquired firm been divested? Please tick. 
Yes Go to question 2 No Go to question 3 
2. What was the reason for divestment? Please tick al/ that apply. 
o Change of focus or corporate strategy 0 Acquired firm proved incompatible with the 
o Acquired firm proved unprofitable acquiring firm 
0 Acquired firm sold at a profit 
0 Acquired firm managed poorly 
0 To finance subsequent acquisition 
0 To eliminate internal conflict 
0 To provide a takeover defence 
0 
0 
'0 
Acquired firm once had synergy with acquirer 
firm but now no synergy 
To separate businesses that have different 
capital requirements 
To separate businesses that have different 
operating characteristics 
3. Who decides the acquired firm's key performance goals and competitive strategies? Please 
circle your answer. 
Your firm decides Acquired firm decides Jointly decided 
1 2 3 
4. For each of the following categories of performance, to what extent has the acquisition 
performance met Initial expectations. Please circle your answer. 
Expectation No Initial 
Not met Fully met expectation 
1. Profitability 1 2 3 4 5 6 
2. Sales growth 1 2 3 4 5 6 
3. Growth in market share 1 2 3 4 5 6 
4. Return on investment 1 2 3 4 5 6 
5. Return on Sales 1 2 3 4 5 6 
6. Asset Utilization 1 2 3 4 5 6 
7. Cash flow 2 3 4 5 6 
8. Earnings per share 1 2 3 4 5 6 
9. Share price 1 2 3 4 5 6 
5. Overall, how successful has the acquisition been for your company? Please circle your answer 
Not successful Very successful 
1 2 3 4 5 
G. OTHER COMMENTS 
If you have any other comments you wish to make about the management of acquired firms, or wish to 
explore any question in more detail, please do so below. 
H.SURVEYFEEDBACK 
We will be pleased to send you a summary of the results from this survey. If you would like to receive a 
summary please provide your details below. 
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APPENDIXC 
Factor analysis of the pre-acquisition evaluation items 
Factor Eigenvalue % Variance Cumulative Cronbach's loads explained percent alpha 
Factor 1: Investment and financial Issues 3.35 23.90 23.90 0.85 
The future investment needs of the acquired firm 0.84 
The extent of the debt of the acquired firm 0.73 
The future interest payments of the acquired firm 0.72 
The degree ofthe acquired firm's cash flow generating 0.72 
capability 
The future financing needs of the acquired firm 0.72 
Factor 2: Employee and Business capability 3.16 22.57 46.48 0.83 
The acquired firm's business competence 0.83 
The acquired firm's management capability 0.83 
The capability of the acquired firm's workforce 0.78 
The effectiveness of the acquired firm's HRM policies 0.72 
Factor 3: Legal, Tax & IT compatibility 2.07 14.77 61.26 0.72 
The differences in the legal system between the UK and 0.85 the acquired firm's home nation 
The differences in the tax system between the UK and 0.78 the acquired firm's home nation 
The degree of compatibility of the IT systems of both 0.57 firms 
Factor 4: Strategic and organizational fit 1.43 10.21 71.47 0.64 
The strategic relatedness between your company and 0.81 the acquired firm 
The degree of cultural relatedness between your 0.67 
company and the acquired firm 
Notes: Principal component factor analysis with varimax rotation. K-M-O Measure of sampling adequacy = 
0.727 Bartlett's test of Sphericity = 475.990, p< 0.000. 
Factor 1: Investment and financing issues. This factor had high positive factor loadings on the following 
five pre-acquisition aspects: the future investment needs of the acquired firm, the extent of the debt of the 
acquired firm, the future interest payments of the acquired firm, the degree of the acquired firm's cash 
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flow generating capability and the future financing needs of the acquired firm. The first factor can be 
interpreted as a thorough evaluation of investment and financing issues. 
Factor 2: Employee and business capability. The second factor had high positive loadings on the 
following four pre-acquisition aspects: the acquired firm's business competence, the acquired firm's 
management capability, the capability of the acquired firm's workforce and, the effectiveness of the 
acquired firm's HRM policies. This factor can be interpreted as a thorough evaluation of the employee 
and business capability. 
Factor 3: Legal, Tax and IT compatibility. This factor had high positive factor loadings on three pre-
acquisition aspects: the differences in the legal system between the UK and the acquired firm's home 
nation, the differences in the tax system between the UK and the acquired firm's home nation and, the 
degree of compatibility of the IT systems of both firms. This factor, therefore, is interpreted as a thorough 
evaluation of the legal, tax and IT compatibility. 
Factor 4: Strategic and organizational fit. This factor had high positive factor loadings on two pre-
acquisition aspects: The strategic relatedness between the acquiring company and the acquired firm and, 
the degree of cultural relatedness between the acquiring company and the acquired firm. This factor is 
interpreted as a thorough evaluation of the strategic and organizational fit. 
Factor analysis of understanding pre-acquisition problems 
Factor 1: Tax, accounting, legal and regulatory issues. The first factor had high positive loadings on the 
following five pre-acquisition problems: understanding acquired firm's tax systems, understanding local 
environmental regulations, understanding acquired firm's legal systems, dealing with different accounting 
systems, understanding currency control regulations. This first factor was, therefore, interpreted to be a 
problem related to understanding tax, accounting, legal and regulatory issues. 
Factor 2: National and corporate cultural issues. This factor had high positive loadings on two pre-
acquisition problems: understanding different cultures and understanding different management styles. It 
was interpreted that this second factor reflects problems with understanding national and corporate 
cultural issues. 
Factor 3: Negotiation issues. The third factor had high positive loadings on three pre-acquisition 
problems: negotiating with the acquired firm, multiple motives for acquisition leading to difficulty in 
negotiation and negotiating employment contracts of acquired firm's employees. This factor can be 
interpreted as a problem connected with understanding negotiation issues. 
Factor 4: Communication issues. This factor had high positive loadings on the following three pre-
acquisition problems: communicating with the acquired firm, identifying acceptable firm, overcoming 
language barriers. This factor may be interpreted as a problem related with understanding communication 
issues. 
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Factor 5: Deal structuring issues. The last factor had high positive loadings on the following three pre-
acquisition problems: effectively structuring a deal, ensuring reliability of the information collected, 
assembling teams to conduct the acquisition process. This factor may be interpreted as a problem 
connected with understanding deal structuring issues. 
Factor analysis of understapding pre-acquisition problems 
Factor . % Variance Cumulative Cronbach's 
EIgenvalue 
alpha loads explained percent 
Factor 1: Tax, accounting, legal and regulatory issues 3.46 21.66 21.66 0.87 
Understanding acquired firm's tax systems 0.89 
Understanding local environmental regulations 0.86 
Understanding acquired firm's legal systems 0.84 
Dealing with a different accounting systems 0.70 
Understanding currency control regulations 0.60 
Factor 2: National and corporate cultural issues 2.00 12.51 34.18 0.74 
Understanding different cultures 0.86 
Understanding different management styles 0.75 
Factor 3: Negotiation issues 1.92 12.05 46.24 0.67 
Negotiating with the acquired firm 0.80 
Multiple motives for acquisition leading to difficulty in 0.78 
negotiation 
Negotiating employment contracts of acquired firm's 0.57 
employees 
Factor 4: Communication issues 1.92 12.00 58.24 0.62 
I 
Communicating with the acquired firm 0.70 
Identifying acceptable firm 0.69 
Overcoming language barriers 0.69 
Factor 5: Deal structuring issues 1.84 11.52 69.77 0.69 
Effectively structuring a deal 0.86 
Ensuring reliability of the information collected 0.71 
Assembling teams to conduct the acquisition process 0.55 
Notes: Principal component factor analysis with varimax rotation. K-M-O Measure of sampling adequacy 
= 0.710 Bartlett's test of Sphericity = 447.329,p< 0.000. 
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APPENDIXD 
Factor analysis of measures of performance 
Performance measures Factor Eigenvalue % Variance Cumulative Cronbach's loads explained percent 
Factor 1: Market Share and Sales growth 2.36 26.29 26.29 
Sales growth 0.87 
Return on Sales 0.75 
Growth in market share 0.71 
Cash flow 0.51 
Factor 2: EPS and Share Price 2.23 24.84 51.13 
Share price 0.88 
Earnings per share 0.86 
Asset Utilization 0.65 
Factor 3: Profitability 2.08 23.13 74.26 
Profitability 0.90 
Return on investment 0.88 
Notes: Principal component factor analysis with varimax rotation. K-M-O Measure of sampling 
adequacy = 0.774 Bartlett's test of Sphericity = 292.436, p< 0.000. 
alpha 
0.81 
0.81 
0.89 
Factor 1: Market share and sales growth. The first factor had high positive factor loadings on the four 
measures of performance: sales growth, return on sales, growth in market share and, cash flow. This 
factor can be interpreted as a performance measures related to market share and sales growth. 
Factor 2: Earning per share (EPS) and Share price. This factor had high positive factor loadings on the 
three measures of performance: share price, earning per share and, asset utilization. This factor may be 
interpreted as a performance measures associated with EPS and share price. 
Factor 3: Profitability. The third factor had high positive factor loadings on the two measures of 
performance: profitability and return on investment. This factor, therefore, interpreted as a performance 
measures connected with profitability. 
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